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ABSTRACT
ANTHONY M. DIERCKS: Asset Prices and Macroeconomic Policy.
(Under the direction of Patrick Conway and M. Max Croce)
My dissertation work focuses on the relationship between asset pricing and macroeconomic
policy. Asset prices play a fundamental role in the daily lives of most people as they face impor-
tant choices about saving in the form of cash, bank deposits, bonds, stocks, or even real estate.
Asset prices are connected to macroeconomic policy through monetary and fiscal policy’s impact
on interest rates together with taxation and government spending. The three projects within my
dissertation focus on the policy implications of macro models that are consistent with financial
market data and the channels through which policy impacts asset prices. Many previous studies
have sought to determine the optimal behavior of monetary policy while abstracting from asset
pricing considerations, and their predominant conclusion is that it is optimal for monetary policy
to concentrate mainly on stabilizing inflation. In the first chapter, my contribution is to show that
monetary policy puts more emphasis on stabilizing output compared to previous studies when the
model replicates key features of financial markets. In the second chapter, I investigate the channels
through which fiscal policy impacts financial markets using a news decomposition. I find that the
effects are highly dependent upon the stance of monetary policy, and this is rationalized with a
standard DSGE model. In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of monetary policy responding
to government debt, and find there exists a significant tradeoff between reducing inflation risk and
increasing taxation risk.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
My dissertation work focuses on the relationship between asset pricing and macroeconomic
policy. Asset prices play a fundamental role in the daily lives of most people as they face impor-
tant choices about saving in the form of cash, bank deposits, bonds, stocks, or even real estate.
Asset prices are connected to macroeconomic policy through monetary and fiscal policy’s impact
on interest rates together with taxation and government spending. The three projects within my
dissertation focus on the policy implications of macro models that are consistent with financial
market data and the channels through which policy impacts asset prices.
In my first chapter, “Asset Pricing and the Welfare Effects of Monetary Policy,” I construct
a novel asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian model to evaluate the welfare effects of monetary
policy. To match asset pricing facts, I incorporate recursive preferences and long-run risk in pro-
ductivity. When combined, I find these characteristics lead to policy recommendations that place
significantly greater weight on output and less weight on inflation compared to the existing liter-
ature. Greater weight is placed on stabilizing output because the welfare costs of recessions are
much higher upon matching the equity premium. At the same time, a low risk-free rate suggests
that agents are very patient and forward looking, implying that monetary policy can more effec-
tively and persistently reduce the average markup with higher inflation volatility. The difference
in welfare between the implementation of complete inflation stabilization (as is often suggested in
prior literature) versus the optimal policy in the asset pricing framework is over $3,000 for each
individual.
In work with William Waller, “Taxes, Spending, and Market Returns,” we study fiscal policy’s
effects on financial markets by decomposing changes in current equity and bond returns into news
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about cash flows and news about discount rates. Our main empirical findings suggest that fiscal
policy’s effects are highly dependent upon the stance of monetary policy. For the Post-1980 era,
tax increases lead to lower cash flow news and lower discount rates. However, the discount rate
news dominates so that higher taxes are associated with higher equity returns. In contrast, for the
Pre-1980 era, we find the effects on cash flows and discount rates flip signs so that higher taxes
are associated with lower equity returns. The change in the relationship between taxes and equity
returns can be fully rationalized within the context of a standard New Keynesian DSGE model by
slightly altering just one parameter, the weight monetary policy places on output in the interest rate
reaction function.
In the third chapter, “Inflating Away Debt: Trading Off Inflation Risk and Taxation Risk,” I
evaluate the effects of monetary policy reacting to the debt-output ratio in a simple interest rate
rule using a model that prices risk consistent with the data. In contrast to my job market paper,
this paper focuses on the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy when taxes are distortionary.
In this setting, a Taylor rule in which the inflation target increases with the debt-output ratio (thus
inflating away debt) can improve welfare, but only at debt levels above 200%. At such high debt
levels, taxes are forced to adjust more to deal with greater interest payments, causing higher tax
and equity risk. By allowing for greater inflation in response to higher debt, monetary policy can
bring greater certainty to the tax rate and reduce consumption risk, which improves welfare.
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CHAPTER 2
ASSET PRICING AND THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF MONETARY POLICY
2.1 Introduction
As we continue to recover from the Great Recession, monetary policy makers are confronted
with the decision of when to start raising interest rates and by how much. Underlying these choices
is a concern about the trade-off between inflation and output. On one side there are “inflation
hawks” who suggest that the primary goal of monetary policy should be price stability, with over-
whelming concern for the stabilization of inflation—potentially at the expense of output. This
course of action has historically been followed by the European Central Bank. On the other side,
“inflation doves” suggest that monetary policy should place a greater emphasis on stabilizing out-
put to decrease the severity of recessions, potentially at the expense of increased inflation. This
more closely aligns with the approach of the Federal Reserve, which has a dual mandate to pro-
mote both maximum employment and stable prices. For policy makers, determining the proper
emphasis to place on inflation versus output is a high-stakes decision that impacts everyone in the
economy.
Existing studies of monetary policy predominantly find that stabilizing inflation is strongly
preferred to stabilizing output.1 However, these studies suffer from the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil
1989) and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985), and thus they ignore key char-
acteristics of financial data. The present study addresses this issue by incorporating financial data
while evaluating the welfare implications of simple monetary policy rules that are functions of
inflation and output. Specifically, I construct a model that is consistent with the historical risk-free
rate, the historical equity premium, and the presence of long-run risk in productivity. Each of these
1See Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2011) and Woodford (2010) for extensive overviews.
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features is important in capturing key aspects of the macroeconomy. The equity premium captures
the welfare costs of recessions; the risk-free rate dictates the extent to which households and firms
are patient and forward looking; and long-run productivity risk is crucial because of its major im-
pact on the pricing decisions of forward-looking firms. Taken together, these three characteristics
lead to policy recommendations that place significantly greater weight on output and less weight
on inflation than is the case in the existing literature.
To explain this result, I investigate the trade-offs among three sources of welfare losses in
the New Keynesian model: inflation volatility, output volatility, and the average markup. Output
volatility and the average markup have greater impact within my model relative to previous studies
because households and firms are assumed to have recursive preferences. Unlike constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, recursive preferences break the inverse relationship between
risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). This allows my model to repli-
cate both the high equity premium and low risk-free rate observed in financial data. High levels
of risk aversion combined with a high IES causes households to dislike recessions strongly while
being much more patient and forward looking.
The combination of greater patience with long-run productivity shocks dramatically alters the
influence of monetary policy on firms’ price setting and the average markup. The reduction in the
average markup, a key determinant of welfare, provides substantial welfare benefits. To understand
fully the mechanism that drives the importance of the markup, it is first necessary to recognize
that in the context of my fully specified nonlinear model, risk-adjusted measures are what matter
for pricing and consumer decisions. The likelihood of positive shocks is down-weighted, while
negative shocks receive greater weight; this creates an asymmetry that is present in any standard
macro model that does not linearize first-order conditions. This second-order-based asymmetry is
crucial for risk characterization, the determination of patience, and ultimately the determination of
optimal price setting.
This asymmetry also generates important implications for monetary policy when bad news for
4
long-run growth is realized. Specifically, negative long-run news shocks to productivity lead pa-
tient (i.e., very forward-looking) firms to choose substantially higher prices, which pushes inflation
persistently higher. Higher inflation in turn mechanically lowers relative prices set by firms in pre-
vious periods and erodes the real value of the average markup. The persistent reduction of the
average markup works like a hedge when the household receives negative long-run news shocks.
By allowing inflation to rise, monetary policy provides good long-run news thanks to the reduction
in the average markup.
Across a wide range of values for the coefficient on inflation in the monetary policy rule,
my model yields an interior solution of 3.0, where the benefits and costs to stabilizing inflation
perfectly balance each other. With higher values on the coefficient of inflation in the monetary
policy rule, inflation does not rise as much in response to a negative shock, which implies a smaller
reduction in the markup. As a result of this smaller reduction, the steady-state markup rises with
the inflation coefficient, placing a greater implicit tax on labor and capital as monetary policy
increasingly stabilizes inflation. At values greater than 3.0 for the inflation coefficient, I find that
the costs of the higher markup outweigh the benefits associated with lower inflation volatility.
This result stands in contrast to the conclusions of a number of previous studies, which suggest
that the reduction of inflation volatility should be the primary focus of monetary policy. I replicate
this finding in my model with CRRA utility, in which the optimal weight placed on fluctuations
of inflation in the monetary policy rule is set to infinity. Results show that the markup channel
is insignificant in the standard (second-order CRRA) setting because its movements are not as
asymmetric and persistent as in the recursive preferences setting. In the CRRA utility setting,
both the representative agent and firms are relatively impatient, and monetary policy is unable to
influence persistently the price setting and average markup. Furthermore, not as much weight is
placed on negative shocks in the stochastic discount factor, which reduces the asymmetry compared
to the setting with recursive preferences.
Another justification for the low value of the inflation coefficient is the trade-off between real
and nominal uncertainty. In my model, monetary policy can lower nominal uncertainty by placing
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a greater weight on inflation fluctuations, but this comes at the expense of the greater volatility of
real variables such as output. This makes intuitive sense, because greater stabilization of inflation
is achieved only through greater changes in real interest rates. The higher IES by definition makes
households more willing to substitute consumption intertemporally due to changes in the real in-
terest rates, which implies that monetary policy is more effective in altering real quantities. This
channel is also present in a standard model but is much smaller (due to the restricted, lower IES)
and is dominated in terms of welfare by the price dispersion channel. Holding all else constant,
higher output and consumption volatility reduce welfare. Thus, this channel also contributes to the
finding of an interior solution of 3.0 for the coefficient on inflation.
In addition to the lower value for the coefficient on inflation, my proposed model also yields
a high value on the coefficient for output. Unlike most previous studies, I focus on output growth
rather than the typical output gap (the deviation between the actual level and the flexible-price
output level). I include output growth because it is easier to observe in real time and does not
require policy makers to make decisions based on the unobservable flexible-price level of output.
As pointed out in Sims (2013), focusing on output growth allows monetary policy to respond to
recessions while also anchoring inflation expectations. These expectations are better anchored
because monetary policy is implicitly promising to raise rates as the economy recovers and growth
rates rise. Anchoring inflation expectations is imperative because current inflation depends on
expectations of future inflation, and in the proposed model, firms are very patient and forward
looking.
Placing a higher weight on the output growth benefits welfare because it reduces fluctuations in
consumption. Moreover, it also pushes up inflation during negative long-run productivity shocks,
which effectively lowers the markup. Matching the high equity premium in the data implies that
households strongly dislike the recessions associated with output fluctuations, so that the costs and
benefits equal at a coefficient value of 1.5 for output growth in the interest rate rule. This weight
is three times greater than the optimal weight on the output growth of Sims (2013), who does not
include long-run productivity shocks and instead uses habits in a comparable framework. Results
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from my model with CRRA utility show that zero weight should be placed on the output growth;
this is because the welfare costs of recessions are significantly lower and the costs coming from
inflation volatility dominate.
2.1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the sizable literature on monetary policy as well as a growing body
of work on production-based asset pricing. A benchmark result in the monetary policy literature is
that attention should be completely focused on inflation stabilization (Goodfriend and King 1997;
Rotemberg and Woodford 1997; Woodford 2001; King and Wolman 1999; Benigno and Wood-
ford 2005; Khan, King, and Wolman 2003; Siu 2004a; Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe 2007; Kollmann
2008).2 However, my asset pricing–driven approach suggests that strict inflation stabilization may
be suboptimal. In contrast to Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000); Giannoni and Woodford (2004);
and Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2005), my results do not hinge on wage stickiness.
To isolate the welfare effects of asset pricing data better, I do not include sticky wages or
pure cost-push shocks. Rather, I simply use a second-order approximation around a distorted
steady state and assume Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences for households. I resolve both the
equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985) and the risk-free rate puzzle (Weil 1989) by
introducing productivity long-run risk, in the spirit of Croce (2014a) and more broadly of Bansal
and Yaron (2004). This setting has not been explored to date in the monetary policy literature.
Long-run risk is a key driver of my qualitative results. Croce (2014a), Beaudry and Portier
(2004), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2012), Kurmann and Otrok (2010), and Barsky and Sims (2011)
have all found evidence of long-run news shocks to productivity, which explain a large fraction of
business cycle fluctuations. Endogenous growth models have also been used to generate long-run
consumption risk, as in Kung and Schmid (2011). The connection between endogenous growth,
monetary policy and the term structure of interest rates has also been explored by Kung (2014).
2For instance, the Ramsey solution for Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) yields an optimal inflation volatility of
0.01%. Moreover, in a similar study Kollmann (2008) finds the optimal value on the inflation coefficient in the interest
rate rule is 8,660.
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None of these studies has explored the welfare implications of long-run news for the trade-off
between inflation and output stabilization.
To be clear, my study is not the first to incorporate recursive preferences when evaluating the
welfare effects of monetary policy. Levin, David Lo´pez-Salido, Nelson, and Yun (2008) use a very
stylized, one-shock New Keynesian model with no capital in order to study the linearized Ramsey
planner problem. They find that the planner is more risk averse and permits fewer fluctuations
in output with more volatile inflation. In contrast to my study, there is no long-run risk and no
quantification of optimal inflation volatility or the optimal coefficients on an interest rate rule.
An (2010) shows how to use perturbation methods to solve models with recursive preferences
and simple monetary policy rules. Long-run risk is not incorporated, and his optimal policy coeffi-
cients and inflation volatility are low and almost identical to those in the setting of Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007) with CRRA preferences.
Darracq Paries and Loublier (2010) come closest to my study by moving beyond a highly
stylized setting to look at the effects of recursive preferences. Their study differs from mine in
a number of ways: (1) habits are incorporated, (2) the IES is less than one, (3) wages are rigid,
and (4) there is no growth and no long-run risk. They find that the optimal inflation volatility
is less than 0.05 percent after including Epstein-Zin preferences. Finally, Benigno and Paciello
(2014) incorporate doubts and ambiguity aversion and find that as doubts rise, monetary policy
finds it optimal to further deviate from strict inflation targeting. However, while they target a high
equity premium, they do not match the low risk-free rate. None of the studies that incorporate
recursive preference when evaluating the effects of monetary policy includes long-run risk shocks
or attempts to match both the equity premium and the risk-free rate.
Certain studies, such as Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2009), do look at the effects of monetary
policy with permanent changes in the growth rate of productivity. However, they use log utility
and do not match financial data. In their model, the central bank’s optimal policy is to fully stabilize
the inflation rate at its steady state in order to completely eliminate the sticky price distortion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the model and empirical
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motivation. Section 2.3 shows the optimal interest rate rules and explains the welfare channels
driving the results. Section 2.4 explores the underlying dynamics of the welfare channels and
Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model and Empirical Motivation
In the discussion below I focus on two key differences of my model with respect to existing
monetary policy analysis: the preferences and the productivity process.3 The economy consists of
a continuum of identical households, a continuum of intermediate-goods firms, and a government
that conducts monetary and fiscal policy. The structure of the model is a standard neoclassical
growth model augmented with real and nominal frictions. The nominal friction is sticky prices.
The real friction is monopolistic competition, which results in a markup of price over marginal
costs. Monetary policy assumes full commitment to an interest rate rule that is a function of
inflation, output growth, and the previous period’s interest rate. Fiscal policy raises lump-sum
taxes to pay for exogenous expenditures.
Preferences. The households have Epstein-Zin preferences defined over consumption goods, ct,
and leisure, 1−ht. These preferences exhibit a CES aggregate of current and future utility certainty
equivalent weighted by (1-β) and β, respectively.
vt =
{
(1− β)(cιt(1− ht)1−ι)1−
1
ψ + β(Et[v
1−γ
t+1 ])
1− 1
ψ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
ψ
s.t.
bt + ct + it + τt = Rt−1
bt−1
pit
+ wtht + utkt + φˇt
The real value of debt is bt; ct is consumption; it is investment; Rt−1 is the risk-free rate; pit is the
inflation rate Pt
Pt−1
; τt is the lump-sum tax; wt is the real wage; ht is labor hours; ut is the rental rate
of capital; kt is capital; and φˇt is profits.
3The full model is described in appendix A.1.
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Unlike CRRA preferences, Epstein-Zin preferences allow for the disentanglement of γ, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ψ, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When 1
ψ
=
γ, the utility collapses to CRRA preferences, with additively separable expected utility both in
time and state. When γ > 1
ψ
, the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty, so the agent dislikes
shocks to long-run expected growth rates.
Stochastic Discount Factor. The stochastic discount factor (SDF) represents the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution for consumption. It is the major focal point in the forward-looking
New Keynesian model, as it translates the value of future income/profits to the present. Given the
fact that monetary policy relies on long-term expectations to influence the economy, the functional
form is very relevant for all of the household’s and firm’s intertemporal maximization decisions:
Mt,t+1 = β
(
ct+1
ct
)ι(1− 1
ψ
)−1(
1− ht+1
1− ht
)(1−ι)(1− 1
ψ
)
Pt
Pt+1
[
vt+1
Et[v
1−γ
t+1 ]
1
1−γ
] 1
ψ
−γ
(2.1)
The last part of equation 2.1 is unique to recursive preferences. This factor captures news
regarding the continuation value of the representative agent. Future utility, as represented by the
continuation value, is very sensitive to long-run news and this allows for greater variation of the
stochastic discount factor without the need for excessive levels of risk aversion. Compared to
CRRA preferences, the last factor implies a significantly higher weight on negative outcomes as
marginal utility rises. This results in endogenous asymmetric responses to shocks because agents
are more concerned with negative long-run news.
Productivity. The law of motion of the productivity process captures both short-run and long-run
productivity risks:
log
At+1
At
≡ ∆at+1 = µ+ xt + σaεa,t+1,
xt+1 = ρxt + σxεx,t+1, εa,t+1
εx,t+1
 ∼ i.i.d.N

 0
0
 ,
 1 0
0 1

 , t = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
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According to the above specification, short-run productivity shocks, εa,t+1, affect contemporane-
ous output directly, but they have no effect on future productivity growth. Shocks to long-run
productivity, represented by εx,t+1, carry news about future productivity growth rates but do not
affect current output.
2.2.1 Welfare Analysis: Three Major Channels
In this section I describe the three key sources of welfare losses in the New Keynesian model:
inflation volatility, the average markup, and output volatility. In short, inflation volatility causes
relative price dispersion and inefficient production; the average markup acts as an implicit tax on
factors of production; and output volatility reduces concave utility. The average markup and output
volatility will have a greater impact within my model relative to previous studies. The reasons for
this will be discussed in the following section.
2.2.1.1 Inflation Volatility: Price Dispersion
From a welfare perspective, price dispersion is a crucial characteristic of the Calvo-based time-
dependent sticky price models. Each period, a fraction α ∈ [0, 1] of randomly picked firms is not
allowed to optimally set the nominal price of the good they produce. The remaining 1 − α firms
choose Pi,t to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits.
Price dispersion arises when a subset of firms finds it optimal to choose a different price relative
to the remaining firms who are unable to update. Differences in pricing across firms are important
because it is assumed that monopolistically competitive firms choose a price and agree to supply
the quantity demanded. The quantity demanded for each firm (Yi,t) follows a downward-sloping
demand schedule based on the firm’s price (Pi,t) and the elasticity of substitution across goods, η:
Yi,t =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−η
Yt
Given that supply must equal demand at the firm level,
Kθi,t(AtNi,t)
1−θ =
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−η
Yt
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One can then aggregate across all firms to arrive at
Kθt (AtNt)
1−θ =
∫ 1
0
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−η
di · Yt.
Defining the resource cost of price dispersion as st =
∫ 1
0
(
Pi,t
Pt
)−η
di, one can see that its effect is
similar to a negative aggregate productivity shock, as it increases the amount of labor and capital
required to produce a given level of output.
1
st
Kθt (AtNt)
1−θ = Yt
This happens because firms with relatively low prices produce an inefficiently high quantity to
meet relatively high demand, while the opposite occurs for the high-price firms. As shown by
Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), st ≥ 1, and st is equal to one when there is no price dispersion.
Furthermore, price dispersion can be recursively decomposed into the following equation:
st = (1− α)(p∗t )−η + αpiηt st−1 (2.2)
where p∗t =
P ∗t
Pt
represents the relative price of the optimizing firm at time t. Price dispersion is an
increasing function of α, the probability that firms are unable to update their prices; η, the elasticity
of substitution across goods; and pi, the steady-state rate of inflation.4
The main driver of price dispersion within the model is inflation volatility. Given the elasticity
of substitution (η ≥ 1), more volatile inflation will lead to higher price dispersion on average due
to the Jensens Inequality (piηt ) in equation 2.2. This effect is absent in a first-order approximation.
4If prices were flexible (α = 0), all firms would be able re-optimize every period, and there would be no price
dispersion (s = 1). A higher elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods moves the economy closer to perfect
competition (where η = ∞). This results in greater costs of price dispersion because households are more willing
to switch from the high-price good to the low-price good, causing aggregate production to become more inefficient
because the low-price firm must meet the higher demand. Lastly, price dispersion increases with steady-state inflation
because firms that are resetting their prices optimally choose a higher price than the existing price level.
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Price Dispersion and the Stochastic Discount Factor. The stochastic discount factor affects
price dispersion through the relative price of the optimizing firm. The forward-looking firm
chooses a price to maximize expected profits while knowing that its price may become stuck for
multiple periods. The price is a markup over a ratio of the present discounted value of future
marginal costs and the present discounted value of future marginal revenues:
p∗t =
η
η − 1
Et
∑∞
j=0 α
jMt,t+jpi
η
t,t+jyt+jmct+j
Et
∑∞
j=0 α
jMt,t+jpi
η−1
t,t+jyt+j
(2.3)
where η
η−1 is the nonstochastic steady-state markup, α is the probability of not being able to update
next quarter, Mt,t+j is the nominal stochastic discount factor between t and t+j, and mct+j is the
marginal costs.
The stochastic discount factor is an important component of equation 2.3, the pricing equilib-
rium condition. The use of financial data to discipline the dynamics of the pricing equilibrium
condition can have a significant impact on the predictions of the model. Specifically, matching
the low risk-free rate in the data makes the firms more patient and forward looking, placing more
weight on future economic conditions as compared to the present. This is especially important in
a world with highly persistent shocks, such as the long-run risk shocks to productivity. Although
these shocks are quantitatively small, their persistence combined with the inability of firms to up-
date each period tends to magnify firms’ pricing decisions. Firms also use expected inflation rates
to discount future marginal costs and marginal revenues, because inflation erodes the markup over
time. Higher expected inflation places greater weight on future marginal costs, which again is
important in a setting with small but highly persistent productivity shocks. The greater weight on
future marginal costs (versus future marginal revenues) can be seen by the different exponents on
expected inflation (η vs. η − 1) in the numerator and denominator.
2.2.1.2 The Markup: Implicit Tax
Monopolistic competition allows firms to charge a price that is higher than their marginal costs.
The difference between the price and the marginal costs is known as the average markup. From
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a welfare perspective, the average markup is very important because it acts as a wedge between
factor prices and marginal products, which causes inefficiently low levels of labor, capital, and
output. Hence, the average markup is akin to an implicit tax on capital and labor.
The implicit tax can be seen in the firm’s demand for labor and capital:
MPLt = µtwt MPKt = µtut
where µt is the markup. Higher markups imply lower real wages and rental rates of capital, and
this affects both labor and capital supply. For example, combining the labor supply equation with
labor demand yields
1− ι
ι
ct
1− ht = wt =
MPLt
µt
where ι is the share of consumption in the consumption-leisure bundle. This shows that a higher
markup reduces the amount of labor supplied. Moreover, given that the slope of the labor supply
is both positive and increasing, increases in the markup result in greater and greater decreases in
the quantity of labor supplied. This fact is important in explaining the reasons that the costs of
higher markups dominate the benefits of reduced price dispersion as monetary policy increasingly
stabilizes inflation.
Markup decomposition. As outlined in King and Wolman (1996), the average markup of price
over marginal cost can be decomposed into two components:
µt =
(
Pt
P ∗t
)(
P ∗t
MCt
)
where
(
Pt
P ∗t
)
is defined as the price adjustment gap and
(
P ∗t
MCt
)
is defined as the marginal markup.
The price adjustment gap is just the inverse of the relative price of the optimizing firm at time t and
the marginal markup is the ratio of price to marginal cost for firms allowed to adjust their price in
period t.
If inflation increases, it must be that P ∗t is greater than Pt, and the price adjustment gap falls.
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The price adjustment gap captures the notion that higher inflation automatically decreases relative
prices set by firms in previous periods and decreases the real value of the average markup. King
and Wolman (1996) find that if the average markup only consisted of the price adjustment gap, an
increase in inflation from 5 to 10 percent would raise output permanently by 7 percent.
Marginal markup. The marginal markup captures the markup that re-optimizing firms are able
to charge. This can be shown to depend positively on expected future inflation as firms choose a
higher price when they are allowed to update their prices. Firms will choose a higher price because
they are concerned that they will get “stuck” (i.e., be unable to re-optimize) and that inflation
will erode their relative price. Erosion of a firm’s relative price causes households to substitute
toward their good as it becomes relatively less expensive, and this can be problematic as the firm
is required to meet demand by securing more labor at higher costs. Inflation will also erode the
real value of any markup established at time t, so that per-unit profits will decline for as long as
the firm is stuck.
Ascari and Sbordone (2013) show that as trend inflation increases, the increase in the marginal
markup dominates so that the overall average markup also rises. As the average markup rises,
output declines along with welfare. This raises the question of which channel dominates in a
setting with zero trend inflation or a zero inflation target. In a comparison across different policy
rules, I find that the price adjustment gap channel dominates the marginal markup for negative
productivity shocks, so that the average markup falls as inflation volatility increases. This is not
surprising because under the benchmark calibration, most firms are unable to update their prices
each period.5
The Markup and the Stochastic Discount Factor. The stochastic discount factor significantly
impacts both the price adjustment gap and the marginal markup. Matching the low risk-free rate
in the data makes the firms more patient and forward looking, raising concerns about the erosion
5Under the benchmark calibration, 75% of the firms are unable to update in any given period, which is equivalent
to firms getting stuck on average for 12 months. This duration is in the middle of empirical estimates and will be
further discussed in the calibration section.
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of future markups. This suggests that more patient firms will choose higher marginal markups in
response to persistently higher expected inflation. At the same time, the price adjustment gap will
also decline as firms choose prices further away from the existing price level. Results show that
the price adjustment gap dominates in the benchmark model.6
2.2.1.3 The Output Gap: Consumption-Leisure Volatility
The output gap is defined as the deviation between the actual level of output and its natural
level (the level of output in the absence of nominal rigidities). In the typical New Keynesian setup,
a second-order approximation to household welfare gives rise to a loss function in the variances
of the output gap and inflation. The loss function is then used to evaluate various monetary pol-
icy rules. However, the reason the output gap enters the loss function is due to the simplifying
assumption that consumption is equal to output.
In my model, output of final goods and services goes toward not only consumption but also
investment and government expenditures. In addition, agents care not about consumption but
rather a consumption-leisure bundle. Therefore, I focus on the bundle rather than output when
evaluating the effects of policy on welfare. With regard to the welfare costs of recessions, the
magnitude is much greater in the asset pricing–oriented New Keynesian model, as indicated by the
higher equity premium. The higher welfare costs suggest that greater weight should be placed on
stabilizing output and the consumption-leisure bundle, in contrast to what is the case in existing
studies that do not match the equity premium.7
6Although it may appear that P ∗t cancels out between the two channels, note that the average markup can also be
defined as µt = mc−1t
∫ 1
0
Pi,t
Pt
di. Letting xt =
∫ 1
0
Pi,t
Pt
di, this can be stated recursively as shown in Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007)
xt = (1− )p∗t +
α
pi
xt−1
Therefore, P ∗t is still implicitly on the right-hand side of the equation that defines the average markup.
7The procedure for computing welfare is based on An (2010). Welfare costs in consumption equivalent units is
defined as χc = 1− ( v
i
ss
vjss
)ι where ι is the share of consumption in the consumption-leisure bundle and vkss represents
the lifetime welfare based on policy k = i, j.
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2.2.2 Empirical Motivation for Welfare Channels
The existing literature on optimal monetary policy finds that movement toward a hawk policy
has no effect on the steady-state markup. However, I show below that the theoretical prediction of a
nil effect is not supported by the data. In other words, CRRA preferences are not only inconsistent
with asset pricing facts but also with the empirical evidence on the average markup when monetary
policy increasingly stabilizes inflation. In addition, CRRA models do not predict a meaningful
trade-off between reducing nominal uncertainty at the expense of higher real uncertainty. This
lack of a trade-off is also inconsistent with empirical evidence discussed in more detail below.
Compared to empirical estimates of the Taylor rule, the optimal coefficients on inflation in
the interest rate rule as determined by the existing literature are often orders of magnitude higher.
This is because the CRRA models are not fully taking into account the explicit costs of the higher
markup and greater consumption volatility implied by the data, so the benefits of reducing inflation
volatility dominate all other channels. In contrast, my novel asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian
model is consistent with the empirical evidence on the average markup and the real-nominal trade-
off. As this model endogenously captures these channels as reflected in the data, the optimal policy
coefficients are much closer to empirical estimates for the interest rate rule.
In the sections that follow, I provide a discussion along with empirical evidence on the markup
and the trade-off involved in reducing nominal volatility at the expense of increased consump-
tion volatility. I then estimate interest rate rules over the pre-Volcker and post-Volcker periods to
connect the observed behavior of the Federal Reserve with the markup channel and real-nominal
trade-off.
The Markup. The empirical evidence of the association of a higher markup with greater inflation
stabilization was first found by Benabou (1992). Using US data on the retail trade sector, he finds
that inflation has significantly negative effects on the markup. Other studies have focused on the
inverse of the labor share, as this can be shown to be theoretically proportional to the markup if the
production function is Cobb-Douglas. Nekarda and Ramey (2013) show that an upward trend of
the markup began in the early 1980s. The rise in the markup coincides with the more aggressive
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Post−Volcker (1980-2007): Higher Average Markup
Figure 2.1: Historical Average Markup: Higher Markup Since 1980
The data depicted in this figure are based on the inverse of the labor share of income, as computed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. The inverse of the labor share of income can be shown to be theoretically equal to the average markup
when the production function is Cobb-Douglas. Splitting the time series into 1950–1980 and 1980–2007, the solid
red line reflects the increase in the mean of the markup for the post-Volcker period (1980-2007), a period in which
inflation was stabilized to a much greater extent. This figure provides empirical evidence for the theoretical result that
increasingly stabilizing inflation is associated with a higher markup, which is relevant for my welfare analysis.
role of monetary policy in stabilizing inflation. This can be seen in figure 2.1, which plots data
on the average markup according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics records dating back to 1950.
During the post-Volcker period (1980–2007), the mean of the markup increased as inflation was
stabilized to a greater extent. Other studies such as Alcala and Sancho (2000) and Raurich, Sala,
and Sorolla (2012) have shown using various measures that the markup has risen since 1980.8
The rise in the markup due to greater inflation stabilization is consistent with the theoretical
dynamics of my asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian model. Specifically, figure 2.1 shows that
8The mechanism for the relationship between inflation and labor share is simple. As pointed out by Alcala and
Sancho (2000), accelerated inflation is correlated with higher employment, higher employment leads to greater bar-
gaining power, and greater bargaining power is correlated with lower markups. In my New Keynesian model inflation
is largely due to output being pushed above the natural level, which reduces the real average markup because labor
costs rise but most firms are unable to update their prices.
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the mean of the markup rises between 2.5–3% when moving from pre-Volcker to post-Volcker.
Similarly, my general equilibrium model predicts that the average markup will also rise 3%, from
12% to 15%, as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation.9 Therefore, the theoretical effect
of monetary policy on the markup lines up with the empirical evidence. Moreover, the volatility of
the markup is 3% under the optimal rule within my model, while in the data, the markup volatility
is historically between 5% and 6%. This suggests that my model is conservative with respect to
the observed volatility of the markup and that the relative importance of the markup channel for
welfare is not driven by exaggerated or implausible dynamics.
Real-Nominal Trade-Off. The real-nominal trade-off suggests that as monetary policy increas-
ingly stabilizes inflation, nominal uncertainty falls while real uncertainty increases. This trade-off
arises as an endogenous outcome of my general equilibrium model. The intuition is that as the
central bank increasingly targets inflation, this induces greater changes in both nominal rates and
real rates (due to sticky prices), which causes higher real consumption volatility. This channel is
also present in the endogenous growth model of Kung (2014). Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013)
provide empirical evidence that real uncertainty is higher relative to nominal uncertainty for the
post-Volcker period.
Empirical Interest Rate Rules. A number of studies suggest that simple interest rate rules can
characterize the behavior of the Federal Reserve over various time periods. Taylor (1993) proposes
a simple rule of the Federal Funds Rate as a function of inflation and the output gap around a trend.
Weights of 1.5 and 0.5 are assumed on inflation and output, respectively, and seem to capture
roughly the behavior of monetary policy. Other papers have since evaluated the empirical fit of
simple interest rate rules, including Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Taylor (1999), Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1998) and Orphanides (2003). In contrast to many of these studies, I choose to focus
on output growth rather than the output gap because there is greater consensus in terms of its
9The rise in the markup within the asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian model is further demonstrated in section
2.3, figure 2.2.
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Table 2.1: Estimated Interest Rate Reaction Function
αr αpi α∆y
Parsimonious Regression
1955:1–1982:4 0.90 1.60 0.79
(0.41) (0.55) (0.25)
1983:1–2002:4 0.92 2.46 1.10
(0.35) (0.82) (0.26)
Coibion & Gorodnichenko (2012)
1983:1–2002:4 0.93 2.20 1.56
(0.11) (0.40) (0.39)
This table shows results of regressions of the Federal Funds Rate on the lagged rate (αr), inflation based on the GDP
price deflator (αpi), and the growth of real GDP (α∆y). Results from Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) over a
similar time period are shown for sake of comparison. Their method uses real-time measures of expected inflation and
expected output growth based on Greenbook forecasts from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). Standard
errors are listed in parentheses.
measurement.10
I conduct my own estimation of the interest rate reaction function using data from 1983Q1 to
2002Q4. The starting and ending dates are chosen to match Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
I regress the Federal Funds Rate on its lagged term, the demeaned inflation rate according to the
GDP price deflator, and the demeaned output growth rate of real GDP:
Rt = αr ·Rt−1 + (1− αr) (αpi · (pit − pi∗) + α∆y · (∆yt −∆y∗)) + t
where αr captures partial adjustment or inertia, αpi is the weight on inflation, α∆y is the weight on
output growth, and the starred variables indicate means that act as proxies for the targets.
The results of my regression for post-1983 are in line with Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011),
as shown in table 2.1. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) solely focus on characterizing Federal
Reserve policy, which leads them to use a more richly parameterized empirical model. Here, I char-
acterize this behavior in a more parsimonious and straightforward manner. The small difference
10Other studies have estimated interest rate rules that include output growth, including Ireland (2004), Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2012), and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011).
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in results can be attributed to these modeling differences, along with Coibion and Gorodnichenko
(2011)’s use of expected inflation and expected output growth based on the Greenbook forecasts
from the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).
In both instances, it is clear that the Federal Reserve did not target inflation as much for the pre-
Volcker period. With less weight placed on inflation, higher inflation volatility was associated with
lower average markups, which is an important channel for my welfare analysis. Most importantly,
the values on the inflation coefficient for the post-Volcker regressions are much lower than the
optimal monetary policy literature frequently suggests. For example, the model of Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe (2007) in a similar setting with no long-run risk and CRRA preferences yields an optimal
inflation coefficient of 332 with no weight on output. Likewise, Kollmann (2008) finds an optimal
inflation coefficient of 8,660.
The optimal policy in my asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian model places a weight on
inflation that is within the standard error of the point estimate based on my post-Volcker regression.
Also, the optimal weight placed on output growth is higher than that estimated in both of my
regressions. Thus, this model, with its high welfare costs of recessions, suggests that it would have
been optimal for the Federal Reserve to respond more to output growth over the estimated time
period.
Overall, CRRA preferences are inconsistent not only with asset pricing facts but also with the
empirical evidence described in this section. Once Epstein-Zin preferences are introduced, the em-
pirical evidence on the markup and consumption volatility is reproduced in a general equilibrium
setting and the implications for monetary policy change dramatically.
2.2.3 Calibration
In the proposed model, I calibrate the time period to a quarterly frequency. I then annualize the
moments and focus on matching the behavior of macroeconomic variables over the long sample of
US data from 1929–2008. Data on consumption and investment are from the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA). Fiscal policy variables such as government spending and steady-state debt are
taken from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). The parameters described below are listed in table
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Table 2.2: Model Features and Parameter Values
Recursive CRRA
High IES
High RA
Low IES
High RA
High IES
Low RA
Low IES
High RA
Preference parameters
Discount factor β 0.9955 0.999 0.998 0.999
Effective risk aversion γ 10 10 1/2 10
Intertemporal elasticity of subs. ψ 2.0 0.2 2.0 1/γ
Leisure weight o 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Technology parameters
Capital share θ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Quarterly depreciation rate δ 1.725% 1.5% 1.725% 1.5%
Productivity parameters
Risk exposure of new investment φ0 0 0 0 0
Average quarterly growth rate µ 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Volatility of short-run risk σa 0.0055 0.0055 0.0065 0.003
Volatility of long-run risk σx 0.15·σa 0.15·σa 0.15·σa 0.15·σa
AR(1) of expected growth ρ 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
New Keynesian parameters
Price elasticity of demand η 7 7 7 7
Probability firm cannot change P α 75% 75% 75% 75%
Policy parameters
Steady-state debt to GDP SB 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Steady-state GY SG 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Monetary policy inflation coeff. αpi 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
Output growth gap coeff. α∆y 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75
Inertia coeff. αr 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
The four models were calibrated to minimize the distance between the moments implied by the model and
the moments taken from the data. The moments to match were the volatilities of consumption and investment
growth, the level of the risk-free rate, and if possible the equity premium.
4.1.
For the New Keynesian parameters, the markup due to monopolistic competition is set to 15%,
which is in line with previous studies (Bils and Klenow 2002). Firms are assumed to re-optimize
their prices every 12 months, which is in the middle of empirical estimates that range from 6 to
18 months (see Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2011)). With regard to fiscal policy,
steady-state government purchases make up 17% of GDP, and the steady-state debt-GDP ratio
is set to the historical average of 44%, following Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). Taxes are
collected by lump sum to pay for an exogenous expenditure stream. The persistence and standard
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deviation of the government spending shocks follow Croce, Kung, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012),
but given the assumed nondistortionary nature of taxes, they essentially have a nil effect on the
results.
For monetary policy, the default interest rate rule used for calibration includes an inertia coeffi-
cient of 0.8 and an output growth coefficient of 0.75. The parameters chosen for these coefficients
are set to match inflation dynamics and the interest rate serial correlation observed in the data. An
inertia coefficient of 0.8 is consistent with empirical quarterly estimates, which set it as high as
0.9. Without including output growth, inflation in the model is positively correlated with perma-
nent productivity shocks, which is counterfactual. The incorporation of the output growth causes
inflation to fall with good productivity shocks and rise with bad productivity shocks. The inflation
coefficient is set to 1.5 to match the original work of Taylor (1993).
Production and Preference Parameters. The parameters for effective risk aversion (γ = 10)
and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (ψ = 2) are consistent with the estimates of Bansal,
Gallant, and Tauchen (2007), Bansal, Kiku, and Yaron (2010), and Colacito and Croce (2011).11
The capital share (α = 0.25) and the quarterly depreciation rate of physical capital (δ = 0.01725%)
are consistent with the labor share of income in the data and with the quarterly depreciation rate
of 1.5 to 4% observed in the real business cycle (RBC) literature. I calibrate µ at 2% per year,
consistent with the average annual real growth rate of the US economy. I set the persistence
parameter on long run risk at ρ = 0.98, which is close to the point estimate of Croce (2014a).
The subjective discount factor is set to be consistent with the low risk-free rate observed in the
data. Labor is endogenous and set to match the level of hours in the data, ι = 0.35. I set σa to
match the standard deviation of consumption. The smaller long-run shock is set to 0.15 · σa as
estimated by Croce (2014a).
Free Parameters and Moments Matched. The free parameters above are the subjective dis-
count factor (β), the depreciation rate for capital (δ), the volatility of short-run risk (σa), and the
11See Swanson (2012) for a discussion of risk aversion when leisure is present.
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persistence parameter on long-run risk (ρ). These parameters are chosen within a grid of values
accepted by the literature in order to maximize the model’s ability to reproduce the moments of
interest, which are the mean of the real risk-free rate, the levered excess return, and the volatilities
of consumption and investment growth. I minimize the distance between the moments implied by
the model and the moments taken from the data as shown in table 2.3. The distance is measured
by
min
a
ζ(a) = [FˆT − f(a)]′[FˆT − f(a)]
where f(a) is the vector of moments generated by the model, and FˆT is the moments in the data.
The minimization is done by searching over a grid of values for a: β = [0.995, 1], δ = [.015, .04],
σa = [0.005, 0.02], and ρ = [0.92, 0.98]. Note that in the data, excess returns are levered. Hence, I
use the following excess return: RLEVex,t = χLEV (R
K
t − Rft−1). The calibration of χLEV is set to 3
to match the debt-equity ratio in the data along with the degree of operating leverage as estimated
in Garcı´a-Feijo´o and Jorgensen (2010).
Simulation. The policy rules are numerically computed using second-order approximations from
Dynare++. The simulations consist of random draws of the two productivity shocks (short-run and
long-run) and a fiscal shock (government spending). The number of periods is 200 (the first 100
are discarded) and the number of simulations is 100. The moments for the models are listed in
table 2.3. The preferred High IES (ψ = 2), High RA (γ = 10) model comes closest to matching
the low risk-free rate, the high equity premium, the smooth volatility of consumption growth, and
volatile investment growth. Matching data on both macroeconomic aggregates and asset pricing
facts imposes joint structural restrictions on both the quantity and price of risk in the data.
2.3 Optimal Interest Rate Rules
In the following section, I describe the characteristics of the interest rate rules that yield the
highest welfare. I then restrict the model to a setting with only long-run shocks and a setting with
only short-run shocks to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying dynamics. Following
this, I examine the effect of the inflation coefficient and output growth coefficient on the three
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Table 2.3: Main Moments
Recursive CRRA
High IES Low IES High IES Low IES
Data High RA High RA Low RA High RA
E(I/Y ) 0.18 0.20 0.16 0.20 0.08
σ(∆c) 2.14 2.09 2.81 2.29 2.64
σ(∆i) 13.17 11.58 11.78 13.23 11.14
σ(∆n) 3.66 3.62 2.19 2.81 2.99
σ(rf ) 1.35 0.39 0.44 0.32 0.60
E[rf ] 0.89 2.10 4.78 2.42 15.79
E[rL,ex] 4.71 4.56 3.06 0.02 −0.01
ACF1[R
f
t ] 0.89 0.83 0.92 0.90 0.88
ρ(∆a, pi) −0.30 −0.54 −0.31 −0.72 0.23
The four models are calibrated to minimize the distance between the moments implied by the model and the moments
taken from the data. The minimization is done by searching over a grid of values: β = [0.995, 1], δ = [.015, .04],
σa = [0.005, 0.02], and ρ = [0.92, 0.98]. The moments to match were the volatilities of consumption and investment
growth, the level of the risk-free rate, and the equity premium, if possible. For recursive preferences, settings tested
were High RA (γ = 10), High IES (ψ = 2), and Low IES (ψ = 0.2). For CRRA preferences, settings tested were
High RA (γ = 10) and High IES (ψ = 2). All entries for the models are obtained from repetitions of small samples.
Data refer to the US and include pre–World War II observations (1930–2012). Quarterly calibrations are reported in
table 4.1. Excess returns are levered by a factor of three, consistent with Garcı´a-Feijo´o and Jorgensen (2010). Note
that with CRRA preferences, a low risk free rate and high equity premium are not possible given the inverse link of
RA and IES.
major channels of welfare.
To obtain the simple monetary policy rule that yields the highest welfare, I search across a grid
for the inflation coefficient, αpi, the output growth coefficient, α∆y, and the inertia coefficient, αr.
Their respective grids are (1,∞), (−∞,∞), and (−∞,∞). I constrain αpi > 1 in order to be
consistent with the Taylor principle. With αpi > 1, the real interest rate rises with inflation, and
this ensures determinacy. The rule is formulated as follows:
Rˆt = αr · Rˆt−1 + (1− αr)(αpi · pˆit + α∆y ·∆yˆt) (2.4)
The variables denoted with a hat are log deviations from steady state. The first two panels of table
2.4 list the optimal inflation volatility and inflation coefficient for each model, and the third panel
shows the optimal output growth coefficient. The bottom panel shows the relative welfare gain (in
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the model that matches asset prices) for the optimal policy compared to the policy that completely
stabilizes inflation. The columns are split into settings based on the sources of the shocks in order
to capture the role of long-run risk.
Inflation Volatility. The setting with recursive preferences, high risk aversion (γ = 10), and a
high IES (ψ = 2) yields the highest optimal inflation volatility of 0.42% with all shocks. Compared
to results in extant studies with similar model features, this value is relatively high and represents
close to 20% of the observed historical inflation volatility.12 Most of the inflation volatility can be
attributed to the long-run shocks. The higher optimal inflation volatility is due to the rise in the
average markup as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation. These dynamics are explained
in greater detail in section 2.3.1.
Output Growth. Under recursive preferences, I find that the output growth coefficient is dra-
matically larger for the setting with long-run shocks compared to that with only short-run shocks.
Increasing the weight on the output growth reduces the markup and lowers the volatility of the
consumption-leisure bundle. For CRRA preferences, I find it optimal to eliminate price dispersion
completely and place an infinite coefficient on inflation with no weight on output growth. The
average markup and the volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle stay relatively constant as
monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation, which is counterfactual to empirical evidence.
Welfare Gains. For the benchmark setting with a low risk free rate and high equity premium
(table 2.4, last panel), I find the optimal policy provides a welfare gain of 0.07% compared to
the policy that places an infinite weight on inflation. This translates into about 0.20 additional
percentage of consumption units every quarter. While this may be small compared to the gains
found in the policy literature that incorporates endogenous growth, a perpetuity that pays this
amount each year from now on is worth over $3,000, assuming an interest rate of 2%. In other
words, a greater response to output growth and less to inflation (relative to that advocated in the
12Inflation is defined as the annualized percentage change in the quarterly GDP price deflator dating back to 1947.
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Table 2.4: Optimal Coefficients, Volatility, and Welfare
Optimal Inflation Volatility
Preferences RA IES All Shocks LRR only SRR only
Recursive High High 0.42% 0.39% 0.05%
Recursive High Low 0.16% 0.18% 0.06%
CRRA High Low 0 0 0
CRRA Low High 0 0 0
Optimal Inflation Coefficient
Preferences RA IES All Shocks LRR only SRR only
Recursive High High 3 3 1.75
Recursive High Low 16 11 3.25
CRRA High Low ∞ ∞ ∞
CRRA Low High ∞ ∞ ∞
Optimal Output Growth Coefficient
Preferences RA IES All Shocks LRR only SRR only
Recursive High High 1.5 1.625 0.25
Recursive High Low 3 3.25 0.25
CRRA High Low 0 0 0
CRRA Low High 0 0 0
Rec. Pref., High RA, High IES: All Shocks LRR only SRR only
Relative Welfare Gain 0.07% 0.07% 0.00037%
Consumption Equivalent Units 0.19% 0.20% 0.001%
Perpetuity of Welfare Gain $3,255 $3,427 $17.13
This table shows the optimal inflation volatility, optimal inflation coefficient, and optimal output growth coefficient
across different shocks and different utility specifications. RA is risk aversion, IES is intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, and CRRA is constant relative risk aversion. For recursive preferences, settings tested were High RA
(γ = 10), High IES (ψ = 2), and Low IES (ψ = 0.2). For CRRA preferences, settings tested were High RA (γ = 10)
and High IES (ψ = 2). Quarterly calibrations are reported in table 4.1. The bottom panel shows the relative welfare
gain compared to the policy that places infinite weight on inflation. The consumption equivalent units are computed as
in An (2010). The perpetuity of the welfare gain is computed by assuming an interest rate of 2% and real consumption
expenditures per capita of $34,270 per year. The consumption equivalent unit percentage is multiplied by $34,270 and
divided by the interest rate to arrive at the value of the perpetuity.
existing literature) would be worth a one-time payment of over $3,000 to each individual.13 This is
13Base year 2009 dollars.
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in contrast to results from the setting with only short-run shocks, in which an equivalent calculation
would yield a perpetuity worth only $17. This small magnitude is in line with the existing literature
(see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)).
To explain the low inflation coefficient and high weight on the output growth for the asset
pricing-oriented model, I focus on the setting in which there are only long-run shocks. Although
the long-run shock is one-seventh the size of the short-run shock, its persistence (combined with
the very forward-looking nature of agents) dominates the other shocks.
2.3.1 Long-Run Productivity Shocks Only
The small but persistent news shock to productivity growth has been empirically documented
by Croce (2014a), Beaudry and Portier (2004), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007), Barsky and Sims
(2011), and Kurmann and Otrok (2010). Specifically, Croce (2014a) finds that the conditional
mean of productivity growth is extremely persistent and time-varying. In a setting with forward-
looking monopolistically competitive firms, a low-frequency predictable fluctuation in productivity
can have significant ramifications for the prices chosen by firms, which reverberates through the
demand-driven New Keynesian model. Below, I examine the channels that drive the finding of a
low optimal inflation coefficient and relatively high weight on output growth.14
Optimal Inflation Coefficient and Three Welfare Channels. In this section I examine the rea-
sons the optimal inflation coefficient is low for the recursive preferences asset pricing-oriented
model and high for the CRRA preferences model. In figures 2.2–2.3, I compare three different
models: (1) recursive preferences with high risk aversion (γ = 10) and high IES (ψ = 2); (2)
recursive preferences with high risk aversion (γ = 10) and low IES (ψ = 0.2); and (3) CRRA
preferences with high risk aversion (γ = 10) and low IES (ψ = 1/10). Figure 2.2 depicts the
effects of increasing the inflation coefficient and figure 2.3 shows the welfare. The increase in αpi
can be thought of as moving from a dove regime to a hawk regime. The level of price dispersion
decreases in all settings due to the lower inflation volatility (far right panel of figure 2.2). Monetary
14Discussion of the optimal inertia coefficient, αr, is reserved for appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.2: Effects of Increasing the Inflation Coefficient (αpi)
This figure shows the three key channels for welfare (volatility of consumption-leisure bundle, average markup, price
dispersion) and the effects of greater inflation stabilization. The setting is a world with only long-run news shocks to
productivity. The other coefficients are set to match the rule that yields the highest welfare for the high IES (ψ = 2)
and high risk aversion (γ = 10) case, as in equation 2.4 and table 4.1. Both of the recursive preference settings exhibit
strong increases in the volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle compared to the CRRA preferences. The average
markup rises the most for the high IES and high risk aversion setting. All of the settings see a reduction in price
dispersion as the inflation coefficient rises.
policy, by increasingly stabilizing inflation, reduces nominal uncertainty.
Major differences across the three settings can be seen in the left two panels of figure 2.2. The
far left panel shows the volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle. While volatility is increasing
with the degree of inflation stabilization for all three settings, the increase is lowest for the CRRA
preferences. This makes sense because of the inverse nature of CRRA preferences, in which the
IES is lower due to the high risk aversion. With a lower IES, by definition agents will react less to
monetary policy and so the volatility does not rise as much for a given change in policy. This is
also true for the recursive preferences as one moves from a low IES to a high IES. The increase in
volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle is greatest for the high IES case.
The average markup rises the most for the model with the high IES.15 The markup falls more
in response to negative productivity shocks, and the more that monetary policy stabilizes inflation,
the less the markup will be allowed to decline, resulting in a higher average markup. Note that
with less asymmetry, the low IES markup does not rise as much with the inflation coefficient. All
three models converge to the average markup that would occur in the nonstochastic steady-state,
15This is perfectly consistent with the asymmetric responses discussed in appendix A.3 and figure A1
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Figure 2.3: Effects of Increasing the Inflation Coefficient: Welfare (αpi)
This figure shows the effects on welfare of increasing the inflation coefficient in a world with only long-run productivity
shocks. The other coefficients are set to match the rule that yields the highest welfare for the high IES (ψ = 2) and
high risk aversion (γ = 10) case as in equation 2.4 and table 4.1. The greatest fall in welfare comes with the High IES,
High Risk Aversion on the far left due to the higher markup from stabilizing inflation and the increased volatility of
the consumption-leisure bundle. This is in contrast to the CRRA preferences setting in which completely stabilizing
inflation is optimal.
in which the variance of the markup is zero. In other words, they all converge to the level of the
markup that would occur under a first-order approximation.
In terms of overall welfare, the optimal inflation coefficient is lowest for the model with high
IES (ψ = 2) and high risk aversion (γ = 10), as shown in figure 2.3. Beyond the value of 3 for
the inflation coefficient, the benefits of reducing price dispersion are outweighed by the costs of
the higher markup and greater volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle. For the low IES case,
the optimal inflation coefficient is higher with lesser increases in the markup. Finally, the CRRA
preferences setting has a value on the inflation coefficient of infinity as the reduction in price
dispersion dominates the markup channel. Monetary policy has very little effect on the volatility
of the consumption-leisure bundle and the markup, which means the costs of stabilizing inflation
are essentially nil.
Output Growth Coefficient and Three Welfare Channels. In this section I examine the reasons
the optimal output growth coefficient is high for the asset pricing-oriented model. As shown in
figure 2.4, placing weight on the output growth reduces the variability of the consumption-leisure
bundle and also provides a greater anchor for inflation expectations. This is because when output
falls below potential, monetary policy lowers interest rates with the implicit assurance that interest
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Figure 2.4: Effects of Increasing the Output Growth Coefficient (α∆y)
This figure shows the effect of placing higher weight on the output growth in a world with only long-run productivity
shocks. The other coefficients are set to match the rule that yields the highest welfare for the high IES (ψ = 2) and
high risk aversion (γ = 10) case, as in equation 2.4 and table 4.1. The volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle
and the average markup decline, while price dispersion is increasing due to higher inflation volatility, which causes a
hump-shape for welfare.
rates will rise as output increases back to potential. Anchoring inflation expectations is imperative
because current inflation depends on expectations of future inflation, and in the model firms are
very patient and forward looking.16
In addition, the markup monotonically decreases with the output growth coefficient. Greater
weight on the output growth means relatively less weight on inflation, so that inflation volatility
and price dispersion increase. Thus, after the negative long-run productivity shock shown in Figure
2.5, the average markup is persistently lower in the medium to long term, while inflation is higher.
Furthermore, the decline in the response of the consumption-leisure bundle is also beneficial to
welfare. Eventually, the consumption-leisure bundle volatility increases due to monetary policy
overcompensation. This, combined with the higher price dispersion, leads to the decline in welfare
when moving beyond an output growth coefficient of 1.5.
2.3.2 CRRA Preferences
This section shows how agents and firms with CRRA preferences react to negative long-run
productivity shocks. Figure 2.6 shows the real stochastic discount factor in the upper left panel.
Note the rise for recursive preferences is eight times greater in magnitude due to the continuation
16This is in contrast to reacting to simply the level of output, which destabilizes inflation expectations. I find that a
zero weight on the level of output is optimal as the negative effects of price dispersion dominate.
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Figure 2.5: Higher Output Growth Response: Negative Long-Run Shock (α∆y)
This figure shows the response to a negative long-run productivity shock. The parameterization is based on the cali-
bration in table 4.1 for the high IES (ψ = 2) and high risk aversion (γ = 10) case and focuses on the policy that yields
the highest welfare in equation 2.4. The volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle declines and the average markup
falls more over the medium to long term due to the higher inflation.
value that captures news. The higher real SDF combined with the higher IES makes firms more
forward looking, which causes them to raise prices to a greater extent because they are concerned
with higher future marginal costs.
The higher inflation directly translates into a lower real markup, which acts as a hedge and
provides good long-run news. The low IES with CRRA preferences reduces the effectiveness of
monetary policy so that the consumption-leisure bundle and average markup quickly converge to
the steady state. This analysis concurs with the evidence in figure 2.2, which shows that for CRRA
preferences, monetary policy is less effective in reducing the average markup and the volatility of
the consumption-leisure bundle.
2.3.3 Short-Run Shocks Only
In a setting with only short-run shocks, I find that the differences in welfare across policies
are negligible, as shown in figure 2.7. Under CRRA preferences, the policy that yields the highest
welfare places an infinite value on the inflation coefficient. Under recursive preferences, the fol-
lowing rule yields the highest welfare: Rˆt = 0.9 · Rˆt−1 + 1.75 · (1− 0.9) · pˆit + 14 · (1− 0.9) ·∆yˆt.
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Figure 2.6: CRRA: Low IES, High Risk Aversion, Negative Long-Run Shock
This figure shows the response to a negative long-run productivity shock. The parameterization is based on the cali-
bration in table 4.1 for the low IES (ψ = 1/10) and high risk aversion (γ = 10) case and around the policy that yields
the highest welfare in equation 2.4. The real stochastic discount factor (SDF) in the top-left panel shows the impact
of the continuation utility and the higher IES for recursive preferences. The negative news leads to a greater rise in
the real SDF. This translates into a greater rise of inflation and much lower markup compared to the CRRA setting, as
firms place greater weight on the future. In addition, the low IES for CRRA preferences reduces the effectiveness of
monetary policy so that the consumption-leisure bundle and average markup quickly converge to steady state.
However, in contrast to the policy that places an infinite weight on inflation, the welfare benefit is
only 0.000367%. This is 200 times smaller than a similar comparison with a setting comprising
only long-run shocks, where the welfare benefit of the best policy is 0.07% compared to the one
that places an infinite weight on inflation.
The differences in welfare across policies are small due to the largely symmetric responses
of the average markup and inflation to short-run shocks. Moreover, these variables revert to the
steady state very quickly compared to those in the setting with long-run shocks. In summary, the
lack of persistence and asymmetry in response to short-run shocks combined with the near-zero
equity premium makes all three welfare channels insignificant. Note that the small differences in
welfare across policies in this setting are consistent with the findings of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe
(2007), who also reach this conclusion in a setting without long-run risk.
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Figure 2.7: Effects of Increasing the Inflation Coefficient (αpi), Short-Run Shocks Only
This figure shows the three key channels for welfare (volatility of consumption-leisure bundle, average markup, price
dispersion) and the effects of greater inflation stabilization. The setting is a world with only short-run shocks to
productivity. The other coefficients are set to match the rule that yields the highest welfare for the high IES (ψ = 2) and
high risk aversion (γ = 10) case, as in table 4.1. The effect on the average markup and price dispersion is essentially
flat for all three models. The effects on the volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle are muted compared to the
setting with long-run shocks only. Overall, I find the welfare differences across policies are negligible.
2.4 Further Inspection of Dynamics
In this section I directly compare the low IES (ψ = 0.2) and high IES (ψ = 2) settings to
further emphasize the importance of making firms and agents more patient. Following that, I show
the reasons the average markup rises as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation. Further
sensitivity analysis with respect to changes in the risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of
substitution can be found in appendix A.4.17
High vs. Low IES. The high IES model better captures the low risk-free rate in the data and
makes forward-looking agents and firms more patient, as shown in the left panel of figure 2.8.
With greater precautionary savings, the consumption-leisure bundle growth declines more, and
this results in the doubling of the stochastic discount factor when moving from the low to high IES
model. In this context, forward-looking firms place greater weight on future marginal costs, so that
the decrease in inflation in the initial period is five times less in the high IES model than the low
17In appendix A.4, I also show why the markup channel is largely not present in other studies–namely, due to the
absence of both a high IES and high risk aversion. When the IES is relatively low (which is typically the case for
CRRA preferences), moving from a first-order to second-order approximation barely changes the dynamics.
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IES model. The higher inflation pushes down the relative prices set by firms in previous periods
and decreases the real value of the average markup. All of the above results suggest that the high
IES model has a greater negative effect on the average markup.
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Figure 2.8: Negative Long-Run Shock
This figure shows the effects of a negative long-run productivity shock on the three key channels for welfare: inflation volatility, markup, and consumption-leisure
volatility. The parameterization is based on the calibration in table 4.1 and focuses on the policy that yields the highest welfare in equation 2.4. The left panel shows
that moving from a low IES to a high IES leads to significantly different implications for each channel. The right panel shows that moving from the low inflation
coefficient of 2.25 to the high inflation coefficient of 5, there is a decrease in inflation volatility which means the markup does not fall by as much in recessions.
This suggests the average markup will be higher as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation.
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High IES: Low vs. High αpi (Dove vs. Hawk). As shown in the right panel of figure 2.8, a
higher inflation coefficient combined with a high coefficient on the lagged interest rate imply a
higher real interest rate for many periods in response to inflation. Forward-looking firms take this
into account when setting prices, knowing that monetary policy is actively attempting to stabilize
inflation. Therefore, firms choose lower prices due to the lower expected inflation, and this causes
the initial inflation to be lower.
However, the decrease of inflation volatility lowers the inefficient allocation coming from price
dispersion. Therefore, a trade-off exists between increasing the average markup and decreasing
price dispersion as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation. Note that this markup channel
is nonexistent for first-order approximations and is not as large for the low IES model. Since the
decrease in inflation volatility means the markup does not decrease by as much in recessions, this
implies the average markup will be higher as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation.
2.5 Conclusion
Asset pricing is important for monetary policy analysis because it reveals how much agents
dislike recessions and the extent to which they are forward-looking and patient. I have shown in
this study that incorporating the combination of these two characteristics, along with the presence
of long-run risk, leads to policy recommendations that are very different from those of prior studies.
Specifically, in my asset pricing-oriented New Keynesian model, much greater weight is placed on
output growth, and a much smaller weight is placed on inflation. Price dispersion is no longer the
dominant channel in this setting. In addition, the effects of monetary policy on the volatility of the
consumption-leisure bundle and the average markup become first-order concerns.
I find that the welfare gain of moving away from a policy that completely stabilizes inflation
is two hundred times greater for settings with long-run shocks relative to those with short-run
shocks. This translates into the equivalent of a one-time benefit of over $3,000 for every individual.
Moreover, the optimal inflation volatility is forty times greater in this setting than in similar settings
without long-run risk. In my model, the weight on the output growth is over 14 times greater than
the weight that is placed on the output level in the original study by Taylor (1993). All of these
37
findings would likely be magnified in a setting with endogenous rather than exogenous growth. In
the current economic setting, monetary policy is unable to increase or decrease long term growth,
and I leave this as a topic for future research.
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CHAPTER 3
TAXES, SPENDING, AND MARKET RETURNS
3.1 Introduction
Recent papers by Romer and Romer (2010) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002), among others,
have documented specific real effects of fiscal policy on the economy. On the one hand, increased
taxes are associated with lower investment and lower GDP. A fall in both investment and GDP im-
plies a decrease in current/future production and lower cash flows for the firm. On the other hand,
lowering the deficit is associated with lower real interest rates (Gale and Orszag 2003). From an
asset-pricing perspective, the change in fiscal policy leads to two countervailing effects: a nega-
tive effect on cash flows and a negative effect on discount rates. The question then becomes, which
channel dominates? Do the lower future cash flows result in lower aggregate returns or do the lower
discount rates dominate and imply higher aggregate returns? Based on a news decomposition, we
find that the answer is heavily dependent upon the stance of monetary policy.
News decompositions1 consist of splitting the variation in unexpected stock market returns into
two fundamental components – news about future discount rates and news about future cash flows.
Cash flows often represent dividends and are related to profits and production. Discount rates tend
to reflect the actions of monetary policy along with risk aversion or investor sentiment. The news
component of both channels reflect changes in investors expectations, which can be proxied using
vector autoregressions (VARs) to capture revisions in forecasts of cash flows and discount rates.
Given that a VAR can always be transformed into an infinite moving average, discounted sums
1See Campbell and Shiller (1988); Campbell (1991); Campbell and Ammer (1993); Vuolteenaho (2002); Chen and
Zhao (2009) among many others focus on importance of discount rate news. Cash flow news is emphasized by Bansal
and Yaron (2004); Bansal, Dittmar, and Lundblad (2005); Lettau and Ludvigson (2005); Santos and Veronesi (2010);
Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2009); Da (2009); Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2008).
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can be computed for expected future excess returns, dividends, and real interest rates. The channels
through which fiscal policy impacts the stock market can then be explained by incorporating un-
expected fiscal spending or tax shocks into the VAR as an exogenous variable. For the government
spending shocks, our study makes use of Ramey (2011), a narrative dataset that categorizes unex-
pected variations in government spending dating back to 1890. We also use the narrative dataset
of Romer and Romer (2010) to evaluate the effects of exogenous tax shocks, dating back to 1947.
While these datasets are subjective, they provide for more transparent analysis and empirical tests
have confirmed their exogeneity.
Previous studies have used similar empirical methods to derive the effects of monetary pol-
icy on the stock market, but not fiscal policy. Patelis (1997); Bernanke and Kuttner (2005); and
Maio (2013) have all found monetary policy imposing significant effects on the stock market using
a news decomposition. For instance, Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) find that unexpected mone-
tary policy shocks impact stock market returns predominantly through the future excess returns
channel, whereas the effect on real interest rates and dividends are smaller and less significant.
Studies that do focus on the effect of fiscal policy on the stock market (Darrat 1988; Jansen, Li,
Wang, and Yang 2008; Arin, Mamun, and Purushothman 2009; Ardagna 2009; Afonso and Sousa
2009, 2012; Agnello and Sousa 2013; Chatziantoniou, Duffy, and Filis 2013) typically find that
government spending has a negative effect on stock prices.
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003); Tavares and Valkanov (2001); and Belo, Gala, and Li (2013)
also focus on the effects of government spending on the stock market. Our study differs from these
papers in several respects. First, our analysis focuses on a wider set of fiscal policy shocks, includ-
ing both changes to government spending and changes to tax policy. Furthermore, our analysis
encompasses a broader set of asset classes across multiple financial markets. Third, our use of the
Campbell-Shiller (1989) decomposition allows us to determine which channels (cash flows or dis-
count rates) are specifically impacted by fiscal policy. Finally, our methodology explicitly controls
for macroeconomic conditions via a VAR framework and avoids potential endogeneity issues by
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identifying a set of plausibly exogenous fiscal policy shocks.2
Statistical tests suggest a structural break in our data in 1980. For this reason, we split the time
series into Pre-1980 and Post-1980 eras. We find that over the 1980-2008 period, a one percent
increase in tax revenues relative to GDP (roughly five percent of government spending) is associ-
ated with a 5.82 percent decrease in the present value of expected future cash flows. However, the
net effect of a tax shock is an 8.24 percent increase in current excess equity returns. This positive
relationship between taxes and equity returns is due to a significant decrease in real interest rate
news of 9.96 percent.
In contrast, for the Pre-1980 era, we find that the effects on cash flows and discount rates flip
signs so that higher taxes are associated with lower equity returns. This documented change in
the relationship between taxes and equity returns can be fully rationalized within the context of a
standard New Keynesian DSGE model by slightly altering just one parameter, the weight monetary
policy places on output in the interest rate reaction function.
The importance of monetary policy stems from the degree to which it accommodates fiscal pol-
icy shocks. For this reason, any analysis of fiscal policy that excludes the endogenous responses
of monetary policy will be incomplete. This is especially true when attempting to disentangle the
effects on the discount rate and cash flow channels. We use a prototypical New Keynesian DSGE
model to show the following: An increase in taxes is associated with lower output. Monetary
policy, following a standard Taylor (1993) rule, responds by decreasing nominal rates to a greater
extent, which lowers real interest rates due to sticky prices. Based on a completely standard cali-
bration, we show that the effect on the discount rate (e.g. real interest rate) channel will be larger
than the negative cash flow channel. Therefore, higher taxes are associated with higher equity
returns due to the discount rate effect dominating.
Furthermore, our model predicts this positive relationship between taxes and equity returns will
disappear if we change just one parameter, the weight placed on output in the interest rate reaction
2Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Belo et al. (2013) use univariate regressions that include limited controls for
macroeconomic conditions. Tavares and Valkanov (2001) use a structural VAR to identify their fiscal policy shocks,
which may reflect endogenous policy responses to the economic environment.
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function. We find that placing greater weight on output is equivalent to monetary policy providing
a “put” or insurance against the higher tax shock. Households take this insurance into account so
that consumption growth declines less in response to the negative tax shock, as monetary policy is
able to dampen the negative wealth effect. The end result is that real interest rates do not decline
as much (since consumption growth declines less) and the cash flow channel also becomes less
negative. In fact, our model predicts that the tax shocks’ effects on discount rates and cash flows
may flip signs, after taking into account monetary policy’s insurance or greater weight on output.
For the effect of taxes on equity returns, we are able to run similar decompositions within both
our DSGE model and the data. The DSGE model’s effect of taxes on equity returns matches the
signs of our empirical exercise for each channel and for both time periods. More importantly, the
magnitudes predicted by the model (with a typical calibration) are all within one standard error of
their empirical counterparts.
In addition to the effects on equity returns, we find that the tax shocks have a significantly
positive effect on future excess bond return news, which is associated with a 9.69% drop in inflation
news for the Pre-1980 period. This empirical finding is also validated by the predictions of our
DSGE model.
We also explore the effect of exogenous defense spending on the aggregate stock market and
find positive significant effects on cash-flows. We then examine the industry specific effects of
tax shocks and defense spending shocks and continue to find significance. Specifically, the Trans-
portation sector of the Fama and French 17 Industry portfolios shows a positive significant effect
(1.18 percent increase for a given one percent increase in defense spending relative to GDP) on
cash flow news. Finally, we extend our analysis to the international setting and show that UK fiscal
policy has similar significant negative effects on real interest news and cash flow news for the UK
stock market.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes our DSGE model and provides
model predictions. Section 3 is the theoretical background on the news decomposition. Section 4
discusses our dataset in detail. Section 5 explains the main empirical results and Section 6 provides
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additional tests. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Theoretical News Decomposition background
In this section, we describe the basic framework of Campbell and Shiller (1988); Campbell
(1991); and Campbell and Ammer (1993). Those studies show that according to a simple dynamic
accounting identity, innovations in current equity excess returns can be decomposed into revisions
of future expected cash flows, revisions of future expected excess returns, and revisions of future
expected real interest rates.
rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) =(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrex,t+1+j
− (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρjrreal,t+1+j
(3.1)
rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) ≡ NCF,t+1 −Nex,t+1 −Nreal,t+1 (3.2)
where
NCF,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j = rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) +Nex,t+1 +Nreal,t+1 (3.3)
Nex,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrex,t+1+j (3.4)
Nreal,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρjrfreal,t+1+j (3.5)
represents revisions about future cash-flows, revisions in future expected excess returns, and re-
visions in future real interest rates. The discount factor ρ is set to 0.9962, following the previous
literature (Campbell and Ammer 1993; Bernanke and Kuttner 2005) and is used to match the steady
state average annual dividend yield of 5%. As previously stated, the above relationships reflect dy-
namic accounting identities and have no economic or behavioral content. The explicit derivations
for the above equations can be found in the Appendix.
While excess equity returns and real interest rates are to an extent observable, the expectations
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appearing above require empirical proxies. The approach taken to capture these expectations fol-
lows Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) as we implement a vector autoregression (VAR) involving the
variables that we are concerned with (real interest rate and excess returns) along with other state
variables that are considered useful in forecasting them. Computing the discounted sum of the
revisions in expectations involves writing the n-variable, p-lag VAR as a first-order system
Zt+1 = AZt + wt+1 (3.6)
where Zt+1 is a stacked np × 1 vector containing the real interest rate, the excess equity return,
and other variables that are considered useful for forecasting that will be discussed in the following
section.
3.2.1 Empirical Implementation with Cash-Flow Residual
With the VAR expressed as above, the discounted sum of revisions in expectations are estimated
as follows by Campbell (1991); Campbell and Ammer (1993); and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005):
Nex,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrex,t+1+j
= e1′ρA(I− ρA)−1wt+1
(3.7)
Nreal,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρjrreal,t+1+j
= e2′(I− ρA)−1wt+1
(3.8)
NCF,t+1 ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j
= rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) +Nex,t+1 +Nreal,t+1
=
[
e1′ + e1′ρA(I− ρA)−1 + e2′(I− ρA)−1]wt+1
(3.9)
In the above equations, e1 is a vector whose first element is equal to one and zero otherwise,
which corresponds to the position in the VAR for the excess return of the CRSP value-weighted
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excess equity return; e2 is a vector whose second element is equal to one and zero otherwise,
corresponding to the position in the VAR for the real interest rate. In the above equations, cash-
flow news is the residual of the unexpected excess return that cannot be explained by future excess
returns and future real interest rates. Calculating cash-flow news as the residual has the advantage
of not having to directly model the dynamics of dividends, which often exhibit seasonality and are
non-stationary (Maio 2013).
The state vector associated with the VAR above is given by
Zt ≡ [rex,t, rreal,t, ∆rt, SPREADt, dt − pt, RELt]′ (3.10)
where rex,t is the CRSP value-weighted return in excess of the risk-free rate; rreal,t is the real
interest rate, defined as the 3-Month Treasury bill rate divided by quarterly CPI; ∆rt denotes the
change in the nominal 3-Month Treasury bill rate; SPREADt denotes the difference between the
yields on the 10-year T-Bill and 3-month T-Bill; dt − pt denotes the log dividend-price ratio for
the S&P 500; and RELt is the difference between the 3-Month T-Bill and its 12-month moving
average.
Including variables beyond the excess equity return and real risk free rate are important for
improving the forecast of future news about discount rates and cash-flows. For instance, both ∆rt
and RELt are known to be good predictors of the real interest rate. As pointed out in Campbell
and Ammer (1993), the relative bill rate helps to capture the longer-run dynamics of changes in the
interest rate without introducing long lags that drive up the number of parameters to be estimated.
The SPREADt variable has been popular in the predictability of returns literature as Campbell
(1991) shows it tracks the business cycle relatively well. The aggregate dividend-price ratio is
another popular predictor of aggregate stock returns (see Cochrane (2008)) and is appealing from
a theoretical perspective based on the Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition (Maio 2013).
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3.2.2 Empirical Implementation with Directly Modeled Cash-Flow
In contrast to the Campbell and Ammer (1993) approach of using the residual, Chen and Zhao
(2009) directly model the cash-flow news. They argue that there is often large mis-specification
error that shows up in the cash-flow residual because there is small predictive power for the dis-
count rate news. Cash-flow news is directly modeled by incorporating the dividend growth rate. A
separate VAR system is devoted to the dividend growth rate because the state variables that predict
equity returns are not necessarily the same variables that predict dividend growth rate (Chen and
Zhao 2009).
Following Chen and Zhao (2009), the state variables in the dividend growth VAR include
dividend growth rate, market equity return, and dividend yield. Alternatively, this is equivalent to
having a single VAR with dividend growth but with parameter restrictions. By directly modeling
cash-flows in this way, the noise component of stock returns is not being lumped together with
cash-flow news. We choose to not take a stand on which is our preferred method and instead
include empirical results for both. With dividend growth directly included in the VAR, the excess
return can be rewritten as
rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) ≡ (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j = NCF,t+1 −Nex,t+1 −Nreal,t+1 + ε (3.11)
where
NCF,t+1 ≡ e7′(I− ρA)−1wt+1, (3.12)
e7 corresponds to the location in the state vector of the dividend growth rate, and ε is the residual.
3.2.3 Explaining the Responses to Fiscal Policy Actions
Following Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), the proxy for fiscal policy is included in the VAR as
an exogenous variable,
Zt = AZt−1 + φFISCALt + ut (3.13)
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where FISCALt represents either the exogenous defense spending shocks of Ramey (2011) or
the exogenous tax shocks of Romer and Romer (2010). The effects of the fiscal shock on current
(unexpected) excess returns, future excess return news, real interest rate news, and cash flow news
are given by
ξex,current ≡ e1′φ (3.14)
ξex,future ≡ e1′ρA(I− ρA)−1φ (3.15)
ξreal ≡ e2′(I− ρA)−1φ (3.16)
ξCF ≡ e1′φ+ e1′ρA(I− ρA)−1φ+ e2′(I− ρA)−1φ (3.17)
The above effects are derived for the Campbell and Ammer (1993) method in which cash-flow news
is the residual. Note that both the VAR dynamics and coefficient φ are relevant for characterizing
the effects of fiscal policy. Alternatively, the effect of the fiscal policy shock on cash flow news
when it is modeled directly as in Chen and Zhao (2009) is the following
ξCF ≡ e7′φ (3.18)
3.2.4 Excess Bond Returns
We follow Campbell and Ammer (1993) by using a dynamic accounting identity to decompose
the ten-year bond excess return into future excess return news, inflation news, and real interest rate
news:
rb,exn,t+1 − Etrb,exn,t+1 =(Et+1 − Et)
[
−
n−1∑
j=1
rb,exn−i,t+1+i −
n−1∑
j=1
pit+1+i −
n−1∑
j=1
rreal,t+1
]
=−N b,ext+1 −Npi,t+1 −Nreal,t+1
(3.19)
The derivation for this decomposition can be found in the Appendix. The effects of fiscal
policy on current (unexpected) excess bond returns, future excess bond return news, real interest
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rate news, and inflation news are given by
ξex,current ≡ e1′φB (3.20)
ξex,future ≡ −e1′φB − (e2+ e3)′(A−AN)(I−A)−1φB (3.21)
ξreal ≡ e2′(A−AN)(I−A)−1φB (3.22)
ξpi ≡ e3′(A−AN)(I−A)−1φB (3.23)
We use direct forecasting to obtain inflation and real interest rate news, which forces the revision
in expected excess returns to be the residual. Modeling noise may enter the residual as we can-
not directly measure the excess returns on the bond as its maturity decreases over the remaining
periods.3 This approach mirrors that of Campbell and Ammer (1993). Moreover, Chen and Zhao
(2009) suggest that this modeling noise is unlikely to be a main driver of the results.
3.3 Data and Sample Period
3.3.1 Data
In our main analysis, we estimate the VAR given in equation 6 for excess US equity returns and
excess US bond returns. Data are as in Goyal and Welch (2008).4 Specifically, our state variables
for each excess return series are as follows.
As discussed above, we estimate a constrained VAR for excess equity returns. The state vector
is given by
Zt ≡ [rex,t, rreal,t, ∆rt, SPREADt, dt − pt, RELt, ∆Dt]′ (3.24)
where rex,t is the CRSP value-weighted return in excess of the risk-free rate; rreal,t is the real
interest rate, defined as the 3-Month Treasury bill rate divided by quarterly CPI; ∆rt denotes the
change in the nominal 3-Month Treasury bill rate; SPREADt denotes the difference between
3Instead of observing returns on individual bonds, our data provide returns on a constant maturity portfolio of
bonds.
4We thank Amit Goyal for providing these data.
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the yields on the 10-year T-Bill and 3-month T-Bill; dt − pt denotes the log dividend-price ratio
for the S&P 500; RELt is the difference between the 3-Month T-Bill and its 12-month moving
average; and ∆Dt is the dividend growth of the S&P 500 smoothed over 12 months. We impose
two restrictions on this system. First, ∆Dt cannot feedback on the first six state variables. Second,
∆Dt is a function of the following variables: ∆Dt−1, dt−1 − pt−1, and rex,t−1.
The state vector for excess bond returns is given by
Zt ≡ [rBond ex,t, rreal,t, pit, SPREADt,CREDITt]′ (3.25)
where rBond ex,t is the return on the intermediate-term Treasury in excess of the risk-free rate;
rreal,t is the real interest rate, defined as the 3-Month Treasury bill rate divided by quarterly CPI;
pit denotes the change in the 12-month inflation rate; SPREADt denotes the difference between
the yields on the 10-year T-Bill and 3-month T-Bill; and CREDITt denotes the spread between
Baa and Aaa bond yields.
3.3.2 Identification of Fiscal Policy Shocks
3.3.2.1 Exogenous Tax Changes for United States
In defining our exogenous tax shocks for the United States, we follow Romer and Romer
(2010). They conduct a narrative analysis that focuses on identifying all significant federal tax
actions from 1947 to 2007. The sources used to identify the shocks are public government doc-
uments coming from both the executive branch (e.g. Economic Report of the President) and the
legislative branch (e.g. Congressional Record). Fifty significant exogenous federal tax actions are
identified and analysis is limited to tax actions that actually change tax liabilities. The size of tax
changes are measured at the time of implementation and are normalized by the previous period’s
nominal GDP.
Common measures of tax shocks typically focus on changes in overall revenues and changes
in cyclically adjusted revenues (see Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). A concern with using these
measures for tax shocks is that they could reflect endogenous policy responses to the economic
49
environment. The goal in using the narrative analysis is to avoid the potential correlation of tax
shocks with influences on aggregate outcomes. To accomplish this, federal tax actions are classified
into four categories: spending-driven, countercyclical, deficit-driven, and for long-run growth. The
spending-driven and countercyclical tax actions are considered endogenous tax changes because
they are correlated with other forces affecting output in the short run. These tax changes are
typically taken in response to current or future economic conditions, so we exclude them from our
analysis.
The two tax actions we focus on are the deficit-driven tax change and the long-run tax change
aimed at raising growth in the long run. Both tax changes are not motivated by current or future
short-run economic conditions. We find that these tax changes have low correlations with all of
our state variables, which is consistent with our goal of using exogenous shocks in our analysis.
By focusing on unexpected policy actions, we can more clearly discern the stock market reaction
to tax changes.
It is important to note that the timing of implementation for tax changes matters from a the-
oretical perspective. Yang (2005) and Leeper, Walker, and Yang (2009) point out the differences
between anticipated and unanticipated tax changes. Romer and Romer (2010) take this into ac-
count and find only slight evidence of expectational effects. They find that the relationship between
exogenous tax increases (when liabilities actually change) and output is robust while including a
proxy for fiscal news. If anything, not correctly timing the implementation should bias our results
toward showing no effects.
3.3.2.2 Exogenous Government Spending Changes for United States
For the government spending shocks, we follow Ramey (2011). Similar to Romer and Romer
(2010), a narrative analysis is conducted to identify exogenous defense spending shocks from 1947
to 2012. The sources used to identify the shocks are from Business Week as well as several other
newspaper sources because government officials have often underestimated the cost of military
actions. These shocks are deemed exogenous because they are unrelated to the state of the economy
or future short-run economic conditions.
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In contrast to the exogenous tax shocks, Ramey (2011) points out that changes in government
spending are often anticipated long before changes in government spending actually occur (e.g.
years in advance), which suggests standard VARS do not properly capture the timing of spending
shocks. This is addressed by calculating the present discounted value of unexpected news about
current and future defense spending. These shocks are then normalized by the previous period’s
nominal GDP. Although the narrative analysis is admittedly subjective, we find that the defense
spending shocks have low correlations with all of our state variables, which is consistent with our
goal of clearly discerning the stock market reaction to government spending.
It also should be noted that unlike Romer and Romer (2010), Ramey (2011) does not try to
exclude events in which both government spending and distortionary taxes rise in the same period.
Our tax shocks exclude spending-driven tax changes, whereas the defense spending shocks are
typically accompanied by increases in distortionary taxes during a military build-up.
3.3.2.3 Exogenous Government Spending Changes By Sector for United States
We define the industry-specific government spending shocks as in Nekarda and Ramey (2011).
The data is only available on an annual basis from 1965 to 2005. The spending shocks are com-
puted in multiple steps. First, with annual industry-specific government spending for over 275
industries, we link each of the industries by SIC code to each of the Fama and French 17 Industry
Portfolios. We compute a value weighted average of the government spending based on the SICs
within each Fama and French portfolio. Next, upon calculating the industry specific government
spending for each Fama and French portfolio, we orthogonalize these variables with respect to the
VAR state variables to obtain our exogenous spending shocks. We then estimate the effects of our
orthogonalized spending shocks on the excess equity returns for each portfolio.
3.3.2.4 Exogenous Tax Changes for United Kingdom
We define the United Kingdom exogenous tax changes as in Cloyne (2013). Shocks are identi-
fied using a narrative analysis from 1945 to 2009. Detailed revenue forecasts and highly centralized
tax policy allow for the categorizing of 2,500 discretionary policy changes. This translates into 60
percent of the quarters having non-zero entries for the exogenous shocks.
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Similar to Romer and Romer (2010), tax policy changes that are related to the funding of spend-
ing decisions, managing demand, stimulating production, or offseting a debt crisis are considered
endogenous. Shocks that are considered exogenous are those taken to improve long-run economic
performance, fiscal measures based on long-run considerations, and ideological changes related to
political party causes.
Cloyne (2013) tests the Granger causality of the exogenous tax shocks and finds that output,
government spending, inflation, and the policy interest rate have zero coefficients. In contrast,
the tax changes that are categorized as countercyclical or endogenous are found to be predictable.
Furthermore, an analysis of anticipated versus unexpected shocks also shows that the decision to
change taxes is not forecastable based on past information. An ordered probit model estimated by
maximum likelihood shows a failure to reject the hypothesis that past information in the regression
contain no information for forecasting the exogenous tax shocks.
3.3.3 Sample Period
Our analysis focuses on the post-World War II period for which we can construct a series
of fiscal policy shocks, either tax policy shocks or defense spending shocks. We are therefore
constrained to the period in which quarterly national income and product accounts (NIPA) are
available: 1947q1 to 2012q4. Since identifying the exact announcement date for our fiscal policy
shocks is difficult we restrict our analysis to estimating equations 14-17 using quarterly data.
The results presented below focus on four periods, the full sample period and three subsamples.
We define the following subsamples: 1947q1-1980q2, 1980q3-2012q4 and 1980q3-2008q2. Our
cutoff between 1980q2 and 1980q3 captures the Pre- and Post-Volcker period in our data.5 We also
consider ending our sample before the financial crisis to avoid structural breaks at the end of our
sample where breaks are difficult to detect.
5Distinguishing between these two periods is important economically as inflation targeting reduced the yields (and
variation in yields) of treasuries used in our VAR specification.We confirm that the distinction between these two
periods is also important statistically. Specifically, we test for multiple unknown structural breaks using the SupW
test of Andrews (1993). We allow for heteroskedasticity within regimes and implement the fixed regressor bootstrap
of Hansen (2000) to calculate the critical values for our conditional model.
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3.3.4 Bootstrap Algorithm
To calculate standard errors for our news decomposition, we follow the algorithm proposed by
Maio (2013). Specifically, we estimate the VAR given in equation 6 to obtain Â and a vector of
residuals, ŵt+1. For each bootstrap replication b = 1, ..., 1000, we then draw with replacement a
series of residuals
{ŵbt+1}, t = sb1, sb2, ..., sbT , (3.26)
where the residuals in the VAR have the same time sequence to preserve any contemporaneous
cross-correlation. We then separately draw with replacement a series of fiscal policy shocks
{FISCALbt+1}, t = rb1, rb2, ..., rbT . (3.27)
After estimating the effects of the fiscal shock given by equations 14-17 for each bootstrapped
sample, we can construct the empirical standard error in the usual way.6
3.4 Results
Throughout the paper we report results that are quarterly for the full sample period 1947q1-
2012q4, as well as for subsamples 1947q1-1980q2, 1980q3-2008q2, and 1980q3-2012q4. The
initial period for the full sample is constrained by the availability of our data, specifically the
quarterly tax shocks of Romer and Romer (2010). The breaking point of 1980q2 is consistent with
the notion of a major shift in monetary policy, which we refer to as Pre-Volcker and Post-Volcker.
A test for a structural break confirms this date as an acceptable point at which to split the data.
We also focus on two different windows for the Post-Volcker era, with the difference being the
exclusion of the financial crisis of 2008.
Table 3.1 reports basic summary statistics about the state variables included in our benchmark
6Since both the residual draws for the VAR and the fiscal policy shock draws are independent, we term this boot-
strap algorithm an independent-independent algorithm. We consider two additional algorithms: a block-independent
algorithm and a block-block algorithm. In these cases, the block draw is a stationary bootstrap, or a moving block
bootstrap where block size is varied randomly. See Politis and Romano (1994) for additional details. Results are
quantitatively similar using either of these alternative algorithms.
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VAR. The standard deviations are reported in the first column and the remaining entries represent
correlations. A few points are worth mentioning. First, as one might expect, the excess equity
return has the highest volatility amongst the state variables. Furthermore, the excess equity return
and excess bond return have a very low correlation. Both of these features are consistent with the
smaller sample periods (not shown) and the data used in Campbell and Ammer (1993).
The major takeaway coming from Table 3.1 is that our exogenous tax shocks as defined by
Romer and Romer (2010) along with our defense spending shocks as defined by Ramey (2011)
have very low correlations with the rest of the variables in the VAR. This suggests that even though
the shocks are coming from narratives, their lack of correlation with the other state variables ap-
pears to be consistent with our assumption of their exogeneity. Although small, the correlation of
both exogenous shocks with respect to the excess equity return is positive.
The potential channels through which this positive correlation could be operating include the
negative correlation between the change in the T-Bill and the tax shocks, reflecting the possibility
of lower crowding out as taxes rise, holding all else constant. Lower crowding out would entail
lower discount rates and higher current equity excess returns. In addition, the observed negative
correlation between the dividend yield and the tax shocks is consistent with higher taxes being
associated with lower cash-flow news. These correlations are broadly concurrent with our more
formal analysis of the effects of fiscal policy on discount rate news and cash-flow news below.
3.4.1 The Effects of Exogenous Tax Shocks on Excess Returns
This section focuses on the effects of tax shocks as identified by Romer and Romer (2010). We
proceed by first discussing the effects on the aggregate stock market, followed by a discussion of
the effects on the excess returns of 10 year T-Notes.
3.4.1.1 The Effects of Exogenous Tax Shocks on Equity
Table 3.2 shows the effect of exogenous tax shocks on the current unexpected excess return,
future excess return news, real interest rate news, and cash-flow news. Significance is found for
both Post-Volcker periods for the current excess return, real interest rate news, and the residual
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cash-flow news coming from the Campbell and Ammer (1993) method. In words, a one percent
increase in tax revenues as a percentage of GDP results in a 7.7615% increase in the unexpected
excess equity return. This increase in the unexpected return is coming from the 9.47% decrease in
real interest rate news. As real interest rate news declines, the return rises because the cash-flows
are being discounted at a lower rate.7
The cash-flow news based on the Chen and Zhao (2009) direct modeling of dividends yields
an insignificant coefficient, regardless of the time period. In contrast, the Campbell and Ammer
(1993) residual cash-flow method yields a negative effect of taxes on future cash-flow news. Cash-
flow news reflects future expected dividends that are the result of production and profits.
3.4.1.2 The Effects of Exogenous Tax Shocks on Bonds
Table 3.3 shows the effect of tax shocks on the current unexpected excess return on the 10
year T-Note, future bond excess return news, real interest rate news, and inflation news. None of
the time periods result in a significant effect on the current unexpected excess return. However,
both the future bond excess return news, real interest rate news, and inflation news channels are
significant for the Pre-Volcker period. Exogenous increases in taxes are associated with a -9.69%
drop in inflation news.
The fall in inflation news is consistent with higher future expected excess bond returns. The
combination with the positive effects on real interest rates appears to cancel out the overall effect
on the current excess bond return. One should notice that in the previous analysis the effect of
taxes on real interest rate news was negative. However, this change in sign is perfectly consistent
with the above equity analysis as the time period is now the Pre-Volcker period as opposed to the
Post-Volcker period. The relationship between inflation and real interest rates flips going from
7The concurrent effects of monetary policy are frequently suggested as a possible issue with our estimation. We
address this concern in two ways. First, we incorporate the federal funds rate as an additional state variable and find
quantitatively similar results. Second, we perform a Hall (1988) and Evans (1992) test by regressing our tax shocks on
the monetary policy shocks used in Bernanke and Kuttner (2005). Specifically, we regress our tax shocks on four lags
of our tax shocks, contemporaneous monetary policy shocks and four lags of monetary policy shocks. We fail to reject
the hypothesis of exogeneity (p-value = 0.4649) over the period where both of these shocks are available, 1989Q2 to
2008Q2.
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Pre-Volcker to Post-Volcker, as discussed in Section B.3.2.
3.4.2 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Defense Spending on Excess Returns
This section focuses on the effects of defense spending shocks as identified by Ramey (2011).
We proceed by first discussing the effects on the aggregate stock market, followed by a discussion
of the effects on the excess returns of 10 year T-Notes.
3.4.2.1 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Defense Spending on Equity
Table 3.4 lists the effects of defense spending shocks. Given the limited scope of the shocks,
as they pertain strictly to the defense industry, we find no significance for the current unexpected
excess return or any of the channels based on the Campbell and Ammer (1993) residual method.
While we do find a positive significant effect on the cash-flow channel based on the Chen and Zhao
(2009) method of directly modeling dividends, we also find an equally signficant negative effect
on the residual, which in effect cancels out the positive effect on the cash-flow news channel. The
limited scope of the defense spending shocks on the entire stock market would suggest a focus on a
smaller subset of stocks that are directly affected by defense spending would be more appropriate.
We explore this idea in Section 3.5.1.2.
3.4.2.2 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Defense Spending on Bonds
Table 3.5 shows no significance on any of the channels with the exception of the effect on
inflation news for the entire sample. In words, a one percent increase in government spending as a
ratio of nominal GDP raises future inflation news 0.39%. The increase in aggregate demand due to
higher government spending is consistent with textbook theory that would suggest higher inflation.
In addition, although the effect on real interest rate news is insignificant, the positive effect for the
Post-Volcker time period is fully consistent with a standard New Keynesian DSGE model.
While these tests provide little evidence of the impact of government spending shocks on mar-
ket returns, there are several reasons why this finding may be the case. First over our sample
period, there have been relatively few shocks to defense spending. This resulting lack of power
is consistent with many of the signs of our results being in the hypothesized direction but the
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absence of statistical significance. Second, these shocks to defense spending may be funded by
distortionary taxes. If these two shocks to fiscal policy work in opposite directions as hypothe-
sized, changes to tax policy concurrent with defense spending shocks would bias against finding
results. Third, defense spending may be concentrated in a few firms with relatively few spillovers
to other industries due to input-output linkages. When aggregate to the market as a whole, this
concentrated loading on defense spending may be muted, consistent with out lack of findings. We
explore industry-specific sensitivities to government spending in the next section.
3.5 Additional Tests
In this section, we discuss results from cross-sectional variation in the exposure to our ex-
ogenous shocks to fiscal policy and the effects of exogenous tax shocks on excess returns in the
UK.
3.5.1 Cross-sectional Results
To begin, we explore cross-sectional variation in the impact of exogenous fiscal policy shocks
on excess stock returns and the specific news channels through which these shocks operate. Our
approach follows that of Maio (2013) in that we sort stocks into portfolios based on specific stock
characteristics which should proxy for differential exposures to the fiscal policy shocks. We then
calculate value-weighted returns for each of these portfolios and consider the impact of fiscal policy
surprises on the news components of current unexpected excess returns.8 For these portfolios, the
state vector for the VAR associated with portfolio p is given by
Zpt ≡ [rpex,t, rreal,t, ∆rt, SPREADt, dt − pt, RELt]′ (3.28)
where rpex,t is the excess return of portfolio p in quarter t and the other state variables are as defined
above. In this specification, we proxy portfolio-specific dividend growth with aggregate dividend
8Results are quantitatively similar if portfolio returns are equally-weighted. These results are available from the
authors upon request.
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growth.9
3.5.1.1 The Effects of Exogenous Tax Shocks on Specific Industries
Changes to tax policy could have a differential impact on firms with different marginal tax
rates. For example, low marginal tax rate firms may receive preferential treatment from progressive
changes to tax policy relative to high marginal tax rate firms. This preferential treatment would
manifest itself in higher current excess returns. The increase in returns may be attributable to
news about discount rates. Consider a simple tradeoff model where tax policy increases and the
shift is more progressive. The present value of the tax shield increases so firms take on more
debt with the increase in leverage disproportionately coming from high MTR firms. Since cost
of equity is increasing in leverage, high marginal tax rate firms have higher future excess returns.
Alternatively, the increase in returns may be attributable to news about cash flows. This evidence
would be consistent with a new tax policy where net transfers to firms are more progressive after
the policy.
To proxy for differences in firm exposure to changes in tax policy, we consider a firm’s marginal
tax rate as calculated in Graham and Mills (2008).10 Changes to either tax rates or transfers within
these groups would generate differences in these marginal tax rate portfolios’ current excess stock
9 We also consider an alternative VAR specification given by
Zpt ≡ [rpex,t, rreal,t, ∆rt, SPREADt, dpt − ppt , RELt]′ (3.29)
where dpt−ppt is the log dividend price ratio for portfolio p in quarter t. In this specification, portfolio-specific dividend
growth is proxied by the value-weighted dividend growth. The dividend-price ratio of portfolio p is given by
Dp,t+1
Pp,t+1
= Rp,t+1R
∗
p,t+1 − 1, (3.30)
and the dividend growth of portfolio p is given by
Dp,t+1
Dp,t
= Rp,t+1 −R∗p,t+1Rp,tR∗p,tR∗p,t. (3.31)
Dp,t+1 denotes the dividend level for portfolio p in quarter t + 1. Pp,t+1 denotes the price level for portfolio p
in quarter t + 1. Rp,t+1 denotes the gross return for portfolio p in quarter t + 1. R∗p,t+1 denotes the gross return
excluding dividends for portfolio p in quarter t+ 1. Results using this alternative specification are qualitatively similar
to the reported results and are available upon request.
10We thank John Graham for making these data available. For additional details regarding the simulation of firms’
marginal tax rates, see Graham (1996a) and Graham (1996b).
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returns or the news components of these returns.
Following Fama and French, we form tercile portfolios in June of year t using simulated
marginal tax rates at year end for fiscal year t− 1. After calculating the smoothed dividend growth
and dividend-price ratio for these portfolios, we can estimate portfolio responses from 1982q4 to
2012q4.
Table 3.6 reports these results. Overall results are qualitatively similar to the aggregate market
results reported in Table 3.2. Specifically, current excess returns rise in response to shocks to tax
policy with these returns primarily being generated by a decrease in real interest rate news. For both
sample periods, current excess returns decrease monotonically with marginal tax rates consistent
with either a more progressive tax policy or more progressive transfers stemming from the fiscal
policy shock. However, the differences across these extreme portfolios are not significant. The
estimated difference in current excess returns does not appear to be due to a differential impact
of news about real interest rates across the portfolios. Rather, the majority of the difference is
attributable to unmodeled noise.
3.5.1.2 The Effects of Exogenous Shocks to Defense Spending on Specific Industries
We isolate the effects of government defense spending on portfolios likely to be the benefi-
ciaries of such spending. Specifically, we focus on Sectors 10 and 13 of the Fama and French
17 Industry Portfolios11, which fall under the category of Fabricated Products and Transportation,
respectively. The Fabricated Products Sector seems appropriate to further isolate the effects of
the exogenous shocks to defense spending as it includes industries such as Sheet Metal Work and
Ordnance & Accessories. Similarly, the Transportation Sector includes industries such as Aircraft,
Aircraft Engines and Parts, Ship Building and Repair, Guided Missiles and Space Vehicles, and
Tanks & Tank Components.12
11We would like to thank Kenneth French for providing both the industry definitions and return series for each
industry.
12The decision to include these industries is two-fold. First, these sectors contain industries with the largest share
of shipments to the government as reported in Table 1 of Nekarda and Ramey (2011). Second, these sectors contain
SIC codes found in the Aircraft, Shipbuilding/Railroad Equipment, and Defense industries in the Fama and French 48
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As shown in Table 3.8, a one percent increase in the ratio of government spending to nominal
GDP is found to have a significant 0.97% to 1.18% effect on cash-flow news, depending on industry
and time period. The cash-flow channel appears to dominate bad news from unmodelled noise, as
the overall effect on the current excess returns is positive, albeit insignificant.
3.5.1.3 The Effects of Industry-specific Government Spending Shocks
The goal of this section is to move beyond the defense industry and analyze the effects of gov-
ernment spending on other sectors. To accomplish this, we turn our attention to industry-specific
government spending, as defined in Nekarda and Ramey (2011). They focus on the industry-
specific effects of government spending on output and hours, whereas we restrict attention to the
effects on excess equity returns. As shown in Table 3.7, we find a significant positive effect on
cash flows for the Food Sector (1) and the Clothing and Textiles Sector (4). In addition, over 3/4 of
the Fama and French portfolios show evidence of a positive effect on future cash flows, although
not all are significant. The positive effects on cash flows translates into significant positive excess
returns for the Construction Sector (9) and the Machinery Sector (11).
As before, our lack of findings relating government spending shocks to market returns is con-
sistent with the notion that these spending shocks are funded through changes to tax policy. These
changes to distortionary taxes concurrent with our government spending shocks may bias us against
finding a result.
3.5.2 The Effects of Exogenous Tax Shocks on UK Returns
We extend our analysis beyond the United States to the UK stock market and focus on the
effects of exogenous tax shocks in the UK. Although financial markets in these two countries
are similar, differences in corporate marginal tax rates and differences in the reliance on deficit
industry classification. It should be noted that Fama and French provide other industry definitions that split the stock
market into 5 industries and all the way up to 49 industry portfolios. We found that more refined specifications of
industry portfolios resulted in some portfolios with as little as 5 firms throughout the time period, making it difficult to
detect any significance due to the higher level of noise. The choice of focusing on the 17 Industry Portfolios allowed
us to greater isolate the potential effects of defense spending while not yielding a substantial increase in idiosyncratic
volatility as the number of firms in each portfolio is often greater than 100.
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spending may drive differences in the impact of tax shocks on excess equity and bond returns
across the two countries.
We obtain data for the UK analogues of our US state variables from Global Financial Data from
1966 to the present. Exogenous tax shocks are defined in a similar manner to Romer and Romer
(2010) and are obtained from Cloyne (2013) for the years 1947 to 2009. We split the data into a
subsample starting in the second quarter of 1975 in order to avoid the 75% aggregate stock market
return that occurred in the first quarter of 1975. For the subsample starting in 1975, we find that a
one percent increase in taxes relative to GDP results in a significant 7.16% drop in real interest rate
news. This result is quantitatively consistent with the Post-Volcker era for the US stock market in
which there was a 9.47% drop in real interest rate news.
In contrast to the effects of tax shocks on the US stock market, we find that UK tax shocks
have a significant positive effect on inflation news. However, this channel is dominated by the
fall in interest rate news as the overall effect on the current excess bond return is positive. This
positive but insignificant effect of taxes on the current excess bond return is consistent with what
we observe for the US in Table 3.3.
3.6 DSGE Simulation
This sections provides model predictions for the effects of fiscal policy on equity returns based
on the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007). Fol-
lowing a typical parameter specification and calibration, we show that higher taxes result in lower
real interest rate news and lower cash flow news using simulated data coming from the general
equilibrium model. We also show that if monetary policy places a greater weight on output, the
effect of higher taxes on the discount rate and cash flow channels may flip signs.
3.6.1 Households
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical infinitely lived households. Each house-
hold has preferences defined for consumption, ct, and labor hours, ht. Preferences are based on the
standard CRRA utility function
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E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
(cιt(1− ht)1−ι)1−σ − 1
1− σ (3.32)
where Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at time t,
β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor, ct is the consumption, and ht is labor. The consumption
good is assumed to be a composite good produced with a continuum of differentiated goods, cit,
i ∈ [0, 1], via the aggregator function
ct =
[∫ 1
0
c
1−1/η
it di
]1/(1−1/η)
(3.33)
where the parameter η > 1 denotes the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across different vari-
eties of consumption goods. For any given level of consumption of the composite good, purchases
of each variety i in period t must solve the dual problem of minimizing total expenditure,
∫ 1
0
Pitcitdi
subject to the aggregation constraint above, where Pit denotes the nominal price of a good of vari-
ety i at time t. Upon solving this problem, the optimal level of cit is given by cit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
ct and
Pt is a nominal price index given by Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηit di
]1/(1−η)
. This price index has the property
that the minimum cost of a bundle of intermediate goods yielding ct units of the composite good
is given by Ptct.
Households are assumed to have access to a complete set of nominal contingent claims. The
household’s budget constraint is given by
Etdt,s
xt+1
Pt
+ ct + it =
xt
Pt
+ (1− τDt ) · (wtht + utkt) + δqtτDt kt + φt (3.34)
where dt,s is the stochastic discount factor, defined such that Etdt,sxs is the nominal value in
period t of a random nominal payment xs in period s ≥ t. The variable it denotes investment, τDt
is the distortionary income tax rate, wt is the real wage, ut is the rental rate of capital, kt denotes
capital, and qt denotes the market price of one unit of installed capital. The term δτDt qtkt denotes
deprecation allowance for tax purposes and φt denotes profits received from ownership of firms
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net of income taxes.
The evolution of capital is given by
kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + itΨt
(
it
it−1
)
(3.35)
where the function Ψ represents investment adjustment costs that take the form Ψ(x) = 1− ψ
2
(x−
1)2 and ψ is a positive constant set equal to 2.48 in line with Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005a). Without adjustment costs on investment, the price of capital (or aggregate stock market
price) would never change because the supply would be perfectly elastic and always equal to one.
Households are assumed to be subject to a borrowing limit that prevents them from engaging in
Ponzi schemes.
3.6.2 The Government
The government issues one-period nominal risk-free bonds, Bt, collects tax revenues Ptτt, and
spends an exogenous amount each period, gt. In real terms, the government’s budget constraint is
bt =
Rt−1
pit
bt−1 + gt − τt (3.36)
where lower case letters denote real values, pit ≡ Pt/Pt−1 denotes gross consumer price inflation,
Rt denotes the gross one-period risk free nominal interest rate in period t.
Total tax revenues are τt = τDt yt. The fiscal rule is defined so that tax revenues must rise with
debt
τt = τ
∗ + γ1(Rt−1bt−1 −R∗b∗) (3.37)
where γ1 denotes how fast taxes are paid back, τ ∗ and B∗ denote the deterministic steady state
values of τt and Bt respectively.
To analyze the effect of tax shocks, a normal, mean zero shock is appended to the tax revenue
equation such that
τt
yt
= τDt + 
tax
t . (3.38)
63
The standard deviation is set to match the standard deviation of the tax shocks coming from Romer
and Romer (2010).
The monetary authority sets the short-term nominal interest rate according to a simple feedback
rule.
ln(Rt/R
∗) = αr ln(Rt−1/R∗) + (1− αr) [αpi ln(pit/pi∗) + αy ln(yt/y∗)] (3.39)
where y∗ denotes the deterministic steady state of output.
3.6.3 Firms
Each variety i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically competitive environ-
ment. The production technology is given by ztkθith
1−θ
it − χ where χ denotes fixed costs and zt
denotes an exogenous, aggregate productivity shock.
Aggregate demand for good i is denoted by ait = cit + iit + git = (Pit/Pt)−ηat given the
aggregation constraint. It is assumed that the firm must satisfy demand at the posted price so that
firms maximize expected profits subject to the following constraint
ztk
θ
ith
1−θ
it − χ ≥
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
at (3.40)
Prices are assumed to be sticky as in Calvo (1983). Each period a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of randomly
picked firms are unable to change the nominal price of the good it produces. The remaining (1-α)
firms choose prices optimally.
3.6.4 Calibration
The deep structural parameters have been set to the values in Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007).
Since the goal of Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) was to determine optimal policy and not nec-
essarily to match empirical moments when specifying fiscal and monetary policy, we turn to prior
literature to set the remaining parameters in our model. The four parameters that we are unable to
obtain directly from Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007) are γ1, the speed of tax repayment, αpi, the
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Parameter Value Description
σ 2 Relative Risk Aversion
θ 0.3 Cost share of capital
β 0.99 Quarterly subjective discount rate
η 5 Price Elasticity of Demand
δ 0.025 Quarterly Depreciation Rate
α 0.8 Share of firms that can change price each period
ι 3.6133 Set to match Labor = 0.2
Ψ 2.48 Investment Adjustment Cost Parameter (CEE 2005)
χ 0.0968 Fixed cost parameter
ρG 0.87 Serial correlation of government spending
σG 0.016 Standard deviation of innovation to government purchases
ρz 0.8556 Serial correlation of productivity shock
σz 0.0064 Standard deviation of innovation to productivity shock
ρτ 0.997 Serial correlation of tax shock
στ 0.0022 Standard deviation of innovation to tax rate Romer and Romer (2007)
inflation coefficient, αy, the output coefficient, and αR, the inertia coefficient in the monetary pol-
icy rule. For fiscal policy, our choice for the speed of tax repayment comes from recent estimates
by Drautzburg and Uhlig (2011), which we set to 0.03.
For monetary policy, the inertia coefficient is set to 0.9 which is consistent with recent estimates
by Christiano, Rostagno, and Motto (2010). We set the inflation coefficient for the post-Volcker
era to 1.5 and the output gap coefficient to 0.5/4, which is consistent with Taylor (1993) and Smets
and Wouters (2007). For our pre-Volcker era simulation, we modify only one parameter and that is
the weight on the output gap. There is a consensus that greater weight was placed on output during
this time period, and our weight of 0.85/4 is consistent with the estimation of Smets and Wouters
(2007).
3.6.5 DSGE Results
Our DSGE model results present the exact mapping from the initial fiscal policy shock to the
endogenous responses of returns and cash flows implied by the solution to the model. We solve the
model by taking a second order approximation of the nonlinear equilibrium conditions. Since we
observe the responses to returns and cash flows directly in our model economy, it is unnecessary
to use a vector autoregression to estimate the effects of tax and government spending shocks on
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news about future excess returns, interest rates, and cash-flows.13 The effect that our shocks have
on news is computed by finding the discounted (ρ = 0.99623) sum of the responses following the
shock to fiscal policy.14
We start with a discussion of the impact of an exogenous tax shock on the economy as depicted
in Figure 3.1. Then, we consider the impact of the tax shock on stock returns through the channels
of discount rate news and cash flow news.
Figure 3.1 presents the impulse response functions for an exogenous tax shock. Our discussion
starts with the dynamics for the Post-Volcker era calibration. At the onset of the tax shock, per-
manent income declines causing consumption growth to fall. The fall in consumption growth is
consistent with a lower real risk free rate, as agents engage in precautionary savings to smooth the
associated fall in future consumption. This explains the negative effect on real interest rate news.
The fall in consumption growth also raises marginal utility so the stochastic discount factor also
rises. Monetary policy amplifies the negative effect on the discount rate by further reducing nom-
inal rates in response to the negative demand shock. The discount effect dominates the negative
cash-flow effect (coming from lower output) so that the price of equity rises initially. The rise in
the price of equity helps explain the positive current excess return.
To understand the dynamics for the Pre-Volcker era, note that monetary policy responds more
forcefully to deviations of output in this calibration. Upon the higher tax shock, monetary policy’s
greater emphasis on output is taken into account by households and acts like a “put” or insurance.
The positive effects of monetary policy’s reaction dominates the negative fiscal policy shock, which
leads to an increase of consumption growth and a corresponding rise in the real interest rate. The
relatively higher output for the Pre-Volcker policy leads to a positive effect on future cash flows,
but this effect is dominated by the positive real interest rate and future excess return news. The
current excess return declines due to the fall in the price of equity in the initial period of the shock,
13Alternately, we can estimate our empirical VAR specification using simulated data from our DSGE model. Results
are quantitatively similar and available from the authors upon request.
14In keeping with this goal of consistency with our empirical results, we also compute cash-flows news for excess
equity returns and future excess bond returns as residuals within our DSGE framework.
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which is due to the higher discount channel dominating.
Table 3.10 reports the discounted sum of these effects on equity returns, which can be compared
to the empirical evidence in Table 2. Note that the signs match up between Table 2 and Table 10 for
the effect on each channel and for both time periods. More importantly, the magnitudes predicted
by the model are all within one standard error of their empirical counterparts.
In addition to the above analysis, changes to tax policy could have a differential impact on
firms with different marginal tax rates. To provide a rough benchmark for our cross-sectional
results regarding high vs. low marginal tax rate firms, we consider an additional calibration of our
model when firms are subject to higher taxes. In this high marginal tax rate calibration, we set the
marginal tax rate to 35% versus 17% for the baseline Post-Volcker setup. Upon a one percent tax
increase, we find that the high MTR results in a greater negative cash flow effect which contributes
to a lower current excess return.
Table 3.11 reports the discounted sum of these effects on bond returns. For the Pre-Volcker era,
our DSGE model predicts that both current excess bond returns and real interest rate news will be
positive while inflation news will be negative. The negative inflation news component dominates
in the simulated data. In our theoretical framework, inflation responds negatively because firms
find it optimal to lower prices as future expected marginal costs are relatively lower compared to
future expected marginal revenues. The higher expected marginal revenues is a result of monetary
policy placing upward pressure on output after the positive tax shock.
We now focus on the impact of an exogenous shock to government spending implied by our
model. Government spending shocks are frequently more short-lived than tax shocks. It is for this
reason, the effects of government spending are much smaller in magnitude on forward-looking
asset prices compared to the permanent tax shocks. Furthermore, given that our model is general
equilibrium, increases in government spending are associated with higher future tax rates that are
necessary to balance the budget. Our model predicts that high government spending is associated
with higher inflation, higher real interest rate news, and lower current excess bond returns, which
can be seen in Table 3.11. It also predicts that the price of equity will be largely unaffected for the
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Post-Volcker period. The Pre-Volcker period leads to a sizable decline in the price of equity due
to the higher discount rates coming from higher consumption growth. The higher consumption
growth is due to the positive effects of monetary policy in response to the higher government
spending shock and associated higher future taxes.
Overall, a major takeaway from this theoretical exercise is that the effects of fiscal policy are
highly dependent upon the reaction of monetary policy. Monetary policy can amplify/diminish
the discount rate channel depending on the relative weight on output, which also can affect the
cash flow channel, as shown above. To recap, direct comparisons of the effects on the cash flow
and discount rate channels are shown in Table 2 and Table 10. Table 2 provides the empirical
evidence while Table 10 is the theoretical counterpart in the context of our New Keynesian DSGE
model. The theoretical model is able to match the signs for the Pre-vs-Post Volcker periods, which
is rationalized with the change of just one parameter, the weight on output.
3.7 Conclusion
Our study provides a positive answer on how fiscal policy affects the stock market by using
a news decomposition. The news decomposition allows us to split the variation in unexpected
stock market returns into three fundamental components: news about future excess returns, news
about future interest rates, and news about future cash flows or dividends. Explaining the relative
influence of each channel is important because it provides the empirical foundation for modeling
the theoretical relationship between asset prices and fiscal policy.
We examine the effects of both tax shocks and spending shocks. Out of the two types of fiscal
policy, we find that taxes have the most significant and robust effects on the stock market. For the
Post-1980 era, increased taxes have a significantly positive effect on the unexpected excess return
despite the significant fall in future cash flows based on the Campbell and Ammer (1993) method.
This is because the decrease in real-interest-rate news dominates the fall in future cash flows. With
cash flows being discounted at a lower rate, the excess return rises in response to higher taxes. This
finding is consistent with our standard New Keynesian DSGE model, as the fall in consumption
growth due to higher taxes is associated with lower real interest rates. For the Pre-1980 era, the
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effects on the cash flow and discount rate channel flip signs as monetary policy provides insurance
against the higher tax shock. This theoretical prediction is confirmed by our empirical evidence, as
we no longer find significance for this time period and the effects on the channels become positive.
Government spending is an equally important component of fiscal policy, although we find less
significance when compared to the effects of tax shocks. With regards to defense spending shocks,
we find a positive significant effect on directly modeled cash flow news. Our findings may be less
significant than the case with taxes due to statistical lack of power, changes to distortionary tax
policy concurrent with government spending shocks, or the benefactors of government spending
contracts being a relatively small subset of the market as a whole. Furthermore, the government
spending shocks are more temporary in nature than our observed tax shocks, which also implies a
smaller quantitative effect on forward-looking asset prices.
To better isolate the effects of fiscal policy, we further examine the industry specific effects of
tax shocks and defense spending shocks and continue to find significance. Finally, we extend our
analysis to the international setting and show that UK fiscal policy has similar significant effects
on the UK stock market.
Overall, our study documents the channels through which fiscal policy has significant effects
on asset prices using a news decomposition. We have shown that many of the predictions of a
standard New Keynesian model are fully consistent with our empirical findings. Specifically, the
stance of monetary policy is very important in determining the effects of fiscal policy on financial
markets. Future research should focus on whether or not the effects we find are state-dependent,
to see if the impact depends on whether or not the economy is in a recession or expansion.
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Figure 3.1: DSGE Impulse Response Functions for Exogenous Tax Shock
This figure presents quarterly percent deviations from the steady state for a positive shock to the
tax rate. All parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Section 3.6.
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Figure 3.2: DSGE Impulse Response Functions for Exogenous Govt. Spending Shock
This figure presents quarterly percent deviations from the steady state for a positive shock to gov-
ernment spending. All parameters are calibrated to the values reported in Section 3.6.
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Table 3.1: Correlation Matrix for VAR State Variables and Fiscal Policy Shocks
This table reports the standard deviations and correlations for the VAR state variables, the exogenous tax shocks, and the exogenous
shocks to defense spending for the full sample of 1947q1 to 2012q4. The exogenous shocks are normalized by the nominal GDP from
the previous period. The VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous tax shocks are defined as in Romer and Romer (2010).
Exogenous shocks to defense spending are defined as in Ramey (2011).
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SPREADt 1.379 0.115 0.214 -0.048 -0.327
dt − pt 0.437 -0.032 -0.076 -0.076 0.008 -0.241
RELt 1.017 -0.139 -0.434 -0.111 0.746 -0.541 0.046
Romer Tax Shocks/GDPt−1 0.222 0.028 0.050 0.001 -0.116 0.038 -0.060 0.027
Ramey Defense Shocks/GDPt−1 4.631 0.092 -0.050 -0.228 0.019 -0.070 0.148 0.036 0.002
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Table 3.2: The impact of exogenous tax shocks on dividends, interest rates, and future excess
equity returns
This table reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess equity return, and the
discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest rates, and current
and future dividends (cash flows). Both the Chen and Zhao (2009) and Campbell and Ammer
(1993) methods of computing cash flow news are provided. The six-variable VAR(1) used to
construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated
in the column headings. The VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous tax shocks are
defined as in Romer and Romer (2010). Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm
discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent
levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Current Excess Return 1.771 −3.772 7.762∗∗ 8.236∗∗
Future Excess Return −1.469 5.413 −3.651 −4.099
Real Interest Rate News 1.287 1.096 −9.472∗∗∗ −9.958∗∗∗
Cash Flow News 2.769 4.272 18.486 5.195
Residual −1.180 −1.534 −23.846∗∗ −11.015∗∗
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 1.588 2.738 −5.361∗∗ −5.820∗∗∗
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Table 3.3: The impact of exogenous tax shocks on bond returns, interest rates, and inflation
This table reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess bond return, and the
discounted sums of future excess bond returns, current and future real interest rates, and current and
future inflation. The five-variable VAR(1) used to construct excess bond return and real interest rate
forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. The VAR state variables
are defined in the text. Exogenous tax shocks are defined as in Romer and Romer (2010). Standard
errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Current Excess Bond Return 1.130 0.248 0.309 0.842
Future Excess Bond Returns 4.669∗∗ 4.934∗∗ 4.209 3.244
Real Interest Rate News 0.552 4.514∗∗ −2.369 −2.084
Inflation News −6.352∗∗ −9.695∗∗ −2.149 −2.002
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Table 3.4: The impact of exogenous defense spending shocks on dividends, interest rates, and
future excess equity returns
This table reports the impact of exogenous shocks to defense spending on the current excess equity
return, and the discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest
rates, and current and future dividends (cash flows). Both the Chen and Zhao (2009) and Campbell
and Ammer (1993) methods of computing cash flow news are provided. The six-variable VAR(1)
used to construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample
indicated in the column headings. The VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous
shocks to defense spending are defined as in Ramey (2011). Standard errors are calculated by the
bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Current Excess Return 0.118 0.109 −0.362 −0.918
Future Excess Return 0.095 0.138 0.277 0.586
Real Interest Rate News −0.236 −0.238 −0.598 0.314
Cash Flow News 1.189∗∗ 1.007∗ −1.144 −0.613
Residual −1.212∗∗ −0.998∗ 0.462 0.594
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual −0.023 0.009 −0.683 −0.018
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Table 3.5: The impact of exogenous defense spending shocks on bond returns, interest rates, and
inflation
This table reports the impact of exogenous shocks to defense spending on the current excess bond
return, and the discounted sums of future excess bond returns, current and future real interest rates,
and current and future inflation. The five-variable VAR(1) used to construct excess bond return
and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. The
VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous shocks to defense spending are defined as
in Ramey (2011). Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section
3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Current Excess Bond Return −0.035 −0.023 −0.649 −0.131
Future Excess Bond Returns −0.268 −0.190 −0.085 −0.254
Real Interest Rate News −0.095 −0.208 0.235 0.078
Inflation News 0.397∗ 0.421 0.498 0.307
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Table 3.6: The impact of exogenous tax shocks on portfolios formed on marginal tax rates
This table reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess equity return, and the
discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest rates, and current
and future dividends (cash flows) for portfolios formed on marginal tax rates. Both the Chen and
Zhao (2009) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) methods of computing cash flow news are provided.
The six-variable VAR(1) used to construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is
estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. Following Fama and French, we form
three value-weighted portfolios at the end of June of each year t based on simulated marginal tax
rates from Graham and Mills (2008). Low MTR is the portfolio with the lowest tercile marginal
tax rates. High MTR is the portfolio with the lowest tercile marginal tax rates. Diff is the
difference in the responses between these two portfolios. The VAR state variables are defined in
the text. Exogenous tax shocks are defined as in Romer and Romer (2010). Standard errors are
calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Low MTR High MTR Diff
Panel A: 1982q4-2008q2
Current Excess Return 11.476∗ 7.516∗ −3.960
Future Excess Return −4.200 −4.555 −0.355
Real Interest Rate News −5.592∗∗ −5.511∗∗ 0.081
Cash Flow News 6.797 6.468 −0.329
Residual −5.113 −9.018 −3.905
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 1.684 −2.550 −4.233
Panel B: 1982q4-2012q4
Current Excess Return 10.983∗ 6.967 −4.016
Future Excess Return −3.836 −3.923 −0.086
Real Interest Rate News −5.204 −5.206 −0.002
Cash Flow News 18.137 17.502 −0.636
Residual −16.195 −19.663 −3.468
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 1.942 −2.162 −4.104
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Table 3.7: The impact of government spending shocks on sector returns
This table reports the impact of government spending shocks on the current excess equity return, and the discounted sums of future
excess equity returns, current and future real interest rates, and current and future dividends (cash flows) for Fama and French 17
Industry Portfolios. To be included, an industry must have more than one SIC code involved in manufacturing, as defined by inclusion
in the BEA Input-Output Accounts. Both the Chen and Zhao (2009) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) methods of computing cash
flow news are provided. The six-variable VAR(1) used to construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over
the sample indicated in the column headings. Sector returns are value-weighted. We use the alternative VAR specification defined in
Footnote 9 of the text. Government spending shocks are defined in two steps. First, we calculate the the annual government spending in
a particular industry by multiplying the ratio of government spending to lag GDP and the value-weighted fraction of an industry’s total
shipments that are sent to the government. Second, we orthogonalize this variable relative to the state variables included in our VAR.
Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Food Clths Durbl Chems Cnsum Cnstr Steel FabPr Machn Cars Trans Other
Percentage of SIC Codes in IO Tables 6.19% 8.90% 20.95% 12.86% 4.42% 7.95% 23.64% 37.78% 34.81% 7.32% 2.56% 3.20%
Panel A: 1965-2005
Current Excess Return −5.864∗∗ 2.008 1.786 −2.465 −4.292∗ 3.378 2.736 −0.221 6.277∗ 0.113 −2.146 1.993
Future Excess Return 5.686∗∗ 4.342 −0.629 1.929 1.740 −0.882 −4.663 −1.612 −2.873 −1.547 0.165 −3.584
Real Interest Rate News 1.142∗∗ 1.723∗∗−0.474 0.832 −0.028 0.340 1.063 1.370 −0.627 −0.010 1.209 −0.634
Cash Flow News −0.436 0.470 0.041 0.020 −0.031 0.156 0.009 −0.024 0.060 0.074 0.918 −0.058
Residual 1.400 7.604∗∗ 0.643 0.277 −2.550 2.680 −0.873 −0.438 2.717 −1.518 −1.689 −2.166
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 0.964 8.074∗∗ 0.684 0.296 −2.581∗ 2.836 −0.864 −0.462 2.777 −1.444 −0.772 −2.224
Panel B: 1981-2005
Current Excess Return −5.877∗∗ 1.137 2.681 −1.141 −5.920∗∗ 5.265∗∗ 2.243 −1.090 6.343 0.459 −2.577 −1.076
Future Excess Return 8.315∗∗∗ 4.723 −1.346 3.594 3.944 −0.853 −5.578 −2.855 0.051 4.688 2.725 −2.246
Real Interest Rate News 1.430∗∗ 4.362 −0.422 3.292 1.937 0.004 2.488 2.452 −1.543 2.936 1.664 −0.785
Cash Flow News −1.019 0.701∗ 0.019 0.447 −0.114 0.413 0.321 0.157 0.173 0.192 0.194 −0.342
Residual 4.887 9.522∗∗ 0.895 5.298 0.075 4.003 −1.168 −1.650 4.678 7.891 1.618 −3.764
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 3.869∗∗ 10.222∗∗ 0.914 5.745 −0.039 4.416 −0.847 −1.493 4.851 8.083 1.812 −4.106
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Table 3.8: The impact of exogenous defense spending shocks on sector returns
This table reports the impact of exogenous shocks to defense spending on the current excess eq-
uity return, and the discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest
rates, and current and future dividends (cash flows) for specific Fama and French 17 Industry Port-
folios. Both the Chen and Zhao (2009) and Campbell and Ammer (1993) methods of computing
cash flow news are provided. The six-variable VAR(1) used to construct excess equity return and
real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. Sector
returns are value-weighted. The VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous shocks to
defense spending are defined as in Ramey (2011). Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap
algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent
and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 1980q2 1947q1 - 2008q2 1947q1 - 2012q4
Panel A: Fabricated Products
Current Excess Return 0.011 0.016 0.026
Future Excess Return 0.114 0.068 0.059
Real Interest Rate News −0.243 −0.254 −0.243∗
Cash Flow News 0.992 1.035∗∗∗ 1.177∗∗
Residual −1.111∗ −1.205∗∗∗ −1.335∗∗∗
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual −0.118 −0.170 −0.157
Panel B: Transportation
Current Excess Return 0.265 0.275 0.273
Future Excess Return 0.178 0.117 0.112
Real Interest Rate News −0.267 −0.264 −0.249
Cash Flow News 0.996∗ 1.043∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗
Residual −0.820 −0.914∗∗ −1.046∗∗
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 0.176 0.128 0.137
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Table 3.9: The impact of exogenous tax shocks on UK equity and bond returns
Panel A reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess equity return, and the
discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest rates, and current
and future cash flows. Panel B reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess
bond return, and the discounted sums of future excess bond returns, current and future real interest
rates, and current and future inflation. The VAR used to construct excess equity and bond return
and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. The
VAR state variables are defined in the text. Exogenous tax shocks in the UK are defined as in
Cloyne (2013). Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1966q2 - 2009q4 1975q2 - 2009q4
Panel A: Equity Returns
Current Excess Return 0.194 −0.793
Future Excess Return 0.917 2.752
Real Interest Rate News −0.772 −7.160∗∗
Cash Flow News 2.120 −8.488
Residual −1.781 3.288
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 0.339 −5.200∗
Panel B: Bond Returns
Current Excess Bond Return 3.779 3.166
Future Excess Bond Returns −8.338∗ −11.127∗∗
Real Interest Rate News −5.669 −8.235∗∗∗
Inflation News 10.228 16.196∗∗
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Table 3.10: The impact of exogenous fiscal policy shocks on simulated equity returns
Panel A reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess equity return, and the
discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current and future real interest rates, and current
and future cash flows. Panel B reports the impact of exogenous government spending shocks on
the current excess equity return, and the discounted sums of future excess equity returns, current
and future real interest rates, and current and future cash flows. Data are the solutions to the DSGE
model described in Section 3.6.
Time Periods: Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker High MTR
Panel A: Tax Shock
Current Excess Return −4.327 3.624 2.919
Future Excess Return 9.021 −0.133 0.135
Real Interest Rate News 0.203 −9.099 −9.212
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 4.898 −5.608 −6.158
Panel B: Government Spending Shock
Current Excess Return −3.263 0.446 –
Future Excess Return 3.372 −0.024 –
Real Interest Rate News 2.713 0.895 –
CA (1993) Cash Flow Residual 2.821 1.317 –
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Table 3.11: The impact of exogenous fiscal policy shocks on simulated bond returns
Panel A reports the impact of exogenous tax shocks on the current excess bond return, and the
discounted sums of future excess bond returns, current and future real interest rates, and current
and future inflation. Panel B reports the impact of exogenous government spending shocks on
the current excess bond return, and the discounted sums of future excess bond returns, current and
future real interest rates, and current and future inflation. Data are the solutions to the DSGE model
described in Section 3.6.
Time Periods: Pre-Volcker Post-Volcker
Panel A: Tax Shock
Current Excess Bond Return 52.517 −44.262
Future Excess Bond Returns −16.210 11.272
Real Interest Rate News 3.204 −7.649
Inflation News −39.509 40.639
Panel B: Government Spending Shock
Current Excess Bond Return 26.861 −13.401
Future Excess Bond Returns −18.888 3.069
Real Interest Rate News 2.973 0.105
Inflation News −10.946 10.228
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CHAPTER 4
INFLATING AWAY DEBT: TRADING OFF INFLATION RISK AND TAXATION RISK
4.1 Introduction
With the recent doubling of federal debt due to the financial crisis, several economists (Rogoff
(2008, 2013); Mankiw (2009); Olivier Blanchard and Mauro (2010); Krugman (2013)) recently
advocated for increases in inflation as a device to reduce fiscal stress.1 I address these policy
recommendations by studying the welfare implications of “inflating away debt” policies in the
context of a production-based asset pricing model designed to price both inflation and tax risk.
My general equilibrium analysis suggests that we should be cautious in urging the central bank to
respond to public debt levels. Specifically, I find that altering the inflation target to respond to the
debt-GDP ratio can provide benefits, but only at high debt levels where taxation risk becomes a
first order concern and dominates inflation inefficiencies.
Taxation risk increases as the level of debt rises because higher interest payments are required
to service debt and tax rates must adjust more to balance the budget. By allowing the inflation
target to increase endogenously with the debt-GDP ratio, monetary policy substantially lowers tax
rate uncertainty, which decreases the equity premium on the after-tax return of capital and boosts
capital accumulation.
The study of the welfare trade-off between inflation and distortionary taxes with regards to
financing the government dates back to Phelps (1973). In a Sidrauski (1967) flexible price model
with money in the utility function, Phelps (1973) finds that a positive inflation tax is optimal to re-
duce the welfare costs of distortionary taxes. The intuition follows Ramsey (1927) which suggests
1For example, Rogoff (2008) states that a “Sudden burst of moderate inflation would be extremely helpful in
unwinding today’s epic debt morass.”
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it is optimal to minimize the marginal distortions of all available taxes.
In contrast to Phelps (1973), Lucas and Stokey (1982) find that the Friedman Rule (zero nomi-
nal interest rate with deflation) is optimal for the cash-in-advance setting. In their model, inflation
acts as a tax on an intermediate good (money is a means to consume) and this results in double
taxation of consumption, which is sub-optimal.
Shifting focus from the first to the second moment of inflation, Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe
(1991, 1994) and Calvo and Guidotti (1993) find that unexpected inflation fluctuations can be
used to turn nominal non-state-contingent debt into real state-contingent debt. This allows the
government to smooths taxes and consumption which provides welfare benefits due to concave
utility. Unexpected inflation acts as a shock absorber and the optimal inflation volatility is greater
than 20%. A high inflation volatility is optimal because unexpected inflation is non-distortionary
as there are no substitution effects with flexible prices.
Unexpected inflation is no longer costless when moving to a model with sticky prices, and
this dramatically changes the optimal volatility of inflation. In the Calvo (1983) setting, volatile
inflation causes relative price dispersion as some firms are unable to update their price and an
inefficient quantity is produced. Goodfriend and King (1998, 2001) , King and Wolman (1999),
and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) find it optimal to completely eliminate price dispersion so
that the optimal inflation volatility is zero. However, these studies assume lump sum taxes so that
the inflation-taxation trade-off is non-existent.
Benigno and Woodford (2004), Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006, 2005), and Siu (2004b) all
assume distortionary taxes and find that the optimal inflation volatility is still zero or very close to
zero. The intuition for zero inflation volatility is that surprise inflation in these models only smooth
the distortionary tax, and the benefits of smooth taxes are dominated by the welfare costs of price
dispersion.
All of the papers above use either log linear approximations (which makes the agent risk-
neutral across states of nature), log preferences, power utility, or no capital accumulation.2 It is
2An exception to this may be Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2005), which use habits. This class of preferences exhibits
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well known that each of these setups is not capable of pricing risk consistent with the data. The
production-based asset pricing literature that shows this includes Rouwenhorst (1991), Jermann
(1998), Lettau and Uhlig (2000), Christiano, Boldrin, and Fisher (2001), Tallarini (2000), Guvenen
(2009), Kaltenbrunner and Lochstoer (2010), Dew-Becker (2012), and Croce (2012). Therefore,
analyzing a tradeoff between tax risk and inflation volatility will ultimately favor concerns for
inflation when the price of risk is very low compared to the data. With a low price of risk, increased
taxation risk will have very little effect on the risk premium of capital, so that capital accumulation
is largely unaffected.
To address properly the questions of optimal inflation dynamics and the inflation-taxation trade-
off, I use a model that matches business cycle statistics such as the volatility of consumption growth
and investment growth. To price risk consistent with the data, I borrow features from my compan-
ion paper Ai, Croce, Diercks, and Li (2013). Specifically, I incorporate recursive preferences and
long run risk in the spirit of Bansal and Yaron (2004). Standard capital adjustment costs make
investment volatility counterfactually low, so I include heterogeneous vintages of capital which
yields a high investment volatility as in the data.
I incorporate sticky prices and distortionary taxes in the spirit of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006). To ensure that nominal risk is correctly priced with the data, I match the sizable 5-year
term spread for the term structure of nominal bonds. While consumption-based models such as
Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin (2007) and Bansal and Shaliastovich (2013) find suc-
cess in replicating nominal term structure dynamics, the production-based general equilibrium
framework has had greater difficulty as documented by Rudebusch and Swanson (2008), Li and
Palomino (2012), van Binsbergen, Fernndez-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramrez (2010), and
Rudebusch and Swanson (2012). Kung (2013) finds success in matching the term spread in a
model with endogenous growth, which is in contrast to my model’s specification of exogenous
growth. In addition, Hsu (2013) finds success by incorporating rule of thumb consumers, which I
the following issues: (1) highly volatile risk free rate, (2) high levels of risk aversion, (3) negative serial correlation of
consumption growth, and (4) backwards looking asset prices.
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also abstract from.
From there I endow the government with simple fiscal and monetary policy rules as in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2006) and I find optimal policy characteristics. The fiscal rule ensures that tax
revenues rise as debt rises. The monetary policy rule is a simple Taylor (1993) rule defined so that
the nominal interest rate responds to the previous period’s interest rate, deviations of inflation from
its target, and an output growth gap. In addition, I incorporate an inflation target that responds to
the debt-GDP ratio and determine its effects on welfare.
For a model that abstracts from risk considerations, I find it is never optimal to alter the inflation
target to respond to the debt-GDP ratio. The potential welfare benefits of decreased tax risk are
muted as the risk premium in these models is essentially zero. This suggests previous studies that
determine optimal policy using first-order approximations are missing a key tax risk channel.
Even after pricing risk consistent with the data, I find it is not optimal for monetary policy to
react directly to the debt-GDP ratio at current levels. This is because at lower levels of debt such as
the current debt-GDP ratio (75%), tax rate volatility is relatively low. Therefore, reducing it further
has little to no benefit for welfare but sizable losses coming from higher inflation volatility. Only
at high levels of debt (200%) can monetary policy sufficiently reduce tax risk in order to obtain
welfare gains.
Hence, my contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, I assess optimal inflation dynamics
while departing from the existing literature in just one dimension -- risk considerations. Risk
considerations include the equity premium and the nominal term structure found in the data, and
this is achieved by introducing recursive preferences, long run risk, and heterogeneous vintages of
capital.
I find that as monetary policy increasingly targets inflation (as indicated by increasing the co-
efficient on inflation deviations in the Taylor rule), a tradeoff exists between lowering the inflation
risk premium and raising the equity risk premium. In the risk-sensitive model, taxation risk is more
costly, so optimal inflation volatility is higher (29 basis points versus zero basis points in Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2006)). This difference is economically significant, as it represents about 15%
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of the observed inflation volatility in the data. Taxation risk becomes even more costly at higher
debt levels, where interest payments are higher and tax rates must adjust more. From a policy
perspective, my results suggest complete minimization of inflation volatility is sub-optimal due to
the resulting increase in tax risk. This finding conflicts with previous studies that do not price risk
consistent with the data.
My second contribution is to study the effects of monetary policy on the intertemporal distri-
bution of both nominal and equity risk. The properties of the intertemporal distribution of equity
risk have been previously studied by Lettau and Wachter (2011), van Binsbergen et al. (2010);
van Binsbergen, Brandt, and Koijen (2012), Boguth, Carlson, Fisher, and Simutin (2012), Belo,
Collin-Dufresne, and Goldstein (2012), and Ai et al. (2013). None of these studies has looked at
the effects of policy on the term structure of equity. I find that as monetary policy increasingly sta-
bilizes inflation, short-term equity risk decreases while long-term equity risk rises. The slope of the
term structure increases due to excessive long-term tax risk, which depresses capital accumulation.
My third contribution involves studying the effects of monetary policy reacting directly to
changes in the debt-GDP ratio through the inflation target. Kumhof, Nunes, and Yakadina (2008)
incorporates debt directly into the Taylor rule (alongside inflation deviations and the previous pe-
riod’s interest rate) but they focus on scenarios related to the fiscal theory of the price level. Be-
nigno and Woodford (2007) compute a Ramsey optimal monetary policy that responds to fiscal
variables, but this policy is not implementable in the spirit of Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006),
as the policy depends on variables that are unobservable. In addition, power utility is used with a
log-linear approximation so that risk considerations are muted. While my study allows the infla-
tion target to react to the debt-GDP ratio, the rest of the literature keeps the inflation target fixed
and typically focuses on the volatility around that target. An alternative analysis typically consists
of exogenously changing the steady state target but not allowing it to dynamically adjust to fiscal
variables such as the debt-GDP ratio.
The major policy prescription coming from this study is the following: it is not optimal for
monetary policy to alter the inflation target to respond to the debt-GDP ratio at current debt levels
87
(75%). It is only at higher ratios (200%) of debt-GDP that the costs of inflation (misallocation of
resources) are dominated by the benefits (lower tax risk). According to the CBO, such high debt
levels are decades away for even the worst-case fiscal projections.
I acknowledge that government has multiple dimensions that I abstract from. For example, my
analysis excludes utility-providing expenditures (Ferriere and Karantounias 2012) and any uncer-
tainty about the monetary policy’s actions or inflation target (Krause and Moyen 2013). In addition,
debt is only made up of one period nominal bonds. Likewise, policy effects on endogenous growth
as in Croce, Nguyen, and Schmid (2012), Croce et al. (2012) and the effects of asset prices on
long-run growth as in Schmid and Kung (2011) are not included. Furthermore, more complex fis-
cal financing and their interactions with monetary policy as in Leeper, Plante, and Traum (2010),
Yang and Traum (2010), and Traum (2008) are excluded. Lastly, monetary policy’s effects on risk
premia through bank balance sheets as in Drechsler, Savov, and Schnabl (2013) are also excluded.
These issues are abstracted from for reasons of parsimony and are viewed as potential avenues of
future research.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the model is introduced and
I briefly discuss recursive preferences and heterogenous vintages of capital. In Section 3, I briefly
detail the calibration approach. In section 4, the effects of inflation and taxation risk along with the
policy tradeoff are discussed. The main results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Model
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households, a continuum of intermediate-
goods firms, and a government that conducts monetary and fiscal policy. The structure of the
model is the standard neoclassical growth model augmented with real and nominal frictions. The
nominal friction is sticky prices. The real frictions consist of monopolistic competition in product
markets and distortionary taxation. These inefficiencies motivate the implementation of monetary
and fiscal stabilization policy.
Preferences. The households have Epstein-Zin preferences defined over consumption goods, ct,
and leisure, 1−ht. These preferences exhibit a CES aggregate of current and future utility certainty
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equivalent weighted by (1-β) and β, respectively.
vt = max{cj ,hj ,ij ,bj ,kj+1}∞j=t
{
(1− β)(cιt(1− ht)1−ι)1−
1
ψ + β(Et[v
1−γ
t+1 ])
1− 1
ψ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
ψ
s.t.
bt + ct + it = Rt−1
bt−1
pit
+ (1− τDt )(wtht + utkt) + δqˇτDt kt + φˇt
The real value of debt is bt, ct is consumption, it is investment, Rt−1 is the risk free rate, pit is the
inflation rate Pt
Pt−1
, τDt is the tax rate, wt is the wage, ht is labor hours, ut is the rental rate of capital,
kt is capital, δqˇτDt kt is a tax allowance for depreciation, and φˇt is profits.
Unlike standard preferences, Epstein-Zin preferences allow for the disentanglement of γ, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ψ, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When 1
ψ
=
γ, the utility collapses to standard preferences with additively separable expected utility both in
time and state. When γ > 1
ψ
, the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty, so the agent dislikes
shocks to long-run expected growth rates. This assumption allows asset prices to be influenced by
the intertemporal distribution of tax rates (Croce, 2012).
Intermediate good bundling. The consumption good is assumed to be a composite made of a
continuum of differentiated goods cit indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] via the aggregator:
ct =
[∫ 1
0
c
1− 1
n
it di
] 1
1− 1η
The elasticity of substitution across different varieties of consumption goods is η > 1 (also the
price elasticity of demand for good j) . As η →∞, the goods become closer and closer substitutes,
so that individual firms have less market power.
The household minimizes total expenditures subject to an aggregation constraint, where Pjt is
price of intermediate good j:
min
cjt
∫ 1
0
Pjtcjtdj
s.t.
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[∫ 1
0
c
1− 1
n
it di
] 1
1− 1η ≥ ct
The optimal demand for the level of intermediate consumption good cjt is given by
cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−η
ct
where Pt is the nominal price index
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηjt dj
] 1
η−1
Productivity. The law of motion of the productivity process captures both short-run and long-run
productivity risks:
log
A0t+1
A0t
≡ ∆at+1 = µ+ xt + σaεa,t+1, (4.1)
xt+1 = ρxt + σxεx,t+1, (4.2) εa,t+1
εx,t+1
 ∼ i.i.d.N

 0
0
 ,
 1 0
0 1

 , t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (4.3)
According to the above specification, short-run productivity shocks, εa,t+1, affect contemporaneous
output directly, but have no effect on future productivity growth. Shocks to long-run productivity,
represented by εx,t+1, carry news about future productivity growth rates, but do not affect current
output.
Capital Accumulation Technology. Assume that investments in different vintages of capital
have heterogeneous exposure to aggregate productivity shocks.3 In other words, there will be
vintage specific productivity growth that is going to depend on the age j = 0, 1, ..., t − 1 of the
3Multiple frictions for capital accumulation have been tested, and this friction was chosen because standard capital
adjustment costs result in counterfactually low investment growth volatility. The friction in this paper does not suffer
from this issue.
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vintage of capital
At−jt+1
At−jt
= eµ+φj(∆at+1−µ)
Under the above specification, production units of all generations have the same unconditional
expected growth rate. Also, At−0t = A0t is set to ensure that new production units are on average
as productive as older ones. The log growth rate of the productivity process for the initial gen-
eration of production units, ∆at+1, is given by equation (A.1). Heterogeneity is driven solely by
differences in aggregate productivity risk exposure, φj .
The empirical findings in Ai, Croce, and Li (2012) suggests that older production units are more
exposed to aggregate productivity shocks than younger ones, i.e. the exposure φj is increasing in
j. To capture this fact, a parsimonious specification for φj is adopted:
φj =
 0 j = 01 j = 1, ... .
new vintage of capital, j=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
At−0t+1
At−0t
= eµ
all other older vintages of capital, j=1,2..︷ ︸︸ ︷
At−jt+1
At−jt
= eµ+xt+σaa,t+1 (4.4)
New production units have zero exposure to aggregate productivity shocks in the first period of
life. Every period thereafter, they have 100% exposure to aggregate productivity shocks as do all
other existing vintages.
Let Kt denote the productivity adjusted physical capital stock. Despite the heterogeneity in
productivity, aggregate production can be represented as a function of Kt and Nt. The law of
motion of the productivity-adjusted physical capital stock Kt, takes the following form:
K1 = I0, Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ωt+1It
ωt+1 =
(
At−0t+1
A0t+1
) 1−α
α
= e−
1−α
α
(xt+σaa,t+1)(1−φ0)
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where It is the total mass of new vintage capital produced at time t, and ωt+1 is an endogenous
process that accounts for the productivity gap between the newest vintage of capital and all older
vintages. Note that when φ0 = 1, the new capital vintage has the same exposure to aggregate
productivity shocks as older ones. In this case, ωt+1 = 1 for all t and capital of all generations are
identical.
The government. The government issues one-period nominal risk-free bonds, bt, collects taxes
in the amount of τt, and faces an exogenous expenditure and transfers stream, gt and trt. It’s period
by period budget constraint is given by
bt =
Rt−1
pit
bt−1 + gt − τt + trt
The exogenous expenditure and transfer streams are formulated as in Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006)
G
Y
=
1
1 + e−g¯y
tr
Y
=
1
1 + e− ¯try
gyt = (1− ρg)g¯y + ρggyt−1 + G,t, G,t ∼ N(0, σ2gy)
tryt = (1− ρg) ¯try + ρtrtryt−1 + tr,t, tr,t ∼ N(0, σ2try)
Total tax revenues, τt, consist of revenue from income taxation, τDt yt, where yt denotes aggre-
gate demand
τt = τ
D
t yt
Tax smoothing by the government consists of tax revenues rising whenever the previous pe-
riod’s debt rises
τt − τ∗ = γ1(bt−1 − b∗)
where γ1 > 0 ensures that the debt-GDP ratio is bounded and there is a unique solution.
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The monetary authority sets short-term nominal interest rate according to a simple Taylor rule
ln(Rt/R∗) = αrln(Rt−1/R∗) + αpiln(pit/pit∗) + α∆yln(∆yt/∆y∗)
pi∗t = pi
∗ +
αG
αpi
ln(SBt/SB
∗)
where αr is the inertia coefficient, αpi is the inflation coefficient, α∆y is the output growth gap
coefficient, αG is the inflation target response to the debt-GDP ratio, SBt.
Firms. Each variety i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each firm i produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit, and labor
services, hit. It is assumed that the firm must satisfy demand at the posted price. Formally,
kθit(Athit)
1−θ ≥
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
yt
The objective of the firm is to choose Pit, hit, kit to maximize the present discounted value of
profits, given by
Et
∞∑
s=t
mt,sPsφis
where real profits of firm i are
φit ≡ Pit
Pt
yit − utkit − wthit
Prices are assumed to be sticky as in Calvo (1983). Each period, a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of randomly
picked firms is not allowed to optimally set the nominal price of the good they produce. Instead,
these firms index their prices to past inflation according to the equation
Pit = Pit−1pi
χ
t−1
The remaining 1−α firms choose Pˇt to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits:
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Et
∞∑
s=0
dt,t+sPt+sα
s
{(
Pˇt
Pt
)1−η s∏
k=1
(
piχt+k−1
pit+k
)1−η
yt+s − ut+skit+s − wt+shit+s
+mcit+s
(
kθit+s(Athit+s)
1−θ −
(
Pˇt
Pt
)−η s∏
k=1
(
piχt+k−1
pit+k
)−η
yt+s
)}
The firm’s first order conditions for labor, capital, and optimal price are
mct(1− θ)( k˜t
ht
)θ = w˜t (4.5)
mctθ(
k˜t
ht
)θ−1 = ut (4.6)
The firm’s optimal price is set such that marginal revenues are equal to some markup over marginal
costs
η
η − 1x
1
t = x
2
t (4.7)
where
x˜1t = p
∗−1−η
t y˜tmct + αEtDt,t+1pi
η+1
t+1 pi
χ(−η)
t
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−1−η
x˜1t+1e
∆at+1 (4.8)
x˜2t = p
∗−η
t y˜t + αEtDt,t+1pi
η
t+1pi
χ(1−η)
t
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−η
x˜2t+1e
∆at+1 (4.9)
Aggregation and equilibrium. This period’s price level is a weighted average of the firm’s op-
timal price and the previous period’s price level:
1 = αpi−1+ηt pi
χ(1−η)
t−1 + (1− α)p∗(1−η) (4.10)
It can be shown that the resource costs of inefficient price dispersion are characterized as follows
st = (1− α)p∗−ηt + α
(
pit
piχt−1
)η
st−1 (4.11)
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Given the price dispersion, output is described by
y˜t =
1
st
[k˜θt (Atht)
1−θ] (4.12)
and aggregate demand is the following sum
y˜t = c˜t + i˜t + g˜t (4.13)
4.3 Calibration
I calibrate the model at an annual frequency and evaluate its ability to replicate key moments of
both macroeconomic quantities and asset returns. I focus on a long sample of US annual data, in-
cluding pre-World War II data. All macroeconomic variables are real and per capita. Consumption
and investment are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Fiscal policy variables such as
government spending and steady state debt are taken from Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). The
parameters described below are listed in Table 4.1.
Production and preference parameters. The parameters for effective4 risk aversion γ = 10,
and intertemporal elasticity of substitution, ψ = 2, are set following the long run risk literature.
The capital share α = 0.25 and the annual depreciation rate of physical capital δ = 15% are
consistent with the labor share of income in the data and the quarterly depreciation rate of 2 to 4%
observed in the RBC literature. I calibrate µ = 2% per year, consistent with the average annual
real growth rate of the US economy. I set the persistence parameter on long run risk, ρ = 0.925,
which is close to the point estimate of Croce (2014b).
The subjective discount factor is set to be consistent with the low risk free rate observed in the
data. Labor is endogenous and set to match the level of hours in the data, ι = 0.35. I set σa and σx
to match the standard deviation of consumption and output.5
4See Swanson (2012) for a discussion of risk aversion when leisure is present.
5In models where σx = 0, σa is adjusted to match the standard deviation of consumption.
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Sticky prices parameters. The markup due to monopolistic competition is set to 15%, which is
consistent with previous studies (Bils and Klenow (2004)). Firms are assumed to re-optimize their
prices every 13 months, which is in the middle of empirical estimates that range from 6 months to
18 months (see Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Linde (2005)). The indexation parameter, χ,
is set to one following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005b) and the empirical estimates of
Giannoni and Woodford (2003). At first, the inflation target will be assumed to be constant and set
to its average value of 3.5% which is consistent with the annual average observed from 1945-2012.
Later exercises will consist of endogenizing the inflation target to take into account Debt-GDP
ratio fluctuations.
Fiscal policy parameters. Steady state government purchases make up 17% of GDP and trans-
fers make up 5% of GDP. The steady state Debt-GDP ratio is set to the historical average of 44%
following Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006). The speed of the tax rule for repayment of debt con-
trols both the persistence of the debt-GDP ratio and the volatility of the tax rate. This parameter is
set conservatively so that tax risk (which increases with the speed of repayment) is not amplified
(tax rate volatility for the benchmark model is relatively low at 1.3%). The autoregressive coef-
ficient of the debt-GDP ratio in the model is 90%, which is close to its persistence in the data of
94%. The average income tax rate is 21%, which is pinned down by the model’s Debt-GDP ratio
and government expenditures and transfers.
Monetary policy parameters. The default Taylor Rule includes an inertia coefficient of 0.6 and
an output growth gap coefficient of 0.5. The parameters chosen for the inertia coefficient and
the output growth gap are set to match inflation dynamics and the interest rate serial correlation
observed in the data. An inertia coefficient of 0.6 is consistent with empirical quarterly estimates
that set it as high as 0.9.
Without the output growth gap, inflation in the model is positively correlated with permanent
productivity shocks, which is counterfactual. Incorporating the output growth gap results in infla-
tion falling with good productivity shocks and rising with bad productivity shocks. The inflation
coefficient is set to 0.6 so that the long run inflation coefficient, αpi
1−αr is consistent with the original
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work of Taylor (1993). For later exercises, the inflation coefficient will be scaled to determine
optimal inflation volatility.
Simulation. The policy rules are numerically computed using second order approximations from
Dynare++. The simulations consist of random draws of the two productivity shocks (short run and
long run) and two fiscal shocks (government spending and transfers). The number of periods is
200 (the first 100 are thrown out) and the number of simulations is 100.
Model Moments. The moments for the data are listed in Table 4.2. The Main Model is capable
of matching the low risk free rate, the high equity premium, the smooth volatility of consumption
growth, and volatile investment growth. Matching data on both macroeconomic aggregates and
asset pricing facts imposes joint structural restrictions on both the quantity and price of risk in the
data. In addition, to properly account for nominal risks, the first two moments of inflation were
also matched to the data.
4.4 Policy and the Role of Expectations
Expectations are crucial for the transmission of monetary policy in the forward-looking New
Keynesian model. Iterating forward the intertemporal Euler equation, it can be shown that con-
sumption and aggregate demand depend upon all expected future short real rates, and not simply
upon the current real interest rate. This implies that the long-term real rate of interest determines
aggregate demand in the model, not the short real rate. In other words, monetary policy needs to
be very careful about managing expectations of future policy, as the central bank’s primary impact
on the economy comes through the way it affects private-sector expectations about the probable
future path of interest rates.
It should be noted that a key variable that determines the effectiveness of monetary policy
is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). Based on a simple log-linearization of the
intertemporal Euler equation, it can be shown that the sum of the future real rates are multiplied
by the IES. This implies that the magnitude of the IES will play a role in determining how much
aggregate demand responds to expectations of future real rates. With standard preferences and a
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coefficient of relative risk aversion greater than one, the IES will be small, indicating that monetary
policy will be less effective than in the case with recursive preferences. With recursive preferences,
the IES and risk aversion coefficient are decoupled, and the IES is set to 2 in order to match the
real risk free rate in the data. The lower risk free rate implies an agent that is more patient, placing
greater weight on future expectations of real rates.
Given the importance of expectations, in the model it is assumed that monetary and fiscal
policy follow simple rules, for which the agents have full information. The government is assumed
to be perfectly credible and has the exact same information as the actors in the model. Monetary
policy searches across the parameter space of inflation coefficients, output growth gap coefficients,
and inertia coefficients to find the optimal policy, taking fiscal policy as given. The speed with
which fiscal policy repays taxes is set conservatively to ensure that the debt-GDP ratio has a high
autocorrelation (as in the data) and not to overstate the tax rate volatility. In terms of inflation
expectations, there are two alternatives to pinning down inflation dynamics. The first method
consists of combining the Taylor Rule and the intertemporal Euler equation:
Rt
R∗
=
(
Rt−1
R∗
)αr ( pit
pi∗t
)αpi ( ∆yt
∆yss
)αy
1
Rt
= Et
(
Mt+1
pit+1
)
and the inflation target is defined as pi∗t = pi
∗ + αGln BYtBY ∗ , where BYt is the debt to GDP ratio,
and Mt+1 is the real stochastic discount factor. The inflation rate can then be solved to form a
stochastic difference equation that governs the evolution of inflation.
pit =
(
pi∗ + αG · ln
(
BYt
BY ∗
))
(
Et
[
Mt+1
pit+1
])−1
Rαrt−1R∗1−αr
(
∆yt
∆yss
)αy

1
αpi
From this equation, a great deal of economic content can be gleaned. First, it is clear that the
stochastic discount factor plays an important role in transmitting the effect of expected inflation to
current inflation. Given the forward looking nature of inflation, it can be seen that expected future
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inflation results in higher inflation today, as forward looking firms set their prices with the expecta-
tion they may not be able to update their price for multiple periods. Second, a greater response of
monetary policy to inflation, higher αpi, brings expected inflation closer to zero and thus stabilizes
current inflation. Third, this equation shows the importance of including the output growth gap if
the goal is to generate a positive inflation risk premium. A positive inflation risk premium requires
that the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and inflation be positive. Including the
output growth gap breaks the inverse link between the SDF and current inflation. Lastly, a posi-
tive αG results in higher inflation today if the debt to GDP ratio is above steady state. Given the
persistent nature of debt to GDP, the inflation target will be persistently higher for many periods,
resulting in even greater changes in the current inflation rate.
The alternative way of deriving the New Keynesian Philips Curve involves the definition of the
aggregate price index and the optimal price chosen by the firm:
Pt =
[
(1− α)p∗(1−η)t + αP 1−ηt−1
] 1
1−η
Which can be rewritten as
pit =
[
1− (1− α)p∗(1−η)t
α
] 1
η−1
This shows that inflation today is a positive function of the firm’s optimal price chosen at time t.
The firm’s optimal price is chosen to be a markup over a weighted present discounted value of
future marginal costs
p∗t =
η
η − 1
(Et
∑∞
s=tMt,sα
s−tysmcs)
(Et
∑∞
s=tMt,sα
s−tys)
The optimal price chosen by the firm combined with the previous equation shows that inflation is a
function of expected future marginal costs, for which the stochastic discount factor is crucial. The
stochastic discount factor for recursive preferences incorporates the continuation value of utility,
which is important for long run news shocks. For instance, a negative long run news shock would
drastically increase the marginal utility and stochastic discount factor with recursive preferences,
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and this would result in much greater weight placed on future marginal costs as the firm chooses
its optimal price.
4.4.0.1 Credibility of Policy
The key element of the New Keynesian model is the forward-looking behavior of individuals
and firms. Agents are assumed to anticipate the policymaker’s actions. Therefore, knowledge of
the policymaker’s incentives and the frequency at which the policymaker re-optimizes will heavily
influence the agent’s decisions. A monetary policy that is able to commit to future promises can
better influence expectations than one that is given discretion to break its promises in any given pe-
riod. These expectations feed back into current inflation and output. This feedback occurs because
households experience wealth effects from higher expected future output while firms change their
prices to stay in sync with higher expected future prices.
I assume that the government has the ability to commit fully to the enactment of announced
monetary and fiscal policies. These policies take the form of simple, implementable rules for which
agents have full information. My focus on maximizing welfare by numerically searching across
simple policies (policies that depend on easily observable macro indicators) that are implementable
(deliver uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium) is in contrast to the analytical Ramsey
and quadratic loss function analysis that is also popular within the literature. The analytically
derived optimal rules require policymakers to know the true values of all exogenous shocks and
all endogenous predetermined variables, including unobservable ones such as the output gap or
natural rate of interest. In comparison, the simple rule requires observation of only the rate of
inflation, the output growth, and the previous period’s interest rate. Furthermore, even if it were
possible for policymakers to obtain the true values of all the variables within the economy, there is
no guarantee that a unique equilibrium would exist.
Before moving forward, it is important to note that the government, in reality, is unlikely to
be capable of 100% commitment to specific rules for all future periods. Full commitment requires
that future policymakers (ones not even born yet) will continue to honor the promises set forth by
current rules. While clearly imperfect, the commitment assumption in my model is a parsimonious
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way of providing the government with credibility so that policy can meaningfully affect agents’
expectations. This credibility has become well established in the post-Volcker era dating back to
the early 1980s.
Credibility allows for the manipulation of private-sector expectations, which lets monetary
policy improve the short-run tradeoffs when inflation and output move in opposite directions. On
the opposite spectrum of full commitment is discretionary policy. In contrast to commitment,
optimal discretionary policy involves re-optimization every period by the policymaker. Kydland
and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983), and Rogoff (1985) were the first to focus on the
gains of moving away from discretionary policy towards commitment and credibility.
Commitment permits monetary policy to follow a time-inconsistent path. A time-inconsistent
path is one in which the policymaker would find it optimal to break its promises at a future date
if given the opportunity. This situation would arise following a cost push shock (inflation and the
output gap move in opposite directions). Optimal commitment policy partially reduces current
inflation (which is forward looking) by promising higher real rates, lower inflation, and lower
output gaps in the future. By committing to such a response, the policymaker can improve the
inflation/output gap tradeoff during the period of the shock. The implied benefits in the short term
dominate the relatively small losses generated by lower output gaps in future periods.
Once the cost-push shock subsides, the tradeoff is no longer present, and in contrast to the pol-
icymaker under commitment, the discretionary policymaker chooses to stabilize inflation and the
output gap completely every period thereafter. The discretionary policymaker stabilizes the output
gap (in the medium term) to a greater extent than the policymaker under commitment because it
is unable to affect current inflation through expectations. This is known as the stabilization bias.
The discretionary policymaker is unable to influence expectations because the agents know that
the policymaker will re-optimize each period and will not keep promises about future policy.
In my model, purely exogenous cost-push shocks are not incorporated. The only shocks are
short run shocks to productivity growth, smaller but more persistent (long run) shocks to pro-
ductivity growth, and government expenditure shocks. Each of these shocks result in the output
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gap (between the flexible and sticky price level of output) and inflation moving together in the
same direction. Therefore, in a setting where the steady state is not distorted and there are no real
imperfections, stabilizing inflation amounts to stabilizing the output gap, which as known as the
divine coincidence. In the undistorted setup, the optimal inflation coefficient in the interest rate
reaction function would be infinite. This would eliminate the distortions associated with sticky
prices, namely price dispersion and time-varying markups, and the efficient flexible price alloca-
tions would be attained.
However, my analysis is conducted around a distorted steady state so that the flexible price
allocation is not efficient. I do not assume that an employment subsidy is put in place by the gov-
ernment to offset the monopolistic distortion. In addition, distortionary taxes are used to fund the
government rather than lump sum taxes. Each of these distortions generates an inefficient steady
state in which the natural (flexible price) level of output is permanently different from the efficient
level of output. Specifically, the ratio of marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure and the marginal product of labor would be 1 if the economy were efficient. Instead, the
ratio is approximately 0.85 with monopolistic competition (due to the markup), and 0.7 when dis-
tortionary taxes are included. If it is assumed that these distortions cannot be simply abstracted
away, then there exists a tradeoff between inflation and output. Variations in the gap between
the efficient and natural levels of output makes it impossible to attain both zero inflation and the
efficient level of output.
With discretionary policy around a distorted steady state, it is no longer optimal for the poli-
cymaker to replicate the flexible price allocation. On the other hand, any deviation of output from
the flexible price level generates variations in inflation. Agents form expectations that take into
account the desire for the policymaker to correct for the inefficiently low average level of activity.
The only way for the policymaker to achieve a higher level of activity is to push output past the
natural level and increase inflation. Agents expect this and the net result is higher inflation, with
no impact on output. This is known as the inflation bias.
The discretionary policymaker chooses a positive level of inflation because this is where the
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marginal costs of inflation are equal to the marginal benefits in terms of output. At a rate of zero
inflation and with wages set, the marginal benefit of incremental inflation on output is positive,
and the marginal cost of zero inflation is zero, so the benefits outweigh the costs. The policymaker
systematically raises inflation until the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs, which results in
the inflation bias. Rogoff (1985) showed that one way to address this is to appoint an independent
and conservative central banker who places less weight on the output gap compared to the social
welfare loss function. This would be equivalent to finding that the optimal inflation coefficient is
very high relative to the coefficient on output in a simple monetary policy rule. There are many
studies such as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2004, 2006a, b) that find this to be the case.
The policymaker under commitment is able to raise output initially above its natural level, but
then promises to return output gradually to its natural level. By promising to return output to its
natural level, there are more subdued effects on inflation which improves the short run tradeoff.
Under commitment, the policymaker can commit to avoiding a positive inflation bias asymptoti-
cally.
4.4.0.2 Inertia Coefficient
In the New Keynesian model, forward-looking expectations are a crucial component through
which monetary policy can influence the economy. This is because consumption and investment
(i.e. aggregate demand) is dependent upon not just the current real interest rate, but also all future
expected real interest rates. Given that the policymaker in my model is committing to a rule in
which it has full credibility, monetary policy is capable of altering the expectations of the house-
holds and firms. This is important from a welfare perspective because it allows the policymaker to
improve the short-run tradeoff when inflation and the welfare-relevant output gap move in opposite
directions.
Since firms are forward-looking when resetting their prices, inflation (which is a function of the
firms’ optimal prices) will not rise by as much during a cost-push shock if the firms are promised
by monetary policy that future output gaps and marginal costs will be lower. This improves the
short-run tradeoff between inflation and output and is the basis for why policies under commitment
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welfare-dominate discretionary policies. It is in this spirit that a positive inertia coefficient could
potentially improve welfare. With a positive inertia coefficient, dependence on a lagged term
permits the policymaker to manipulate long term interest rates with more modest movements in
the short term rate than would otherwise be necessary. As pointed out in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1997), the central bank can achieve its stabilization goals only insofar as its actions affect longer-
term rates as output and prices do not respond to daily fluctuations in the federal funds rate. A
straightforward way to influence the future path of short term rates is to maintain a higher level of
interest rates for a period of time after they have been raised. Hence, given the agents forward-
looking expectations, monetary policy can impose significant effects on aggregate demand without
using extremely volatile movements in the short-term interest rate.
4.5 Tax Risk and Inflation Risk
The sources of taxation and inflation risk are discussed in the following paragraphs. Both
types of risk have consequences for forward looking optimizing firms and households along with
welfare, especially in the context of a risk-sensitive model. Prior to exploring these specific risks
further, it is necessary to discuss a broader view of risk.
Risk is exposure to a stochastic environment in which there are known probabilities to all
potential events. This definition is not to be confused with Knightian uncertainty, in which the
probabilistic distribution of outcomes is unknown. From this point forward, any mention of uncer-
tainty will be in the context of a well-defined probability distribution for which the parameters are
assumed to be known by all actors in the economy.
In my general equilibrium model, the primitive sources of risk are three well-defined exogenous
i.i.d., Gaussian symmetric shocks. These shocks consist of a mean-reverting demand shock to the
government expenditures share of output and both a short-run and long-run productivity growth
shock. The long-run productivity growth shock is represented by a persistent AR(1) and has a
smaller volatility compared to the short-run shock. It captures variation in expected productivity
growth, as empirically documented by Croce (2013). My production-based asset pricing model
endogenously creates links between the primitive well-defined sources of risk, cash flows, and
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inflation.
In a setting where agents have concave utility, additional compensation is systematically re-
quired by the agent to hold an asset with stochastic payoffs. This compensation for risk is quantified
by agents and is referred to as the risk premium. Mathematically, the risk premium is equivalent to
the covariance of the stochastic discount factor (SDF) with the return of the asset. The covariance
can be decomposed into three components: (1) the volatility of the SDF, (2) the volatility of the
return and (3) the correlation between the SDF and the return.
4.5.1 Taxation Risk
Tax risk is a reflection of fluctuations and comovement of the tax rate with marginal utility of
the agent. It is important because the agent cares about after-tax income (labor wages and capital
return). In my general equilibrium model, there is no primitive tax risk and no policy uncertainty.
Stochastic tax fluctuations are a result of shocks to productivity and government expenditures.
Capital accumulation. A distortionary tax on labor and capital income will be used to fund the
government. The agent will be exposed to tax risk because the environment is stochastic and the
tax rate on capital and labor income is time varying. In addition, the agent is forward looking and
will care about the risk profile of the entire stream of taxation over the infinite horizon. The tax
immediately enters the household’s intertemporal Euler equation as follows
qt = Et
 mt,t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discount channel
(1− τDt+1)ut+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cash flow channel
+(1− δ)qt+1

where the nominal stochastic discount factor used to price equity in this setting is
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and the real stochastic discount factor is therefore
mt,t+1 = Mt,t+1 · pit+1
The ex-dividend price of one unit of productivity-adjusted aggregate capital is represented by
qt. This quantity is affected by tax risk through two channels: the discount channel and the cash
flow channel. The distortionary tax rate directly enters the cash flow channel and alters the after-
tax rental rate of capital. Persistent changes in tax rates can affect this channel for many periods
depending on the degree of tax smoothing by the government.
The discount channel is affected by the tax rate due to its general equilibrium effect on the prop-
erties of consumption. An increased tax rate results in lower output, altering the stochastic discount
factor through changes in consumption. Note the stochastic discount factor under recursive pref-
erences is able to take into account not just realized consumption/leisure growth but also expected
consumption/leisure growth. In other words, the effects of changes in tax rates that are persistent
beyond period t+1 are missing from the discount channel under power utility preferences. This
suggests the price of tax risk will be substantially higher with risk-sensitive preferences.
Holding all else constant, tax risk leads to higher return uncertainty on capital through the cash-
flow channel. This combined with its effects on the stochastic discount factor result in a higher
equity premium while depressing capital accumulation. This leads to a loss in welfare as income
and consumption fall.
Labor allocation. The tax on labor directly enters the intratemporal optimality equation of the
household as follows
1− ι
ι
ct
1− ht = wt(1− τ
D
t )
A positive tax rate increases the cost of smoothing consumption, which increases the volatility of
leisure and consumption. Furthermore, the tax has a propagation effect on the volatility of labor
based on the following logic: A fall in the tax rate increases equilibrium labor by the substitution
effect, which increases labor income and thus the size of the tax base. As the size of the tax base
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rises, the tax rate needed to balance the budget falls, which then repeats the process just described.
A higher volatility of labor implies a higher volatility of leisure, which enters the stochastic
discount factor used to discount future cash flows. Holding all else constant, a more volatile
stochastic discount factor increases the equity premium (≈ ρm,rK · σ(m) · σ(rK)). In addition,
increased volatility of leisure and consumption lowers welfare because of the assumed concavity
of utility.
4.5.2 Inflation Risk
A measure of risk related to inflation is the inflation risk premium, which is captured by the
covariance of inflation and the SDF of the agent. There are no pure inflation shocks in the model,
as inflation is an endogenous reflection of fiscal and productivity shocks. Views about the size
and sign of inflation risk premia vary considerably across the literature. Hordahl et al. (2007),
Ravenna and Seppala (2007a, 2007b), and Veronesi and Yared (2000) estimate that inflation risk
premia are very close to zero. This is likely due to the assumption of habits in the latter studies,
which generates large real term premia (real interest rate risk), leaving little room for inflation risk
to explain the upward sloping nominal yield curve observed in the data.
A number of empirical studies come to the opposite conclusion that inflation risk is positive
and non-negligible. Buraschi and Jiltsov (2005), Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2006), Kim and Wright
(2005) estimate the inflation risk premium to be between 70 and 200 basis points depending on the
horizon. In terms of inflation risk and optimal monetary policy, Gavin et al (2009) determine that
putting weight on the price path for the monetary policy rule reduces long-run inflation variability.
Their analysis is conducted with log utility and focuses on inflation volatility, which makes up
only one component of the inflation risk premium (volatility of SDF and correlation of SDF with
inflation being the other two).
Stochastic inflation affects the choices of the firm, household, and government. The following
sections describe the sources and ramifications of inflation risk for each agent.
The firm. For the (1− α) % of firms that do get to choose their price optimally, the equilibrium
pricing condition consists of setting the present discounted value of future marginal revenues equal
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to some markup over the present discounted value of future marginal costs. This is equivalent to
x2t =
η
η−1x
1
t where
x2t︸︷︷︸
Marginal Revenues
= p∗−ηt yt + αEt
[
Mt,t+1pi
η
t+1pi
χ(1−η)
t
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−η
x2t+1
]
x1t︸︷︷︸
Marginal Costs
= p∗−1−ηt ytmct︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cash flow
+αEt
Mt,t+1piη+1t+1 piχ(−η)t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discount channel
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−1−η
x1t+1

The firm is affected by inflation risk through two channels: the cash-flow channel and the
discount channel. As can be seen above, the cash flow channel is a function of the production
of the firm. Inflation directly affects the efficiency of production as price dispersion results in
misallocation of resources
yt =
1
st
[
kθt (Atht)
1−θ] (4.14)
where st, the measure of price dispersion, is a function of inflation
st = (1− α)p∗−ηt + α
(
pit
piχt−1
)η
st−1
In the current setup, bad states of the world (e.g. negative productivity shocks) are associated
with higher inflation. This makes the firm’s cash flows riskier because they fall even more in bad
states of the world (due to larger misallocation of resources as a result of higher inflation). Note this
cash-flow channel and the costs of price dispersion are present in previous studies. However, the
major difference between this model and previous efforts will revolve around the discount channel
and its sensitivity to different risks.
With respect to the discount channel, inflation directly enters the equilibrium pricing condition.
Firms are concerned with the possibility of not being able to adjust their prices optimally in the
following periods. Therefore, if future expected inflation rises, firms place greater weight on these
future marginal costs and benefits and discount them less when choosing the optimal price.
The firm is discounting cash flows based on the marginal utility of the household because this
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is a general equilibrium model and the households own the firms. Inflation results in misallocation
of resources, which impacts GDP and the equilibrium properties of consumption. The changes in
consumption due to non-neutral inflation alters the household/firm’s stochastic discount factor.
The government. The government is impacted by inflation risk through two channels: the inter-
est payments it must make on the previous period’s debt and the changes in the size of the tax base.
The tax base is equivalent to income and is going to be altered by inflation risk through the firm’s
production decisions, as described above. With regards to interest payments, agents are going to
require compensation in the form of an inflation risk premium to hold nominal debt as follows
Rt − (rt + Et[pit+1]) = covt(mt,t+1, pit+1) (4.15)
where Rt is the nominal risk free rate, rt is the real risk free rate, Et[pit+1] is the expected inflation
rate, and mt,t+1 is the real stochastic discount factor.
Given that inflation is stochastic, the inflation risk premium is positive if inflation is associated
with high marginal utility states (e.g. bad technology shocks). The intuition is the following: the
agent’s real return from holding the nominal bond is lower with higher realized inflation, and the
agent dislikes lower real returns in high marginal utility states. Thus, the agent requires compen-
sation above expected inflation in the form of an inflation risk premium for holding the nominal
bond. Holding all else constant, the higher interest payment costs of debt put more pressure on tax
rates when balancing the budget.
Observable measures of risk in the data. Ideally, the observable measure of inflation risk would
be the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the inflation rate. However, the
stochastic discount factor is not directly observable in the data. Due to this, I will focus on the
volatility of the inflation rate. An additional measure of the inflation risk premium would be the
difference between a nominal bond and treasury inflation protected security plus expected infla-
tion. However, even this measure abstracts from liquidity premia that make it difficult to determine
the true inflation risk premium.
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Likewise, the observable measure of tax risk would ideally be the covariance between the SDF
and the tax rate. However, as stated above, the stochastic discount factor is not directly observable
in the data. Also, the correlation changes sign depending on the source of uncertainty. Short run
shocks generate a positive correlation, so that tax rates rise in bad times. In contrast, long run
shocks generate a negative correlation, as tax rates rise upon the realization of good news due to
the wealth effect dominating (consumption/leisure rise). In the setting with all three shocks, the
covariance becomes less negative as the inflation coefficient rises, indicating higher tax risk as
monetary policy stabilizes inflation.
Excluded dimensions of risk. In my model, inflation has no effect on the firm’s financing struc-
ture and leverage. That is because I assume the capital structure of the firm is not endogenous. I
assume the firm is made up of 50% equity and 50% debt, which is what we observe in the data.
Financial leverage is assumed to be fixed and there is no tax shield on debt, so the capital structure
is independent of the value of the firm and Modigliani and Miller (1958) holds. Rather than fo-
cusing on corporate debt, the focus of my study is on public debt. Assuming endogenous leverage
and public debt would lead to an analysis of crowding out between private and public debt, but I
abstract from this situation.
In contrast, Gomes, Jermann, Schmid (2013) take into account the structure of the firm and
model real corporate debt but do not include public debt. In their model, debt is written in nominal
terms so that unanticipated changes in inflation affect firm balance sheets. The intuition is that the
real value of debt rises with lower than expected inflation, which worsens firms’ balance sheets
and they become more likely to default. Given debt overhang or multi-period debt, surviving
firms begin to cut future investment and production plans so that the increased real debt lowers the
expected rewards to equity owners.
Their results show a channel through which inflation could improve welfare as it would avoid
the negative welfare consequences of debt deflation. By modeling private debt, the policy recom-
mendations are for allowing greater inflation in bad times in order to improve firms’ balance sheets
as it lowers the real value of their debt. To arrive at this result, the authors compare a setting with
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exogenous inflation to a monetary-policy rule that incorporates inflation and output. The goal of
their study is not to find the optimal policy, but to show that inflation can have real effects without
imposing sticky prices. My study focuses on finding the optimal policy with a focus on inflation’s
effect on public rather than private debt. Higher unexpected inflation in bad times can improve the
balance sheet of the government because the level of real debt declines and tax rates are not forced
to rise by as much.
Another issue is related to the symmetry of the shocks within the model. Shocks in the model
are assumed to be iid, Gaussian, with no jumps, no skewness and no kurtosis. Assuming some
form of skewness would very likely increase the compensation for risk as shown in Colacito et al
(2014).
4.5.3 Tradeoff of Inflation and Taxation Risks: Motivation
The monetary authority controls the dynamics of inflation through the simple Taylor rule
ln
(
Rt
R∗
)
= αrln
(
Rt−1
R∗
)
+
↑︷︸︸︷
αpi ln
( pit
pi∗
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
↓ σ(pi)
+α∆yln
(
∆yt
∆y∗
)
The central bank can decrease inflation risk and its associated costs by engaging in a Hawk pol-
icy (high αpi inflation coefficient). To understand better how this relates to taxation risk, assume
monetary policy is able to stabilize inflation completely so that its volatility is zero. Then the real
government budget constraint
bt =
Rt−1
pit︸ ︷︷ ︸
As σ(pi) ↓
bt−1 + gt −
↑ σ(τD)︷︸︸︷
τDt yt.
can only be balanced through greater fluctuations in the distortionary tax rate, τDt . Hence, monetary
policy faces a tradeoff in which decreasing inflation risk will simultaneously increase tax risk.
Previous studies in the optimal fiscal and monetary policy literature suggest the benefits of
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reducing misallocation of resources completely dominate the costs of increased tax volatility.6 Re-
call, the costs of increased tax risk include higher equity risk (increased after-tax return uncertainty)
and higher labor income risk.7 The increased costs of tax risk are quantitatively insignificant in
previous studies because the price of risk (sensitivity of the stochastic discount factor to uncer-
tainty) is counterfactually low. The goal of the next section is to show that when risk is priced
consistent with the data, the welfare costs of increased tax risk will rise so that optimal inflation
volatility will be substantially higher.
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Equity Premium, Inflation Risk Premium and Optimal Inflation Volatility
The optimal inflation volatility is determined by finding the inflation coefficient αpi in the in-
terest rate rule that corresponds to the household’s greatest lifetime utility. No other economic
actor receives utility in the model except the household. This definition of optimality is specific
to a class of rules that are not considered globally optimal. While there is value in determining
what the economy would look like under the globally optimal policy, implementation of the Ram-
sey policy would require an unrealistic demand in terms of information or computing capacity for
the decision maker. This is because the optimal policy would require perfect observation of all
the shocks hitting the economy along with the laws of motion that govern the dynamics within
the economy. These solutions are well-known for being extremely complicated and very model-
specific while tending to be less robust to model uncertainty. For these reasons, I focus on a small
subset of implementable simple rules that are functions of observable variables. Furthermore, mul-
tiple papers such as Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2007) have shown the best simple rules often come
quite close to matching the welfare of the globally optimal Ramsey rule.
6This is a result that I confirm with power utility in Section 4.6.1.
7Higher labor income risk is due to the stabilization of markups. The wedge/markup between the marginal product
of labor and the real wage decreases in good times as monetary policy stabilizes inflation. This results in a higher labor
response by the substitution effect as the lower markup entails a higher real wage (MPL = markup * w). Therefore,
labor income is higher in good times and this higher labor volatility implies higher consumption/leisure volatility,
which is suboptimal from a welfare perspective.
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The following Taylor Rule will be used to conduct the analysis:
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The parameters chosen for the inertia coefficient and the output growth gap are set to match in-
flation dynamics and interest rate serial correlation observed in the data. Specifically, without
the output growth gap, inflation is theoretically positively correlated with permanent productivity
shocks, which is counterfactual with respect to the empirical evidence and economic intuition. In-
corporating the output growth gap results in inflation falling with good productivity shocks and
rising with bad productivity shocks. At first, the inflation target will be assumed to be constant
and set to its average value of 3.5% which is consistent with the annual average observed from
1945-2012.8 Later exercises will consist of endogenizing the inflation target to take into account
fluctuations in the debt-GDP ratio.
Loss function comparison. The linear-quadratic methodology involves deriving a linear pol-
icy rule that minimizes a quadratic approximation to the true welfare objective subject to linear
constraints that are first-order approximations to the true structural equations (Benigno and Wood-
ford 2007). The central bank loss function is a reduced-form second-order approximation of the
household’s utility, which is a quadratic function of inflation and the output gap. According to
Gali (2008), the use of first-order approximations to the structural equations ignores welfare losses
associated with the steady-state effects of different degrees of volatility.
Benigno and Woodford (2004) derive a different approach that computes the second-order ap-
proximation to the model’s structural equations. They use a linear combination of those equations
to eliminate the linear terms in the second-order approximation to the welfare measure to obtain
a purely quadratic expression. According to Benigno and Woodford (2004), “Because the loss
function is purely quadratic (lacking linear terms), it is possible to evaluate it to second order using
only a first-order approximation to the equilibrium evolution of inflation and output under a given
8Setting the inflation target to 2% yields little to no difference in results.
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policy. Hence, log-linear approximations to the structural relations of their model suffice, yielding
a standard linear-quadratic policy problem.”
While this method computes the correct steady-state capital after accounting for volatility, the
preferences that are used in this setting still abstract from asset-pricing considerations. In other
words, these settings are not truly capturing the effect of uncertainty that is characterized by asset
prices in the data. Furthermore, capital is typically abstracted from, so that labor is the only
input for production. Capital is important to include because (1) it is an important determinant
of wealth, (2) it acts as a propagation mechanism through which shocks affect the economy for
many periods, and (3) changes in capital through investment are a driving factor in fluctuations of
aggregate demand and the business cycle.
The following Figure 4.1 summarizes one method of “inflating away debt” through control of
the inflation coefficient and the second moment. The Dove policy (low αpi) allows for a higher
response of inflation to a negative productivity shock. This decreases the real debt-GDP ratio
and relieves pressure on the fiscal side so tax rates don’t have to rise as much. However, this
decreased tax risk comes at the expense of inefficient price dispersion. The price dispersion costs
completely dominate in previous studies and in the Power Utility model studied in this paper. Upon
incorporating model features consistent with the asset pricing literature, optimal inflation volatility
rises substantially, which suggests that tax risk becomes a first-order concern for monetary-policy
considerations.
Optimal αpi for Power Utility I find that the optimal inflation coefficient9 for the Power Utility
model is∞. This corresponds to a zero volatility of inflation. Optimal monetary policy consists
of completely eliminating inflation volatility at the expense of increased tax volatility. This is the
general result in a simple model of productivity shocks, sticky prices and flexible wages.10
By preventing changes in the rate of inflation, monetary policy is minimizing dead-weight
9I use grid values for the inflation coefficient and find the highest welfare when αpi = 1e16.
10See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006); Woodford (2004); Goodfriend and King (1998)
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Figure 4.1: “Inflating Away Debt” with Inflation Coefficient (αpi)
This panel shows how the inflation coefficient (αpi) can be an important tool for allowing inflation to help
stabilize the debt-GDP ratio. These results are based on the Main Model, and its calibration can be found in
Table 4.1. The Dove policy corresponds to αpi = 0.6 while the Hawk policy is for αpi = 1.6.
losses due to price dispersion. This decreases misallocation of labor and misallocation of interme-
diate goods in the agent’s utility function, which results in higher welfare. The benefits of lower
price dispersion dominate the costs of increased tax volatility because this model understates the
price of risk.
Optimal αpi for Main Model I find that the optimal inflation coefficient for the Main Model11
is 5.65, as opposed to ∞ for the Power Utility model. This corresponds to an optimal inflation
volatility of 21 basis points versus 0 basis points for the Power Utility model. Welfare gains turn
into welfare losses upon reducing inflation volatility below 21 basis points in the Main Model.
This substantial difference in optimal inflation volatility can be better understood by analyzing the
tradeoff between inflation risk and tax risk.
Trading off inflation risk and tax risk. A comparison of the two models shows the equity
premium in the left panel of Figure 4.2. The equity premium reacts significantly more for the
11The model with vintages of capital, long-run risk, and recursive preferences.
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Figure 4.2: Trading off Equity Risk and Inflation Risk
The left panel shows the increase in the equity premium as monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation
with a higher inflation coefficient (αpi). The right panel shows the level of the inflation risk premium as
monetary policy increasingly stabilizes inflation with a higher inflation coefficient (αpi). The annual calibra-
tions are reported in Table 4.1. Excess returns are levered by a factor of three, consistent with Garcia-Feijo
and Jorgensen (2010).
Main Model compared to the Power Utility model. With monetary policy increasing tax risk, the
resulting increased return uncertainty and labor risk combine to yield a 13 basis point increase in
the equity premium for the Main Model. In contrast, the Power Utility model’s equity premium
goes up by less than a basis point. The higher equity premium lowers capital accumulation and
welfare. Likewise, the inflation risk premium falls substantially as monetary policy increasingly
targets inflation. This fall is more drastic in the Main Model because of its greater sensitivity to
risk.
Composition of intertemporal nominal risk. The effect monetary policy has on the intertem-
poral composition of nominal risk can be seen in Figure 4.3. On the horizontal axis is the annual
maturity and on the vertical axis is the real excess return of a nominal bond over the one-period-
ahead risk-free rate. This curve captures compensation for both real interest rate risk and the
inflation risk premium at multiple horizons. Note that the slope is positive and reaches over 100
basis points, which is broadly consistent with empirical evidence of the nominal term structure.
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Figure 4.3: Intertemporal Composition of Nominal Risk as Inflation Coeff. (αpi) ↑
This panel shows the nominal term structures for Dove (αpi = 0.6) and Hawk (αpi = 2) policies. The Dove
policy corresponds to an inflation volatility of 2.2%, which is consistent with the historical average. These
results are based on the Main Model, and its calibration can be found in Table 4.1.
As monetary policy stabilizes inflation, the term structure starts to fall and become downward
sloping, which is due to the fact that the term structure of real bonds is downward sloping in
this model.12 As monetary policy increases the inflation coefficient, the inflation risk premium is
decreasing and the nominal term structure starts to resemble the term structure of real bonds, which
only captures real interest rate risk.
Composition of intertemporal equity risk. The effect monetary policy has on the intertemporal
composition of the equity premium can be seen in Figure 4.4. The aggregate equity premium of
12Note, the term structure of real bonds is downward sloping because real bonds provide insurance when consump-
tion growth is positively autocorrelated. The reason is the following: good news today is associated with good news in
the future (due to positive correlation), and good news is associated with higher real interest rates. Hence, good news
today is associated with lower prices of real bonds, and the later maturity real bonds are most sensitive. Therefore,
the longer term real bonds provide the most insurance as their prices rise the most in recessions or bad states, so
their holding return is highest in bad states. This intuition is consistent with the most recent financial crisis, in which
holding returns for real bonds increased as their prices increased.
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the stock market can be thought of as a value-weighted average of zero coupon equity claims to
the aggregate dividend (Dt = Yt − wtLt − It) at different horizons. In other words, the price of
equity can be decomposed into the sum of future discounted dividend strips
P equityt = Et[mt+1|t ·Dt+1]︸ ︷︷ ︸
P 1t
+ · · ·+ Et[mt+n|t ·Dt+n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pnt
+ · · ·
The term structure of equity is made up of one-period excess returns of zero-coupon claims to
dividends with maturity n defined as
Et[R
ex
n,t+1] = Et
[
Pn−1,t+1
Pn,t
−Rft
]
Figure 4.2 shows that as monetary policy attempts to stabilize inflation, tax risk rises and this
increases return uncertainty and labor income risk, resulting in a higher aggregate equity premium.
Figure 4.4 shows that with regards to the temporal distribution, Hawk monetary policy is actually
decreasing equity risk in the short run but at the expense of higher equity risk in the long run.
Explanation of decreased short-term equity risk. The decreased equity risk in the short run of
the Hawk monetary policy can be explained by the following logic: In good times, Hawk monetary
policy stabilizes inflation which compresses the markup of marginal product of labor over the real
wage in the firm’s demand for labor. The smaller markup entails higher equilibrium labor, which
increases labor income for the household. Given that labor income is higher, the total payout to
the household becomes lower (Dt = Yt − wtLt − It) in good times, which decreases the riskiness
of dividends in the short run. In fact, the fall in equity risk is over 200 basis points for the Main
Model. In contrast, the fall in equity risk for Power Utility is ten times smaller, as shown in Figure
4.5.
Explanation of increased long-term equity risk. The increased equity risk in the long run of
the Hawk monetary policy is due to the increased tax risk, as fiscal policy can no longer depend
on fluctuations of inflation to help balance its budget. The difference in expected excess returns
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Figure 4.4: Intertemporal Composition of Equity Risk
The left panel shows the equity term structure for the Main Model with Hawk policy (αpi = 2). The term
structure of equity shows the one-period excess (holding) return of a zero coupon claim to the aggregate
dividend (Dt = Yt − wtLt − It) with maturity n:
Rn,t = Et[Pn−1,t+1/Pn,t]− rft
where Pn,t (the time-t value of the dividend realized at time t+n) follows a recursion such that P0,t = Dt,
Pn,t = Et[mt+1Pn−1,t+1]. The right panel shows the difference in term structures for the Hawk policy
(αpi = 2) and the Dove Policy (αpi = 0.6). The Hawk policy decreases equity risk in the short run but
increases equity risk in the long run. The calibration for the Main Model can be found in Table 4.1.
after ten years is approximately 13 basis points, which closely resembles the overall increase in the
aggregate equity premium shown in Figure 4.2. This suggests that the aggregate equity premium,
which is essentially a value weighted average over an infinite stream of future cash flows, places
greater weight on long-term risk considerations. Ultimately, the agent’s optimal investment deci-
sions will be more of a function of long-term uncertainty rather than short-term uncertainty. This
effect is muted in the Power Utility model, as shown in Figure 4.5.13
13Note that the above results are suggesting that the value premium should be lower under Hawk vs Dove monetary
policy. Whether this is consistent with empirical evidence is left for future research.
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Figure 4.5: Hawk Minus Dove: Difference in Intertemporal Composition of Equity Risk
The left panel shows the difference in the equity term structures for the Hawk policy (αpi = 2) and Dove
policy (αpi = 0.6) for Power Utility. The right panel shows the difference in term structures for the Hawk
policy (αpi = 2) and the Dove policy (αpi = 0.6) for Main Model, which is identical to the right panel
in Figure 4.4 and is included for comparison. The Hawk policy decreases equity risk in the short run but
increases equity risk in the long run for the Main Model. The long run effect is muted in the Power Utility
model. The calibrations for these models are in Table 4.1.
4.6.2 Increased Debt Levels and Tax Risk
According to the 2013 CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook, “Under one set of alternative policies,
referred to as the extended alternative fiscal scenario... federal debt held by the public would reach
about 190 percent of GDP by 2038, CBO projects.” The extended alternative fiscal scenario is
a projection based on items that are not currently law but may potentially happen. For example,
the alternative scenario assumes lawmakers will prevent Medicare’s payment rates for physicians
from declining, as they have done every year previously.14 The baseline scenario assumes current
law will continue regardless of the feasibility.
The CBO outlines what the increased debt-GDP ratio could mean for tax risk, “Federal spend-
ing on interest payments would rise, thus requiring larger changes in tax policies ... to achieve
14There are other examples. The alternative assumes that about 75 expiring tax provisions (including a provision
allowing businesses to immediately deduct 50 percent of new investments in equipment) will be extended through
2023, whereas the baseline assumes no extension.
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Figure 4.6: Higher Public Debt =⇒ Higher Interest Payments =⇒ Higher Tax Risk
The data for these two panels are taken from 2013 CBO Long-Term Budget Outlook Supplementary Data
Excel file. Note under the alternative scenario, public debt levels cease to be estimated once they pass the
250% threshold of Debt-GDP.
any chosen targets for budget deficits and debt.” This notion that tax risk will increase is clear from
the government’s budget constraint
bt =
Rft−1
pit
bt−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
As b
y
↑
+gt −
↑ σ(τD)︷︸︸︷
τDt yt
A higher steady state debt entails higher interest payments on debt, which leads to more volatile
tax rates so that the budget constraint holds. At 190% debt-GDP ratio, tax volatility jumps 30 basis
points as the inflation coefficient rises, compared to 7 basis points under the lower historical steady
state debt. These higher costs of tax risk are reflected by the higher optimal inflation volatility as
the models become more risk-sensitive, as shown in Figure 4.7.
Moving to the higher debt-GDP ratio in Figure 4.7, the optimal inflation volatility doubles
under the Main Model and is now positive in all models except the Power Utility model. In fact,
in results available upon request, the optimal inflation volatility was zero for debt levels as high as
500% of GDP. This suggests that in a model that does not price risk consistent with the data (Power
Utility), an important cost of inflation stabilization (increased tax risk) is muted even at extreme
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Figure 4.7: Higher Cost of Tax Risk =⇒ Higher Optimal Inflation Volatility
This panel shows the optimal inflation volatility for all of the models over two levels of Debt-GDP: present
day (75%) and CBO 2039’s projection (190%). The bottom model is indicative of the framework typically
studied in the optimal fiscal and monetary policy literature. As one moves up the panel, additional asset
pricing features are incorporated up to the Main Model, which is representative of the framework for the
production-based asset pricing literature. The calibrations for each model can be found in Table 4.1
debt levels. In contrast, the results of the Main Model suggest that with higher levels of debt-GDP,
tax risk becomes a first-order concern. It would be optimal for monetary policy to become less
Hawk and more Dove to help reduce tax risk at both current and extreme levels of debt.15
4.6.3 “Inflating Away Debt” with Time Varying Inflation Target
The focus now shifts from the second moment of inflation to the first moment. I assume that
monetary policy is allowing the inflation target to fluctuate and respond positively to the debt-GDP
ratio. In other words, the following equations govern monetary policy:
ln
(
Rt
R∗
)
= 0.6 · ln
(
Rt−1
R∗
)
+ 0.6 · ln
( pit
pi∗
)
+ 0.5 · ln
(
∆yt
∆y∗
)
15More Dove is in reference to the optimal policy under the Power Utility setting.
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pi∗t = pi ∗+αG · ln(
bt
yt
/
b∗
y∗)
where αG > 0 would indicate monetary policy increasing the inflation target with higher levels of
the debt-GDP ratio.
While fluctuations in the inflation target are related to the first moment, it also clearly impacts
the second moment. Monetary policy is now stabilizing inflation around a moving target, which
would also increase the volatility of inflation. The intuition is the following: holding all else
constant, an increase in the debt-GDP ratio elevates the inflation target, which acts to lower the
nominal rate. This reduces the costs of debt while also boosting GDP.
Mechanism. To understand better the impact of αG > 0, one can observe the effects of an
exogenous increase in government spending. In Figure 4.8 there are four panels and three cases.
The solid blue line represents the case in which the inflation coefficient is set optimally, and there
is no alteration to the inflation target. The dotted green line represents the case when αG > 0
and is “Inflating Away Debt” by increasing the inflation target as debt-GDP rises. The dotted red
line (lower αpi case) is included for sake of comparison to the “Inflating Away Debt” case so both
have identical volatilities of inflation. However, the acceleration of inflation (volatility of pit
pit−1
) for
the lower αpi case is higher than the “Inflating Away Debt” case. This is important for distortion
because when price indexation is perfect, it is the change in inflation rates that matter for welfare.
As can be seen from the second panel, the dotted green line representing the “Inflating Away
Debt” case is elevated for a longer duration. This is due to the inflation target picking up the
extended increase in Debt-GDP as fiscal policy smoothes taxes. In the third panel, one can see that
while the lower αpi case (dotted red line) results in lower Debt-GDP in the short term, the increased
distortion (due to greater acceleration) reduces efficiency of production so that Debt-GDP is higher
in the medium to long term. This translates into a higher distortionary tax rates in the medium to
long term. Higher tax risk in the medium to long term is captured by the risk-sensitive preferences
of the Main Model, and the agent dislikes these long-term risks.
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Figure 4.8: G Shock: Lower Inflation Acceleration: αG > 0 Compared to Lower αpi
The four panels show how allowing the target rate of inflation to be affected by debt-GDP brings about
welfare gains. The reduction in acceleration of inflation compared to the lower αpi results in lower Debt-
GDP ratio and tax rates in the medium to long term.
When is it optimal to alter the inflation target? I find that if this question is addressed in the
context of the Power Utility model, the answer is never. Debt levels up to 500% of GDP were
tested, and in each case, the welfare costs of price dispersion dominated the gains of reduced tax
risk. When moving to the rich asset-pricing Main Model, for debt levels below 200% of GDP,
the reductions in tax risk are quantitatively small. For example, as αG increases in the low debt
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setting (44% of GDP), tax rate volatility decreases by less than a basis point and the volatility of
the consumption-leisure bundle declines by less than a basis point. The effect is less than a basis
point because at low debt levels, interest payments are smaller, and the volatility of the tax rate is
low at 1.14 %.
However, with debt-GDP ratios beyond 200% of GDP, “inflating away debt” becomes optimal
because tax-rate volatility falls by 12 times as much as in the low debt scenario. Furthermore,
the volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle falls by 5 times as much in the low-debt scenario.
Hence, the reduction in tax risk increases with the level of debt. And this reduction in tax risk
leads to a greater reduction in consumption-leisure volatility under the Main Model compared to
the Power Utility model (5 vs 0.9 basis points).
Quantitative welfare differences. Up until this point, all discussion of welfare gains and losses
across different policies have been qualitative in nature. This is because the welfare gains have
been at most a few basis points (hundredths of a percentage point). For instance, when tax rate
volatility is matched to the high end of the data (close to 6%), the welfare gains of inflating away
debt are at best 8 basis points.
The small differences across policies is not just unique to monetary policy. Tax smoothing
combined with removal of all uncertainty with respect to government spending shocks results in a
gain of only 25 basis points. This is an issue that has plagued the business cycle literature since
the discussion of Lucas (1987). That study showed that welfare gains from removing all business
cycle fluctuations were less than a basis point. This issue has been addressed by papers such as
Tallarini (2000) and Croce (2012), in which they use asset pricing facts to discipline the model.
They show that welfare gains from removing business cycle fluctuations are orders of magnitude
larger when agents’ concern for risk matches the data. If monetary and fiscal policy were capable
of removing all fluctuations in the Main Model (which has many of the same features as Croce
(2012)), then there would be sizable welfare gains in this study as well. However, it is not possible
for fiscal or monetary policy to remove all uncertainty, so these welfare improvements represent
best-case scenarios that are impossible to match.
125
Therefore, the small differences in policies are not unique to my model. Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006) also point out that the majority of policies they studied have welfare differences less
than a basis point. When growth is exogenous and agents have the ability to smooth consumption
through endogenous investment and labor, it is expected that policy differences are more quali-
tative than quantitative in nature. If one is concerned about the quantitative welfare differences
across policies, the model must move towards endogenous growth. Other fiscal policy papers such
as Croce et al. (2012) and Croce et al. (2012) only obtain sizable welfare differences once they
incorporate endogenous growth in some form. This is an avenue I plan to leave for future research.
4.7 Conclusion
This study evaluates optimal inflation dynamics while departing from the existing fiscal and
monetary policy literature in just one dimension -- risk considerations. Risk considerations include
the equity premium and the nominal term structure as found in the data, and these are captured by
introducing recursive preferences, long-run risk, and heterogeneous vintages of capital.
I have shown that when accounting for risk and tax uncertainty as in the data, central bankers’
optimal inflation toughness dramatically changes for a fixed inflation target. This is especially true
at higher levels of debt where interest payments increase tax risk. Furthermore, I find it becomes
optimal for monetary policy to directly react to the debt-GDP ratio but only at high levels (greater
than 200%). This contrasts with the findings of the Power Utility model that suggests it is never
optimal. Overall, the results of this study convey the need to account for risk in monetary policy
analysis.
In addition, this is the first study to evaluate the potential effects of monetary policy on the
intertemporal distribution of the aggregate equity premium. I find that Hawk policy (stabilizing
inflation) decreases short term risk while increasing long term risk. This occurs because Hawk
policy stabilizes markups, so that labor rises and the total payout to the household falls in good
times. This makes short-run dividends less risky while increasing tax risk for long-term dividends.
Potential areas of improvement include endogenous growth, the zero lower bound, richer fiscal
policies, and uncertainty about government policy. Policies that affect endogenous growth have
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been shown to yield sizable welfare difference as in Croce et al. (2012) and Croce et al. (2012).
Although the zero lower bound is not explicitly modeled in this study, I consider it to be a fruitful
avenue for future research. In addition, richer fiscal policies beyond the simple rule used in this
study as in Leeper et al. (2010) could potentially alter the conclusions of this study. Finally,
uncertainty about government policy is abstracted from as commitment and perfect information
about policy is assumed for this study. Moving towards uncertainty and learning about policy as in
Pastor and Veronesi (2011), Pastor and Veronesi (2012), and Kelly, Pastor, and Veronesi (2013) is
another channel that should be considered in future research.
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Table 4.1: Model Features and Parameter Values
Main
Model
Rec.
Prefs.
+LRR
Rec.
Prefs.
Power
Utility
Recursive Preferences X X X
Long Run Risk X X
Capital Vintages X
Preference parameters
Discount factor β 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Effective risk aversion γ · o 10 10 10 6
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 2.0 2.0 2.0 1/6
Leisure weight o 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Technology parameters
Capital share θ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Depreciation rate δ 15% 15% 15% 15%
Productivity parameters
Risk exposure of new investment φ0 0 1 1 1
Average growth rate µ 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Volatility of short-run risk σa 3.71% 3.71% 3.71% 3.71%
Volatility of long-run risk σx 0.52% 0.52% 0% 0%
AR(1) of expected growth ρ 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925
New Keynesian parameters
Price elasticity of demand η 7 7 7 7
Probability firm cannot change price α 10% 10% 10% 10%
Policy parameters
Steady state Debt to GDP SB 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Steady state G
Y
SG 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Monetary Policy Inflation Coefficient αpi 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Output Growth Gap Coefficient α∆y 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Inertia Coefficient αr 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
I will be comparing a total of four models that are ordered from most risk-sensitive to least risk sensitive,
left to right. Additional results will be found in the Appendix for the models re-calibrated to match GDP
risk and the risk free rate. Preliminary analysis indicates little to no changes in results upon re-calibrating.
128
Table 4.2: Main Model Moments
Data Main Model
E(I/Y ) 00.15 00.20
σ(∆c) 02.16 (0.17) 02.34
σ(∆i) 16.40 (1.26) 16.18
σ(∆n) 03.66 (0.29) 03.05
σ(∆y) 03.59 03.75
AC1(∆c) 00.49 00.36
AC1(∆y) 00.35 00.30
σ(τD) 03.10 01.40
AC1(
B
Y
) 00.94 00.90
E(pi) 03.50 03.10
σ(pi) 02.32 02.19
σ(rf ) 01.35 01.20
E[rf ] 00.89 01.55
E[rL,ex] 05.70 (2.25) 3.84
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Figure 4.9: Tipping Points: When it is Optimal for Monetary Policy to Respond to Debt-GDP
This panel shows the debt thresholds for when welfare gains start to be realized from inflating away debt.
The bottom model is indicative of the framework typically studied in the optimal fiscal and monetary policy
literature. As one moves up the panel, additional asset pricing features are incorporated up to the Main
Model, which is representative of the framework for the production-based asset pricing literature. Note that
as model risk-sensitivity increases, the threshold for optimal monetary policy responding to debt-GDP falls.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2: ASSET PRICING AND THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF
MONETARY POLICY
A.1 Model
The economy consists of a continuum of identical households, a continuum of intermediate-
goods firms, and a government that conducts monetary and fiscal policy. The structure of the model
is the standard neoclassical growth model augmented with real and nominal frictions. The nominal
friction is sticky prices. The real friction is monopolistic competition, which results in a markup
of price over marginal costs. Monetary policy assumes full commitment to an interest rate rule
that is a function of inflation and output growth. Fiscal policy raises lump-sum taxes to pay for
exogenous expenditures.
Preferences. The households have Epstein-Zin preferences defined over consumption goods, ct,
and leisure, 1−ht. These preferences exhibit a CES aggregate of current and future utility certainty
equivalent weighted by (1-β) and β, respectively.
vt = max{cj ,hj ,ij ,bj ,kj+1}∞j=t
{
(1− β)(cιt(1− ht)1−ι)1−
1
ψ + β(Et[v
1−γ
t+1 ])
1− 1
ψ
1−γ
} 1
1− 1
ψ
s.t.
bt + ct + it + τt = Rt−1
bt−1
pit
+ wtht + utkt + φˇt
The real value of debt is bt; ct is consumption; it is investment; Rt−1 is the risk-free rate; pit is the
inflation rate Pt
Pt−1
; τt is the lump-sum tax; wt is the real wage; ht is labor hours; ut is the rental rate
of capital; kt is capital; and φˇt is profits.
Unlike standard preferences, Epstein-Zin preferences allow for the disentanglement of γ, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion, and ψ, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. When 1
ψ
=
γ, the utility collapses to standard preferences with additively separable expected utility both in
time and state. When γ > 1
ψ
, the agent prefers early resolution of uncertainty, so the agent dislikes
shocks to long-run expected growth rates.
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Intermediate good bundling. The consumption good is assumed to be a composite made of a
continuum of differentiated goods cit indexed by i ∈ [0, 1] via the aggregator:
ct =
[∫ 1
0
c
1− 1
n
it di
] 1
1− 1η
The elasticity of substitution across different varieties of consumption goods is η > 1 (also the
price elasticity of demand for good j) . As η →∞, the goods become closer and closer substitutes,
so that individual firms have less market power.
The household minimizes total expenditures subject to an aggregation constraint, where Pjt is
price of intermediate good j:
min
cjt
∫ 1
0
Pjtcjtdj
s.t. [∫ 1
0
c
1− 1
n
it di
] 1
1− 1η ≥ ct
The optimal demand for the level of intermediate consumption good cjt is given by
cjt =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−η
ct
where Pt is the nominal price index
Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ηjt dj
] 1
η−1
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Productivity. The law of motion of the productivity process captures both short-run and long-run
productivity risks:
log
A0t+1
A0t
≡ ∆at+1 = µ+ xt + σaεa,t+1, (A.1)
xt+1 = ρxt + σxεx,t+1, (A.2) εa,t+1
εx,t+1
 ∼ i.i.d.N

 0
0
 ,
 1 0
0 1

 , t = 0, 1, 2, · · · . (A.3)
According to the above specification, short-run productivity shocks, εa,t+1, affect contemporaneous
output directly but have no effect on future productivity growth. Shocks to long-run productivity,
represented by εx,t+1, carry news about future productivity growth rates but do not affect current
output.
Capital Accumulation Technology. Assume that investments in different vintages of capital
have heterogeneous exposure to aggregate productivity shocks.1 In other words, there will be
vintage-specific productivity growth that is going to depend on the age j = 0, 1, ..., t − 1 of the
vintage of capital
At−jt+1
At−jt
= eµ+φj(∆at+1−µ)
Under the above specification, production units of all generations have the same unconditional
expected growth rate. Also, At−0t = A0t is set to ensure that new production units are on average
as productive as older ones. The log growth rate of the productivity process for the initial gen-
eration of production units, ∆at+1, is given by equation (A.1). Heterogeneity is driven solely by
differences in aggregate productivity risk exposure, φj .
The empirical findings in Ai et al. (2012) suggests that older production units are more exposed
1Multiple frictions for capital accumulation have been tested, and this friction was chosen because standard capital
adjustment costs result in counterfactually low investment growth volatility. The friction in this paper does not suffer
from this issue.
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to aggregate productivity shocks than younger ones, i.e., the exposure φj is increasing in j. To
capture this fact, a parsimonious specification for φj is adopted:
φj =
 0 j = 01 j = 1, ... .
new vintage of capital, j=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
At−0t+1
At−0t
= eµ
all other older vintages of capital, j=1,2..︷ ︸︸ ︷
At−jt+1
At−jt
= eµ+xt+σaa,t+1 (A.4)
New production units have zero exposure to aggregate productivity shocks in the first period of
life. Every period thereafter, they have 100% exposure to aggregate productivity shocks as do all
other existing vintages.
Let Kt denote the productivity-adjusted physical capital stock. Despite the heterogeneity in
productivity, aggregate production can be represented as a function of Kt and Nt. The law of
motion of the productivity-adjusted physical capital stock Kt, takes the following form:
K1 = I0, Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + ωt+1It
ωt+1 =
(
At−0t+1
A0t+1
) 1−α
α
= e−
1−α
α
(xt+σaa,t+1)(1−φ0)
where It is the total mass of new vintage capital produced at time t, and ωt+1 is an endogenous
process that accounts for the productivity gap between the newest vintage of capital and all older
vintages. Note that when φ0 = 1, the new capital vintage has the same exposure to aggregate
productivity shocks as older ones. In this case, ωt+1 = 1 for all t and capital of all generations are
identical.
The Government. The government issues one-period nominal risk-free bonds, bt, collects taxes
in the amount of τt, and faces an exogenous expenditure and transfers stream, gt and trt. Its period
by period budget constraint is given by
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bt =
Rt−1
pit
bt−1 + gt − τt + trt
The exogenous expenditure streams are formulated as in Croce et al. (2012)
G
Y
=
1
1 + e−g¯y
gyt = (1− ρg)g¯y + ρggyt−1 + G,t, G,t ∼ N(0, σ2gy)
tryt = (1− ρg) ¯try + ρtrtryt−1 + tr,t, tr,t ∼ N(0, σ2try)
Total tax revenues, τt, consist of lump-sum tax revenues.
Tax smoothing by the government consists of tax revenues rising whenever the previous pe-
riod’s debt rises
τt − τ∗ = γ1(bt−1 − b∗)
where γ1 > 0 ensures that the debt-GDP ratio is bounded and there is a unique solution.
The monetary authority sets short-term nominal interest rate according to a simple Taylor rule
ln(Rt/R∗) = αrln(Rt−1/R∗) + αpiln(pit/pi∗) + α∆yln(∆yt/∆y∗)
where αr is the inertia coefficient, αpi is the inflation coefficient, α∆y is the output growth gap
coefficient, pi∗ is the inflation target, and ∆y∗ is the output growth target.
Firms. Each variety i ∈ [0, 1] is produced by a single firm in a monopolistically competitive
environment. Each firm i produces output using as factor inputs capital services, kit, and labor
services, hit. It is assumed that the firm must satisfy demand at the posted price. Formally,
kθit(Athit)
1−θ ≥
(
Pit
Pt
)−η
yt
The objective of the firm is to choose Pit, hit, kit to maximize the present discounted value of
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profits, given by
Et
∞∑
s=t
mt,sPsφis
where real profits of firm i are
φit ≡ Pit
Pt
yit − utkit − wthit
Prices are assumed to be sticky as in Calvo (1983). Each period, a fraction α ∈ [0, 1) of randomly
picked firms is not allowed to optimally set the nominal price of the good they produce. Instead,
these firms index their prices to past inflation according to the equation
Pit = Pit−1pi
χ
t−1.
Note, that in all settings χ = 0, which implies there is no price indexation. The remaining 1 − α
firms choose Pˇt to maximize the expected present discounted value of profits:
Et
∞∑
s=0
dt,t+sPt+sα
s
{(
Pˇt
Pt
)1−η s∏
k=1
(
piχt+k−1
pit+k
)1−η
yt+s − ut+skit+s − wt+shit+s
+mcit+s
(
kθit+s(Athit+s)
1−θ −
(
Pˇt
Pt
)−η s∏
k=1
(
piχt+k−1
pit+k
)−η
yt+s
)}
The firm’s first-order conditions for labor, capital, and optimal price are
mct(1− θ)( k˜t
ht
)θ = w˜t (A.5)
mctθ(
k˜t
ht
)θ−1 = ut (A.6)
The firm’s optimal price is set such that marginal revenues are equal to some markup over marginal
costs
η
η − 1x
1
t = x
2
t (A.7)
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where
x˜1t = p
∗−1−η
t y˜tmct + αEtDt,t+1pi
η+1
t+1 pi
χ(−η)
t
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−1−η
x˜1t+1e
∆at+1 (A.8)
x˜2t = p
∗−η
t y˜t + αEtDt,t+1pi
η
t+1pi
χ(1−η)
t
(
p∗t
p∗t+1
)−η
x˜2t+1e
∆at+1 (A.9)
Aggregation and Equilibrium. This period’s price level is a weighted average of the firm’s
optimal price and the previous period’s price level:
1 = αpi−1+ηt pi
χ(1−η)
t−1 + (1− α)p∗(1−η) (A.10)
It can be shown that the resource costs of inefficient price dispersion are characterized as follows
st = (1− α)p∗−ηt + α
(
pit
piχt−1
)η
st−1 (A.11)
Given the price dispersion, output is described by
y˜t =
1
st
[k˜θt (Atht)
1−θ] (A.12)
and aggregate demand is the following sum
y˜t = c˜t + i˜t + g˜t (A.13)
A.2 Optimal Inertia Coefficient
In the New Keynesian model, forward-looking expectations are a crucial component through
which monetary policy can influence the economy. This is because consumption and investment
(i.e., aggregate demand) are dependent upon not just the current real interest rate, but also all
future expected real interest rates. Given that the policymaker in my model is committing to a rule
in which it has complete credibility, monetary policy is fully capable of altering the expectations
of the households and firms.
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Since firms are forward looking when resetting their prices, inflation (which is a function of
the firms optimal prices) will not rise by as much if the firms are promised by monetary policy
that future output gaps and marginal costs will be lower (which is what commitment allows).
This improves the short-run trade-off between inflation and output and is the reason that policies
under commitment welfare-dominate discretionary policies. It is in this spirit that a positive inertia
coefficient could potentially improve welfare.
With a positive inertia coefficient, dependence on a lagged term permits the policy maker to
manipulate long-term interest rates with more modest movements in the short-term rate than would
otherwise be necessary. One way to influence the future path of short-term rates is to maintain a
higher level of interest rates for a period of time after they have been raised. Hence, given the
agents’ forward-looking expectations, monetary policy can impose significant effects on aggregate
demand without using extremely volatile movements in the short-term interest rate. In my model,
a high coefficient on the lagged interest rate reduces the variance of both inflation and consumption
growth, and the optimal value is 0.9.
A.3 Asymmetric, persistent responses to long-run shocks
If all of the above dynamics were symmetric with respect to positive and negative shocks, pol-
icy would have no impact on the stochastic steady state of any of the endogenous variables. The
second-order approximation is crucial because it captures nonlinearities that are inherent to the
data. Nonlinearities imply asymmetric responses of endogenous variables. This potential asym-
metry means that a greater variance can impact the steady-state values of variables such as the
average markup, which is important for my welfare analysis.
Figure A1 shows the response of inflation and the average markup to both a positive and neg-
ative shock. The differences in responses have been magnified for pedagogical reasons. The red
line is the difference in magnitude between the positive and negative long-run shock for the model
with a high IES. It is clear that the red line follows the negative shock, which implies that the
negative shock dominates. The magnitude of the difference is greater for the high IES model than
for the low IES model. In the high IES model, the more forward-looking firms are choosing a
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Figure A1: Asymmetric Responses to Positive and Negative Long-Run Shock
This figure shows the asymmetric endogenous responses to a negative long-run productivity shock on inflation and
the markup. The parameterization is based on the calibration in table 4.1 and focuses on the policy that yields the
highest welfare in equation 2.4. The colored line shows the difference between the positive and negative shocks.
This asymmetry is greatest for the high IES setting and decreases with a low IES or high inflation coefficient. The
implication is that the steady state markup will be close to the markup that occurs in the linear, symmetric setting. The
negative shock dominating for the high IES implies that the average markup would be lower in that setting.
higher optimal price in response to the long-run negative productivity shock, and this erodes the
average markup to a greater extent. The responses are practically symmetric with respect to the
setting with a high inflation coefficient. This implies that the steady-state markup will be close to
the markup that would occur in a linear, symmetric setting. Although not shown, the first-order
approximations were perfectly symmetrical so the difference was precisely zero for every period.
A.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In terms of robustness, I test how sensitive the optimal inflation volatility and optimal infla-
tion coefficients are to changes in the risk aversion coefficient and the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. Figure A2 shows that both a high IES (ψ = 2) and high risk aversion (γ = 10) are
necessary for monetary policy to find it optimal to place less weight on stabilizing inflation. As
these two parameters rise, monetary policy finds it optimal to stabilize consumption to a greater
extent to lessen the severity of recessions and also to more effectively reduce the markup in bad
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times.
First- vs. Second-Order Approximation, Low IES
The first studies of New Keynesian monetary policy (e.g. Goodfriend and King (1997), Wood-
ford (2001)) used linear approximations. Studies thereafter used second-order approximations (e.g.
Kollmann (2008), Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2007)) and they came to the same conclusions: it is
optimal to focus solely on stabilizing inflation. All of the studies mentioned use standard prefer-
ences, where the IES is low and typically below one because it represents the inverse of the risk
aversion coefficient.
To understand the negligible difference, note that the second-order approximation captures the
effect of the variance of future shocks. Given the relatively low patience of the agent, it stands to
reason that future effects would play a minor role in determining the optimal allocations, and this
is confirmed by the impulse response functions in Figure A3. Overall, my findings suggest that
one should expect to see very little difference in dynamics and outcomes when moving from first
order to second order for a model with a low IES and relatively high risk free rate. This finding
is roughly consistent with the notion that the typical macroeconomic model that abstracts from
financial data can be well approximated with a first-order approximation.
First- vs. Second-Order Approximation, High IES
There are sizable differences between the first- and second-order approximations for the high
IES (ψ = 2) case, as shown in Figure A3. The growth of the consumption-leisure bundle reacts
more and does not revert to steady state as quickly as the first-order approximation. This is intu-
itive, because the second-order approximation yields a greater motive for precautionary savings,
so that the agent works more and decreases leisure more at the onset of bad news. Firms also be-
come more forward looking and are choose much higher prices as the negative productivity shock
continues well into the future. For the second-order approximation, the average markup no longer
quickly reverts to steady state but instead stays low for an extended period of time.
By taking into account the future shocks to the variance along with a greater precautionary sav-
ings motive, the second-order approximation implies much lower average markups are associated
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with negative long-run productivity shocks. Recall that the average markup acts as an implicit tax
on factors of production, so that a decrease in its value is positive for welfare. This substantial drop
in the average markup is missing from the previous section that focuses on the low IES and is also
missing in the literature. By allowing inflation to rise so that the average markup falls, monetary
policy is providing good long-run news to counter the bad productivity shock.
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Figure A2: Effects of Increasing IES and Risk Aversion with Long-Run Shocks Only
This figure shows the effects of increasing the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and risk aversion. The setting
is a world with only long-run shocks to productivity. The other coefficients are set to match the rule that yields the
highest welfare for the high IES (ψ = 2) and high risk aversion (γ = 10) case as in table 4.1. The higher IES increases
the patience of households and lowers the risk-free rate. This also makes firms more forward looking and reduces
the average markup. The lower markup combined with the greater sensitivity of consumption to changes in real rates
leads to higher optimal inflation volatility and a lower inflation coefficient as the IES rises, as shown in the bottom
two panels. The higher risk aversion increases the equity premium, which coincides with higher welfare costs of
recessions.
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Figure A3: First- vs. Second-Order Approximation: Negative Long-Run Shock
This figure shows the effects of a negative long-run productivity shock on the three key channels for welfare: inflation volatility, markup, and consumption-leisure
volatility. The parameterization is based on the calibration in table 4.1 and around the policy that yields the highest welfare in equation 2.4. When moving from a
first- to second-order approximation, if the IES is low, the differences are negligible. If the IES is high, the effect on the average markup is significant.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3: TAXES, SPENDING, AND MARKET RETURNS
B.1 Equity Return Decomposition: Derivation
Below is the derivation following Campbell and Shiller (1988) and Campbell (1991) that is
based on the accounting definition of the stock return. The stock return is defined as
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
(B.1)
where Pt represents the price at time t, andDt represents the dividend. This equation can be written
using the price-dividend ratio and the dividend growth rate, such that
Rt+1 =
Pt+1 +Dt+1
Pt
=
Pt+1
Dt
Dt+1
Dt+1
+ Dt+1
Dt
Pt
Dt
=
(1 + PDt+1)∆Dt+1
PDt
(B.2)
where going from the first line to the second line, everything was divided by Dt. Going from the
second line to the third line, Pt
Dt
≡ PDt+1 and ∆Dt+1 represents the dividend growth rate.
Logs can be taken to both sides so that
rt+1 = ∆dt+1 + log(1 + e
pdt+1)− pdt (B.3)
where lower case variables indicate log-versions of the original variable i.e. log(Rt+1) ≡ rt+1.
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This leads to a nonlinear function log(1 + epdt+1) that can be log-linearized as follows
log(1 + epdt+1) ≈ log(1 + epd) + e
pd
1 + epd
(pdt+1 − pd)
= log(1 + epd)− e
pd
1 + epd
pd+
epd
1 + epd
pdt+1
=κ0 + ρ · pdt+1
(B.4)
where κ0 = log(1 + epd)− epd1+epd · pd and ρ = e
pd
1+epd
Plug this back into the definition of the return
rt+1 ≈ ∆dt+1 + κ0 + ρ · pdt+1 − pdt (B.5)
and solve the difference equation forward, imposing terminal condition
lim
j→∞
ρj · pdt+j = 0 (B.6)
and you end up with
pdt =
κ0
1− ρ +
∞∑
j=0
ρj [∆dt+1+j − rt+1+j] (B.7)
Note this is simply an approximate dynamic accounting identity. Take the difference in expecta-
tions between time t and t+1 to both sides
(Et+1 − Et)pdt = (Et+1 − Et)
[
κ0
1− ρ +
∞∑
j=0
ρj [∆dt+1+j − rt+1+j]
]
0 = (Et+1 − Et)
[ ∞∑
j=0
ρj [∆dt+1+j − rt+1+j]
]
(B.8)
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Then split up the two terms and isolate the term rt+1 by taking it out of the sum
(Et+1 − Et)rt+1 = (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj [∆dt+1+j]− (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρj [rt+1+j] (B.9)
rt+1 − Et(rt+1) = (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj [∆dt+1+j]− (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρj [rt+1+j] (B.10)
The equity return rt can be further decomposed into the sum of a risk-free rate and an excess return
rt+1 = rreal,t+1 + rex,t+1 (B.11)
Plugging this into the equation for the unexpected return
rreal,t+1 + rex,t+1 − Et(rreal,t+1 + rex,t+1) =(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j
− (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρj [rreal,t+1 + rex,t+1]
(B.12)
But we assume that rreal,t+1 is known at time t, so the unexpected excess return rexr,t+1−Et(rexr,t+1)
is the same as the overall unexpected return rt+1 − Et(rt+1), hence
rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) =(Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=0
ρj∆dt+1+j − (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrreal,t+1
− (Et+1 − Et)
∞∑
j=1
ρjrex,t+1
(B.13)
which is equivalent to
rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1) = NCF,t+1 −Nex,t+1 −Nreal,t+1 (B.14)
146
B.2 Bond Return Decomposition: Derivation
The log nominal 1-period holding return on a bond with n periods to maturity at time t, held
from t to t+1, as
rbn,t+1 = pn−1,t+1 − pn,t (B.15)
This can be solved forward to the maturity date of the bond, and at this date the bond price is unity
so that its log price is zero (p0,t+n = 0) which means
pn,t = −
[
rbn,t+1 + · · ·+ rbt+n
]
=−
n−1∑
j=0
rbn−i,t+1+i
(B.16)
Taking the difference of expectations between t and t+1 and isolating the t+1 nominal bond return
yields
rbn,t+1 − Etrbn,t+1 = −(Et+1 − Et)
n−1∑
j=1
rbn−i,t+1+i (B.17)
The nominal bond holding return can be written as the sum of the real interest rate, inflation, and
excess return
rbn,t+1 = r
b,ex
n,t+1 + pit+1 + rreal,t+1 (B.18)
We then plug this into unexpected nominal return above and write the equation in terms of the
unexpected excess bond return. Note the summations for inflation and real interest rates could
start at zero rather than 1, and the equation would remain valid. The two extra terms would cancel
out because they add to the nominal interest rate, which is known at time t.
rb,exn,t+1 − Etrb,exn,t+1 =(Et+1 − Et)
[
−
n−1∑
j=1
rb,exn−i,t+1+i −
n−1∑
j=1
pit+1+i −
n−1∑
j=1
rreal,t+1
]
=−N b,ext+1 −Npi,t+1 −Nreal,t+1
(B.19)
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B.3 Variance Decomposition Results
B.3.1 Variance Decomposition for Excess Stock Returns
Table B.4 provides the variance decomposition implied by the VAR for excess stock returns.
The variance decomposition can be derived as follows:
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)] =V ar (NCF,t+1) + V ar (Nex,t+1) + V ar (Nreal,t+1)
− 2Cov (NCF,t+1, Nex,t+1)− 2Cov (NCF,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
+ 2Cov (Nex,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
(B.20)
which in percentage terms is given by
1 =
V ar (NCF,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)] +
V ar (Nex,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)] +
V ar (Nreal,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)]
− 2Cov (NCF,t+1, Nex,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)] −
2Cov (NCF,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)]
+
2Cov (Nex,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
V ar [rex,t+1 − Et(rex,t+1)]
(B.21)
where it is clear the weights can be greater than one in absolute value.
Similar to Campbell and Ammer (1993) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 92% of the variance
of stock returns is attributed to the variance of news about future excess returns for the full sample.
This represents a sizable contrast to the variance of news about future real interest rates and divi-
dends, which explain only 3% and 8% respectively. Regardless of the time period, the variance of
news about future excess returns dominates the news about future real interest rates and dividends
in terms of the decomposition. The often cited reason (see (Campbell 1991)) for the dominance
of future excess return news is that changes in expected excess returns are highly persistent. This
persistence comes from the dividend price ratio, which is a state variable used in our VAR.
The bottom three rows of Table B.4 give the implied R-squared statistic for simple regressions
of the unexpected stock return on each news component. Compared to the full sample period,
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both of the Post-Volcker periods (beginning in 1980) yield sizably higher R-squared values for the
dividend news and real interest rate news. This is the only major difference across time periods
and can be attributed to the increased forecastability of real interest rates and dividends in the later
time periods.
B.3.2 Variance Decomposition for Excess Bond Returns
Table B.5 provides the variance decomposition implied by the VAR for excess bond returns.
The variance decomposition can be derived as follows:
V ar [rBond ex,t+1 − Et(rBond ex,t+1)] =V ar (Npi,t+1) + V ar (NBond ex,t+1) + V ar (Nreal,t+1)
+ 2Cov (Npi,t+1, NBond ex,t+1)
+ 2Cov (Npi,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
+ 2Cov (Nreal,t+1, Nreal,t+1)
(B.22)
For every sample, the R-squared for the simple regression of the unexpected bond return on
inflation dominates. However, the share of variation explained by future inflation news falls by
a factor of ten when moving from Pre-Volcker to Post-Volcker. This is a logical consequence of
the significantly greater inflation volatility in the earlier period. The change in monetary policy is
most evident with the measure of covariance between inflation news and real interest rate news.
A monetary policy that does not forcefully respond to higher inflation would result in lower real
interest rates being associated with higher inflation, which is consistent with our findings for the
Pre-Volcker era. In the Post-Volcker era, monetary policy strongly reacts to inflation by raising
nominal rates by a greater amount than inflation. From a theoretical point of view, this would
be equivalent to a coefficient on inflation that is greater than one in the monetary policy reaction
function, resulting in a positive covariance between inflation and real interest rate news.
Other items worth mentioning include the intuitive result that higher inflation news is negatively
correlated with future excess bond return news across all time periods. This is in contrast to the
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change in sign (depending on the time period) for the covariance of real interest rate news and
future excess bond returns. The change in sign could again be attributed to the change in monetary
policy. Higher future real interest rates indicate future capital losses, but if higher real interest rate
news is associated with lower expected inflation news, as is the case in the Pre-Volcker era, then
it is possible for higher future real interest rates to have a positive covariance with future excess
bond returns. The opposite occurs during the Post-Volcker era, where the capital losses channel
dominates as higher expected inflation news co-varies positively with higher real interest rate news
so that both effects move in the same direction.
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Table B.1: VAR Coefficients for Excess Stock Returns
This table reports the coefficients of equation 3.13 using quarterly variables that include excess stock returns. The six-variable VAR(1)
used to construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. The
VAR state variables are defined in the text. The φ coefficients denote the response to the contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks defined
in the text. Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
rex,t−1 rreal,t−1 ∆rt−1 SPREADt−1
dt−1 −
pt−1
RELt−1 ∆Dt−1 φtaxt φ
defense
t
Panel A: 1947q1-2012q4
rex,t 0.091 0.014 0.154 0.518 3.146∗ −0.620 – 1.771 0.118
rreal,t −0.006 0.356∗∗∗ −0.091 −0.088 −0.222 −0.162 – 0.727 −0.143∗
∆rt 0.015∗∗ −0.005 −0.088 0.083 0.053 0.010 – −0.437 0.003
SPREADt −0.007 0.005 −0.020 0.837∗∗∗ −0.058 0.009 – 0.317 0.000
dt − pt −0.001 −0.002 −0.004 −0.004 0.977∗∗∗ 0.011 – −0.017 0.001
RELt 0.015∗∗ −0.004 0.056 0.101∗ 0.060 0.590∗∗∗ – −0.332 0.004
∆Dt 0.115∗∗ – – – 0.048 – 0.614∗∗∗ 1.099 0.442∗∗
Panel B: 1947q1-1980q2
rex,t 0.077 0.254 0.864 0.393 8.193∗∗ −1.814 – −3.772 0.109
rreal,t 0.015 0.340
∗∗∗ 1.539∗∗∗ −0.326 −2.271∗ −1.315∗∗ – 2.032∗ −0.105
∆rt 0.005 −0.006 0.098 0.201 −0.442 −0.118 – −0.338 0.007
SPREADt 0.005 0.001 −0.182∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗ 0.334 0.091 – 0.252 −0.006
dt − pt 0.000 −0.003∗ −0.015 0.002 0.947∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗ – 0.041 0.001
RELt 0.005 −0.001 0.287∗∗∗ 0.214∗ −0.406 0.459∗∗∗ – −0.301 0.007
∆Dt 0.082 – – – 1.977 – 0.459∗∗∗ 1.270 0.486∗
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Table B.2: VAR Coefficients for Excess Stock Returns (cont.)
rex,t−1 rreal,t−1 ∆rt−1 SPREADt−1
dt−1 −
pt−1
RELt−1 ∆Dt−1 φtaxt φ
defense
t
Panel C: 1980q3-2012q4
rex,t 0.081 −0.160 −0.006 0.137 2.808 −0.289 – 7.762∗∗ −0.362
rreal,t −0.012 0.038 −0.375 −0.731∗∗∗ 3.166∗∗∗ 0.025 – −2.132 −0.454
∆rt 0.019∗ 0.012 −0.148 0.127 −0.047 0.093 – −0.390 −0.021
SPREADt −0.013 −0.005 0.025 0.806∗∗∗ 0.015 −0.038 – 0.235 0.084
dt − pt −0.001 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 0.969∗∗∗ 0.006 – −0.078∗∗ 0.002
RELt 0.018∗∗ 0.012 −0.007 0.144∗∗ −0.046 0.662∗∗∗ – −0.202 −0.007
∆Dt 0.141∗∗∗ – – – −0.787 – 0.832∗∗∗ 1.135 −0.144
Panel D: 1980q3-2008q2
rex,t 0.023 −0.073 0.097 0.203 2.172 −0.634 – 8.236∗∗ −0.918
rreal,t −0.010 0.093 −0.418 −0.502∗ 2.935∗∗∗ 0.220 – −2.151∗ −0.322
∆rt 0.025∗ −0.006 −0.136 0.137 −0.026 0.087 – −0.433 −0.044
SPREADt −0.019∗ 0.004 0.008 0.794∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.028 – 0.251 0.070
dt − pt 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 −0.001 0.978∗∗∗ 0.009 – −0.083∗∗ 0.009
RELt 0.024∗∗ −0.008 0.003 0.155∗ −0.025 0.660∗∗∗ – −0.252 −0.026
∆Dt 0.132∗∗∗ – – – 0.098 – 0.644∗∗∗ 1.572 −0.205
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Table B.3: VAR Coefficients for Excess Bond Returns
This table reports the coefficients of equation 3.13 using quarterly variables that include excess bond returns. The five-variable VAR(1)
used to construct excess equity return and real interest rate forecasts is estimated over the sample indicated in the column headings. The
VAR state variables are defined in the text. The φ coefficients denote the response to the contemporaneous fiscal policy shocks defined
in the text. Standard errors are calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10
percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
rBond ex,t−1 rreal,t−1 pit−1 SPREADt−1 CREDITt−1 φtaxt φ
defense
t
Panel A: 1947q1-2012q4
rBond ex,t −0.085 0.940∗∗∗ 0.028 −0.544 0.047 1.130 −0.035
rreal,t 0.008 0.764
∗∗∗ −0.023 0.494∗∗∗ −0.033∗ 0.304 −0.005
pit −0.014 −0.112 0.315∗∗∗ 0.745 −0.103 0.521 −0.153∗
SPREADt −0.005∗∗ 0.003 0.006 0.843∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.075 −0.001
CREDITt −0.014 −0.124∗∗ −0.023 −0.045 0.893∗∗∗ −0.512∗ 0.046
Panel B: 1947q1-1980q2
rBond ex,t −0.249∗∗∗ 0.221 −0.074 2.778∗∗ −0.166 0.248 −0.023
rreal,t 0.015 0.643
∗∗∗ −0.021 0.940∗∗∗ −0.020 0.109 −0.004
pit −0.069 −0.232 0.132 1.337 −0.386∗∗∗ 1.733 −0.158∗
SPREADt −0.011∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ −0.002 0.971∗∗∗ 0.007 0.055 −0.001
CREDITt −0.021 −0.416∗∗∗ −0.074∗ 0.603 0.863∗∗∗ −0.946∗∗ 0.040
Panel C: 1980q3-2012q4
rBond ex,t −0.019 1.102∗∗ −0.031 −2.116 0.307 0.309 −0.649
rreal,t 0.006 0.719
∗∗∗ −0.019 0.346∗ −0.113∗∗∗ 0.285 0.059
pit 0.014 −0.122 0.204∗∗ −0.424 0.569∗∗∗ −2.159 −0.620∗∗
SPREADt −0.002 0.021 0.002 0.766∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.015
CREDITt −0.012 −0.049 0.019 −0.254 0.836∗∗∗ −0.265 0.119
Panel D: 1980q3-2008q2
rBond ex,t −0.064 0.774∗ 0.084 −0.852 −0.066 0.842 −0.131
rreal,t 0.010 0.702
∗∗∗ −0.031 0.511∗ −0.139∗∗∗ 0.315 0.038
pit 0.008 −0.167 0.207∗∗ 0.814 0.308 −1.752 −0.563∗
SPREADt −0.007∗∗ 0.001 −0.001 0.827∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ −0.007 0.009
CREDITt −0.015 −0.055 0.011 0.042 0.829∗∗∗ −0.176 0.075
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Table B.4: Variance Decomposition for Excess Stock Returns
This table is based on a quarterly VAR that includes excess stock return, real interest rate, change in
the 3-month bill rate, 10-year and 3-month yield spread, log dividend-price ratio, and relative bill
rate (the difference between the bill rate and a 12-month backwards moving average). Return R2
is the implied R2 in a regression of the excess stock return on the VAR explanatory variables. The
VAR is used to calculate the components of the unexpected excess stock return. The components
are divided up into NCF , news about future cash-flows or dividends; Nreal is news about future
real interest rates; Nexr is news about future excess stock returns. The table provides the variances
and covariances of each component, normalized by the variance of the current unexpected excess
return, and the numbers reported add up to one. The bottom three rows give the R2 statistics for
simple regressions of the unexpected excess return on each news component. Standard errors are
calculated by the bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at
the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Return R2 0.052 0.136 0.030 0.031
Shares of:
V ar(NCF ) 0.090
∗∗∗ 0.330 0.094 0.073
−2Cov(NCF , Nreal) −0.021 0.161 0.071 0.084
−2Cov(NCF , Nexr) 0.078 −1.410 0.244 0.237
V ar(Nreal) 0.032
∗∗ 0.077 0.068 0.052
+2Cov(Nexr, Nreal) −0.104 −0.689 0.190 0.197
V ar(Nexr) 0.925∗∗∗ 2.530 0.332 0.357∗
R2 (NCF ) 0.156 0.262
∗ 0.675∗∗∗ 0.746∗∗∗
R2 (Nreal) 0.029 0.451
∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.713∗∗∗
R2 (Nexr) 0.900∗∗∗ 0.867∗∗∗ 0.909∗∗∗ 0.923∗∗∗
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Table B.5: Variance Decomposition for Excess Bond Returns
This table is based on a quarterly VAR that includes excess bond return, real interest rate, change in
the 3-month bill rate, 10-year and 3-month yield spread, log dividend-price ratio, and relative bill
rate (the difference between the bill rate and a 12-month backwards moving average). Return R2
is the implied R2 in a regression of the excess stock return on the VAR explanatory variables. The
VAR is used to calculate the components of the unexpected excess bond return. The components
are divided up into Npi, news about future inflation; Nreal is news about future real interest rates;
Nexr is news about future excess bond returns. The table provides the variances and covariances
of each component, normalized by the variance of the current unexpected excess return, and the
numbers reported add up to one. The bottom three rows give theR2 statistics for simple regressions
of the unexpected excess return on each news component. Standard errors are calculated by the
bootstrap algorithm discussed in Section 3.3. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote significance at the 10 percent, 5
percent and 1 percent levels respectively.
Time Periods: 1947q1 - 2012q4 1947q1 - 1980q2 1980q3 - 2012q4 1980q3 - 2008q2
Return R2 0.055 0.065 0.076 0.049
Shares of:
V ar(Npi) 3.965∗∗ 8.556 0.843 0.813∗
+2Cov(Npi , Nreal) −1.114 −7.088 1.389∗ 1.011∗
+2Cov(Npi , Nexr) −5.020∗ −7.324 −2.192 −1.898
V ar(Nreal) 0.245 1.577 0.599 0.361
+2Cov(Nexr, Nreal) 0.270 3.161 −1.970 −1.438
V ar(Nexr) 2.654∗∗ 2.119 2.331∗ 2.151∗∗
R2 (Npi) 0.204∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.168∗
R2 (Nreal) 0.128 0.095 0.159 0.060
R2 (Nexr) 0.029 0.001 0.027 0.108
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4: INFLATING AWAY DEBT: TRADING OFF INFLATION RISK
AND TAXATION RISK
C.1 Welfare Effects of Tax Risk and Equity Risk
Isolating welfare effect of tax risk. In order to isolate the welfare effect of increased tax risk,
I will impose an exogenous shock on the tax rate to compare how it affects welfare in the Power
Utility and Main Model. Specifically, I place a shock in the following equation and I increase its
volatility to determine its effect on welfare.
τt = τ
D
t · yt + τ
The purpose of this exercise is simply to measure the welfare impact of increased tax rate un-
certainty. Note the total amount of tax revenues is pinned down by another equation (τt − τ∗ =
γ1(Bt−1 −B∗)), so that the key variable is the tax rate τDt .
I find that for a given 25 basis point exogenous increase in tax volatility, the Main Model’s
welfare falls 2.25 times more than the Power Utility model. This is because the Main Model’s
consumption-leisure bundle becomes more volatile as a result of the higher intertemporal elas-
ticity of substitution. With a higher IES, the agent is more willing to substitute both leisure and
consumption to the future, so that the lower distortionary tax rate leads to a greater decrease in
leisure (increase in labor) combined with a small increase in consumption (investment sizably in-
creases due to substitution effect with IES> 1). This leads to the consumption-leisure bundle
significantly falling in the first period. In the following period with the tax cut expired, both con-
sumption and leisure are higher (investment and labor fall) which both significantly increase the
consumption-leisure bundle. The volatility of the growth of consumption-leisure bundle increases
by 10 basis points under the Main Model while it only increases 0.4 basis points under the Power
Utility model. The higher volatility of the consumption-leisure bundle leads to lower welfare due
to concave utility.
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Isolating welfare effect of equity risk. In order to isolate the welfare effect of increased equity
risk, I will impose an exogenous shock on the return of capital that is perfectly correlated with the
short run shock. This will result in a higher equity return in good times, which will increase the
equity premium.
The exogenous equity shock increases the equity premium by approximately 4 percent in both
models. This entails an increase from 6.9 basis points to 7.2 basis points for the Power Utility
model, and 3.81 to 3.96 percent in the Main Model. However, the impacts on welfare are quite
different. Welfare falls by 0.66 basis points for the Main Model while welfare falls by 0.02 basis
points in the Power Utility model. Therefore, the fall in welfare for the Main Model is approxi-
mately 33 times larger than the fall in welfare for the Power Utility model with respect to increased
equity risk. What explains the difference in welfare? The increased cost of capital depresses cap-
ital accumulation. Lower capital accumulation means less consumption, less welfare. and in the
Main Model, the stochastic steady state level of capital falls 41 basis points. In comparison, the
Power Utility model’s steady state level of capital falls by 0.6 basis points. So in percentage terms,
steady state capital falls approximately 70 times more in the Main Model. This explains why the
fall in welfare is 33 times greater for an exogenous increase in the equity premium.
To summarize, the Main Model’s fall in welfare due to increased tax risk is 2.25 times greater
and 33 times greater for increased equity risk. The two exercises of isolating the welfare effects of
each risk provide ample evidence for why optimal inflation volatility is much higher in the Main
Model. The increased tax and equity risk eventually dominate the benefits of decreased inflation
risk.
The effect of faster repayment of debt. By increasing γ1 = 0.2, 0.4, 0.6 in the equation τt −
τ∗ = γ1(Bt−1 − B∗), tax risk is increasing due to the higher tax volatility. Optimal tax volatility
in the Main Model jumps from 1.21 to 1.51 to 1.89. Likewise, the optimal inflation volatility also
increases from 0.21 to 0.31 to 0.49. Optimal inflation volatility is increasing with the speed of
repayment because more and more debt can be retired through surprise bouts of inflation. More
debt can be retired through unexpected inflation because debt becomes less persistent because it is
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paid off quicker. In contrast, the results for Power Utility preferences do not change, as it is still
optimal to have zero inflation volatility regardless of the speed of repayment.
The effect of price indexation. When price indexation is turned off, the optimal inflation volatil-
ity is zero for the Main Model, just as in the Power Utility model. Without indexation, firms that
are not able to optimally choose their price will keep the same price in the previous year. This
significantly increases price dispersion in the model. For instance, there will be significant welfare
costs when annual inflation is 2%, which seems extreme. With full indexation, the firm that is
unable to optimally choose its price is allowed to update its price based on the previous period’s
inflation rate. The welfare costs of price dispersion are still present, but costs come from acceler-
ation of inflation rather than the level. In addition, there exists empirical evidence supporting full
price indexation (Giannoni and Woodford 2003).
C.2 Detailed description of the government and bond market
The government’s goal is to use monetary policy to determine the optimal inflation volatility. I
take fiscal policy as given, spending exogenous amounts and changing taxes sufficiently to main-
tain equilibrium so that debt does not explode to infinity. The speed with which fiscal policy repays
taxes is set conservatively to ensure that the debt to GDP ratio has a high autocorrelation (as in the
data) and not to overstate the tax-rate volatility. In the benchmark model, the tax rate volatility is
less than 1.5%, which is half of the observed volatility in the data. The fiscal rule for taxation, after
adjusting for growth, is assumed to be
Tt − T ∗ = γ1(Bt−1e−∆at −B∗e−µ)
where Tt = τDt Yt reflects tax revenues from income taxes.
The budget constraint of the fiscal branch of government in nominal terms is the following
identity:
BTt = Gt + (1 + it−1)B
T
t−1 − Tt −RCBt
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The left hand side is the interest bearing debt issued today (the superscript T denotes total debt,
assumed to be one period maturity), Gt is government expenditures on goods and services, Tt is
total tax revenues, it−1 is the nominal interest rate, and RCBt is the direct receipts from the central
bank. These direct receipts consist of interest earnings on the U.S. Federal Reserves portfolio of
government debt, which it gives back to the treasury.
The budget constraint of the central bank in nominal terms is the following identity:
BMt −BMt−1 +RCBt = it−1BMt−1 +Mt − (1 + imt−1)Mt−1
BMt − BMt−1 is equal to the central bank’s purchases of government debt (the change in assets),
it−1BMt−1 is the interest paid from the treasury to the central bank (change in capital), Mt is the
central bank’s own liabilities or base money, and imt−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on base
money balances held at the end of period t-1.
Note that from the perspective of the government, only debt held by the public represents an
interest-bearing liability. By letting Bt = BT −BMt be the amount of interest bearing debt held by
the public, the budget identities of the fiscal branch and central bank can be combined to produce
the government budget constraint
Bt = Gt + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 − Tt − (Mt − (1 + imt−1)Mt−1)
Letting lowercase letters denote real terms, the budget constraint can be rewritten as
bt = gt + ((1 + it−1))/pitbt−1 − tt − (mt − ((1 + imt−1))/pitmt−1)
In the current setting, the household budget constraint is defined as follows
bt + ct + ivt +mt =
(1 + it−1)
pit
bt−1 +
(1 + imt−1)
pit
mt−1 + (1− τDt )(wtht + utkt) + δqtτDt kt + φt
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Note, there are also an infinite number of state-contingent securities that the agent may trade
due to the assumption of complete markets. According to Woodford (2003), since any pattern of
future state-contingent payoffs that a household may desire can be arranged (for the appropriate
price), the household’s budget constraint can be written without any explicit reference to the quan-
tities that it holds of these particular assets. Furthermore, if there are redundant assets, there will
not be determinate demands for individual assets (the assumption in the case of the monetary base).
In the standard setting with monetary transactions frictions, monetary policy can be carried out
either through paying interest on reserves or by varying the money supply. It is typically assumed
that there exists a demand for money, either due to the transaction friction or the utility derived
from transaction services. This results in a liquidity preference function that can be used to pin
down the price level for a given money supply. The central bank may freely choose any two of
the variables it, imt , and m
s
t , leaving the third to be endogenously determined by the liquidity
preference function. For instance, the current setting for the United States consists of setting
imt = 0, choosing a short-run target for it while allowing the monetary base to be endogenously
determined by the liquidity preference function.
In my model, I assume there is no non-pecuniary benefit to holding money balances and no
liquidity preference function. Furthermore, changes in the quantity of base money through open
market operations of government securities have no consequences for the equilibrium determina-
tion of interest rates or other variables, as base money is assumed to be a perfect substitute for
riskless government debt. In addition, the money supply does not appear in any equilibrium condi-
tions in my model and is assumed to be some positive exogenous process. Given that markets must
clear at all dates, the household’s demand for base money must equal the supply of base money.
Monetary policy implements an interest rate target by adjusting the return on base money
through the following monetary policy rule:
ln(imt /i
m∗) = αrln(imt−1/i
m∗) + αpiln(pit/pi∗) + α∆yln(∆yt/∆y∗)
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Figure A1: Monetary Policy and the Debt Market
This panel shows how monetary policy impacts the debt market and maintains control over the nominal rate
on bonds.
In addition, imt = it at all times due to the assumption of no arbitrage in equilibrium. Otherwise
an arbitrage opportunity exists. If imt > it, a household could finance unlimited consumption
by shorting riskless one-period government bonds, and using the proceeds partly to hold cash to
repay its debt in one period and partly to finance additional consumption. Since utility is strictly
increasing in consumption, an infinite amount of consumption is affordable and the household
would have no budget constraint.
Thus, the household optimally holds all public government debt, as not doing so would lead to
untapped profit opportunities that an optimizing agent would not pass up. In addition, any bond
demand curve that results in a price of the government bond in which imt 6= it results in an arbitrage
opportunity that cannot exist in equilibrium. The income remaining after purchasing the govern-
ment debt is optimally directed towards consumption and investment based on the intertemporal
Euler equation. A no Ponzi scheme transversality condition also holds so that the productivity
adjusted debt cannot be increased without bound.
The above scenario is specific to a setting where fiscal policy is passive and ensures the budget
balances, while monetary policy targets inflation. An alternative scenario, the Fiscal Theory of
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the Price Level (FTPL), would exist if monetary policy were passive and fiscal policy were active.
This would entail monetary policy not reacting to inflation, which would lead to an indeterminate
equilibrium if fiscal policy was also passive. However, fiscal policy is assumed to be active, so that
the budget constraint of the government pins down the price level so that today’s real debt is equal
to the sum of future surpluses. With active fiscal policy, inflation primarily adjusts in order for the
government’s budget constraint to hold.
The FTPL setting represents an extreme form of inflating away debt. Upon examining the
FTPL scenario, I found that inflation volatility is exceptionally high. This leads to costs of price
dispersion over fifty times greater than a similar setting with passive fiscal policy and active mon-
etary policy. Therefore, from a policy perspective, the welfare losses due to high price dispersion
make this policy far from optimal.
C.3 Alternative formulation for incorporating debt into monetary policy rule
As previously shown, the intertemporal Euler equation and the nominal interest rate rule can
be combined to form a stochastic difference equation that governs the evolution of inflation.
pit =
(
pi∗ + αG · ln
(
BYt
BY ∗
))
(
Et
[
Mt+1
pit+1
])−1
Rαrt−1R∗1−αr
(
∆yt
∆yss
)αy

1
αpi
Instead of implementing the effect of government debt through the inflation target, the debt
also can be incorporated separately as its own term into the Taylor Rule:
Rt
R∗
=
(
Rt−1
R∗
)αr ( pit
pi∗t
)αpi ( ∆yt
∆yss
)αy ( BYt
BY ∗
)αG
If this is the case, then inflation would be rewritten as
pit = (pi
∗)

(
Et
[
Mt+1
pit+1
])−1
Rαrt−1R∗1−αr
(
∆yt
∆yss
)αy (
BYt
BY ∗
)αG

1
αpi
where αG would now be negative if the goal of policy was for inflation to rise with deviations of the
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debt to output ratio. Given the similar structure of the stochastic difference equation for inflation,
it does not matter exactly how the debt to output ratio is incorporated.
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Table C.1: RECALIBRATED: Model Features and Parameter Values
Main
Model
Rec.
Prefs.
+LRR
Rec.
Prefs.
Power
Utility
Recursive Preferences X X X
Long Run Risk X X
Capital Vintages X
Preference parameters
Discount factor β 0.99 0.985 0.989 0.995
Effective risk aversion γ · o 10 10 10 2
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution ψ 2.0 2.0 2.0 1/2
Leisure weight o 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Technology parameters
Capital share θ 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Depreciation rate δ 12% 8% 8% 8%
Adjustment Costs on Capital τj 0 1.75 1.75 0
Productivity parameters
Risk exposure of new investment φ0 0 1 1 1
Average growth rate µ 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Volatility of short-run risk σa 3.71% 5.00% 5.25% 5.00%
Volatility of long-run risk σx 0.52% 0.52% 0% 0%
AR(1) of expected growth ρ 0.925 0.925 0.925 0.925
New Keynesian parameters
Price elasticity of demand η 7 7 7 7
Probability firm cannot change price α 10% 10% 10% 10%
Policy parameters
Steady state Debt to GDP SB 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44
Steady state G
Y
SG 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Monetary Policy Inflation Coefficient αpi 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
Output Growth Gap Coefficient α∆y 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Inertia Coefficient αr 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
The four models were re-calibrated to match the level of GDP risk, the level of the risk free rate, and the
equity premium if possible. Analysis indicates little to no changes in results upon re-calibrating.
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Table C.2: Calibrated and Uncalibrated Model Moments
Main EZ+LRR EZ+LRR EZ EZ Std. Std.
Data Model Uncalib. Calib. Uncalib. Calib. Uncalib. Calib.
E(I/Y ) 0.15 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.14
σ(∆c) 02.16 (0.17) 2.33 2.64 3.56 2.38 3.44 2.51 3.30
σ(∆i) 16.40 (1.26) 16.76 10.84 4.35 7.89 4.21 3.00 4.79
σ(∆n) 03.66 (0.29) 3.55 2.84 1.62 2.39 1.56 1.39 1.89
σ(∆y) 3.59 3.79 3.48 3.74 3.03 3.62 2.59 3.48
AC1(∆c) 0.49 0.34 0.24 0.31 0.13 0.21 0.23 0.22
AC1(∆y) 0.35 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.27 0.28
σ(τD) 3.1 1.19 1.07 0.98 1.10 1.06 1.20 1.23
AC1(
B
Y
) 0.94 0.90 0.92 0.92 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.91
E(pi) 3.5 2.26 2.52 2.20 3.44 3.13 3.10 2.93
σ(pi) 2.32 2.18 2.52 3.04 2.24 2.93 1.48 2.23
σ(rf ) 1.35 1.25 0.98 1.41 0.59 0.91 0.80 0.84
E[rf ] 00.89 1.55 1.47 1.20 1.90 1.16 6.03 5.35
E[rL,ex] 05.70 (2.25) 3.72 0.36 3.57 0.40 3.96 0.06 0.09
The four models were re-calibrated to match the level of GDP risk, the level of the risk free rate, and the
equity premium if possible. Analysis indicates little to no changes in results upon re-calibrating. All entries
for the models are obtained from repetitions of small samples. Data refer to the U.S. and include pre-World
War II observations (1930–2012). Annual calibrations are reported in Table C.1. Excess returns are levered
by a factor of three, consistent with Garcia-Feijo and Jorgensen (2010).
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